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tors	 and	 contributors	 of	 this	 volume.	 Such	 an	 apparently	 simple	 ques‐
tion,	however,	 is,	as	 these	pages	will	eloquently	and	 thoroughly	reveal,	
fraught	with	 complications	 and	oftentimes	petrifying	 ambiguities.	That	




ever,	 it	 is	 precisely	 those	 individuals	most	 intimately	 acquainted	with	
the	specific	conditions	of	poverty	who	are	most	limited	in	their	capacity	
to	 articulate	 and	 provide	 force	 to	 motivate	 the	 dissemination	 of	 their	





Poor	 from	Many	Lands2	 tend	 to	 play	 a	 decidedly	 secondary	 role	 in	 the	
formulation	 of	 policy	 and	 the	 scholarly	 and	 governmental	 understand‐
ings	of	poverty.	This	is,	of	course,	aside	from	the	fact	of	the	problematic	
terminology	 employed	 in	 the	 text	 beginning	with	 the	 title	 itself	 which	
attributes	the	presence	of	poverty	to	the	“poor”	who	are	implicitly	asso‐
ciated	with	this	quality	as	an	intrinsic	part	of	their	being.	
In	 part	 because	 of	 these	 limited	 if	 not	 blinkered	 perceptive	 capacities,	
scholars	 working	 on	 “the	 production	 of”	 poverty	 from	 a	 European	 or	
American	 academic	 post	 and	 background	 have	 tended	 to	 focus	 upon	
those	aspects	that	coordinate	most	closely	with	their	own	societies’	per‐
ceptions	 and	 preconceived	 notions	 as	 to	 what	 exactly	 is	 this	 elusive	
thing	called	“poverty.”		






existing	 poverty	 studies	 and	 the	 association	 of	 poverty	with	 economic	
conditions	and	status,	one	of	the	earliest	strategies	adopted	to	describe	
poverty	was	to	define	the	term	purely	in	its	quantitative	form.	One	of	the	
milestones	 achieved	 in	 this	 approach	was	defining	 absolute	poverty	 in	
the	1990s	as	“an	 individual	 living	on	 less	than	a	dollar	and	ninety‐nine	
cents	a	day.”	Such	notions	have	long	held	sway	in	the	minds	of	analysts	
and	 lay	 individuals	 throughout	 the	 globe,	 including	 in	many	 cases	 the	
very	 same	 communities	 that	were	 ostensibly	 under	 scrutiny.	 Such	 de‐
scriptive	tools	have	contributed,	of	course,	to	the	establishment	and	so‐
lidification	 of	 notions	 in	 development	 studies	 and	 policy	 organization	






an	 influx	 of	 capital	 in	 the	 form	 of	 foreign	 investment	 provided	with	 a	
plethora	of	strings	attached	by	the	IMF	or	the	WB	together	with	a	horde	
of	other	 international	aid	organizations	claiming	 to	have	 the	 resources	





inundations	 of	 capital,	 there	 are	 numerous	 other	 areas	 in	 which	 such	
apparently	good	intentions	once	again	led	both	aid	givers	and	recipients	
down	 the	proverbial	 road	 to	Hell.	 Efforts	 to	 alleviate	 corrupt	practices	
and	 the	 institutional	 presence	 of	 corruption	 in	 “developing”	 societies	






an	 even	 perfunctory	 acquaintance	with	 any	 developing	 geography	 and	




and	giving	 form	and	 force	 to	corruption	 in	 the	 “developing”	world,	 the	
system	of	 thought	now	known	as	Public	Choice	Theory	 came	 into	being	
through	the	work	of	scholars	such	as	Duncan	Black	and	Kenneth	Arrow	
in	 the	1940s	and	1950s.This	 theory	has	sought	 to	provide	a	 logical	ex‐
planation	 for	 the	enduring	presence	of	 corrupt	practices	 in	developing	
societies.	 Such	 explanations	 are	 designed	 to	move	beyond	 ideas	 of	 the	
ingrained	nature	of	corruption	as	social	practice	based	upon	immutable	
cultural	 principles.	 This	 retrograde	 conceptualization	 feeds,	 of	 course,	
upon	neocolonial	notions	of	communities	in	the	Global	South	at	the	same	
time	 as	 it	 is	 propagated	 in	 numerous	 spheres,	 including	 within	 the	
minds	and	mouths	of	members	of	these	societies	themselves.	The	works	
of	 scholars	 such	 as	 John	Mukum	Mbaku	 have	 gone	 a	 long	way	 toward	
debunking	 such	 misconceptions	 and	 have	 demonstrated	 the	 extent	 to	
which	 corrupt	practices	 are	 linked	 to	weak	 state	 structures,	misplaced	
intervention	by	 foreign	powers	and	corporations,	and	the	 impossibility	
of	 exacting	 punishment	 when	 corruption	 is	 carried	 out.	 Public	 Choice	
adherents,	 therefore,	 appeal	 for	 strengthening	 political	 mechanisms,	
treating	 corruption	 as	 a	 punishable	 offense—	 punishment	 severe	
enough	 to	 offset	 the	 benefits	which	 any	 individual	 or	 group	might	 re‐
ceive	from	engaging	in	such	practices.	
A	 similar	 depth	 of	 understanding	 needs	 to	 be	 sought	 in	 order	 to	 ade‐
quately	understand	the	nature	of	what	is	bandied	about	in	scholarly	and	
political	circles	when	poverty	is	under	consideration.	As	with	many	such	





encies	abound.	Seemingly,	 a	 logical	place	 to	start	 is	 from	the	 term	“the	
poor,”	which	 is	 frequently	employed	to	refer	to	 those	who	are	 living	 in	
poverty	 in	 a	particular	moment	or	over	 a	 given	period,	 individually	 or	
collectively.	 John	 Iliffe’s	book,	The	African	Poor:	A	History,	published	 in	
1987,	 eloquently	 describes	 this	 problem	 in	 the	Global	 South;	 Iliffe	 is	 a	
recipient	of	the	Melville	Herskovits	Prize.3	Iliffe	explains	that	“the	hero‐







“the	 poor”	 to	 describe	 those	 individuals	 living	 in	 poverty	 in	 Africa,	 he	
does	 simultaneously	 recognize	 that	 “the	 poor	 are	 diverse,	 poverty	 has	
many	 facets,	 and	 African	 peoples	 had	 their	 own	 varied	 and	 changing	
notions	of	it”	(2).	
At	the	risk	of	pointing	out	the	painfully	obvious,	it	will	be	helpful	to	con‐
sider	 the	 gravity	 of	 this	 terminological	 blunder	 when	 applied	 to	 such	
individuals,	families,	and	communities.	The	problem	inherent	in	such	an	
apparently	 neutral	 world	 is	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 term	 “the	
poor”attributes	those	characteristics	it	seeks	to	describe	the	people	un‐
der	consideration.	Use	of	 the	term	“the	poor”	assigns	a	quality	to	these	
individuals,	 but	 it	 also	 implies	 a	 series	 of	 secondary	 attributes	 which	
cannot	be	 accurately	 assessed	 and	 therefore	 should	be	 cautiously	 con‐
sidered	before	they	are	taken	for	granted.	
Perhaps	the	most	egregious	of	these	implied	messages	is	the	notion	that	








bert	Gans,	who,	 in	 a	1971	article	 in	Social	Policy,	 entitled	 “The	Uses	of	
Poverty:	 The	 Poor	Pay	All,”	 outlines	 the	numerous	ways	 in	which	 “the	
poor”	serve	strong	purposes	in	numerous	societies—purposes	which	he	
divides	 into	 “social,	 economic,	 and	 political”	 functions	 of	 great	 signifi‐
cance.4	This	is	a	version	of	humanity	and	its	societies	in	which	the	reality	
of	poverty	is	accepted	as	an	inevitable	and	seemingly	unalterable	facet	of	








there	 is	 no	 perceived	 necessity	 to	 ask	 those	 living	 with	 poverty	 what	
they	feel	about	their	benighted	(or	possibly	illuminated?)	condition.	The	
excellent	volume	of	essays	¿El	reino	de	Dios	es	de	este	mundo?	El	papel	
ambiguo	de	 las	religions	en	 la	 lucha	contra	 la	pobreza	 (2008)5	explores	
the	 implicit	 and	oftentimes	explicit	 role	of	 religions	 in	 reinforcing	eco‐









ic	 paradigm	 of	 inquiry	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 salient	 reasons.	 To	 begin	 with,	
such	 a	 limited	 understanding	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 “wealth”	 or	 capital,	 if	 you	
will,	 fails	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	myriad	 forms	which	 resources	may	
assume	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 individuals	 and	 groups	 throughout	 the	 globe,	






phenomenon.	 The	 chapters	 contained	 herein	 utilize	 a	 variety	 of	meth‐
ods,	 including	 both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 strategies,	 in	 order	 to	
illuminate	 the	various	and	changeable	natures	of	poverty	 in	 the	Global	
South.	One	element	which	they	all	have	in	common,	however,	is	an	em‐





ies	 undertaken	 in	 this	 volume	 seek	 to	 study	 poverty	 in	 an	 integrative	
manner,	 maintaining	 a	 comprehensive	 vision	 throughout.	 The	 lives	 of	





mense	 variety	 of	 social	 factors,	 forces,	 and	 histories.	 These	 elements	
exist	at	personal,	 local,	national,	and	international	levels,	often	simulta‐





subjective	 and	 objective,	 scientific	 and	 emotional.	 The	 responses	 that	
people	have	to	their	lives	can	and	should	be	a	central	part	of	our	efforts	
to	explore	the	geographies	of	poverty	and	to	ameliorate	 the	severity	of	
these	 circumstances.	 Such	 a	 variegated	 approach	 to	 poverty	 as	 both	
problem	and	reality	allows	all	parties	 involved	to	be	heard	and	consid‐




Pérez	 Bustillo	 explores	 how	 hegemonic	 versions	 of	 human	 rights	 dis‐
course	 and	 practices	 undermine	 contemporary	 struggles	 for	 social	
transformation	 and	 for	 the	 prevention,	 reduction,	 and	 eradication	 of	
poverty	in	the	Global	South.	His	study	attains	to	recall	the	limits	and	dis‐












authorities	 and	 impoverished	 individuals	 to	 ameliorate	 such	 circum‐














to	 promote	 poverty	 reduction	 and	 social	 change.	 He	 provides	 a	 rich	
characterization	of	such	sociopolitical	projects	to	show	that	their	inabil‐





five	 sub‐Saharan	 countries.	 Their	 analysis	 provides	 important	 under‐






itations	 of	 the	 Right	 to	 Information	 legislation	 that	 has	 recently	 been	










Moving	 farther	 south	on	 the	African	 continent,	 Chiweshe	 focuses	upon	








worsened	 unemployment,	 inequality,	 and	 poverty,	 consequently	 in‐
creasing	 dependence	 on	 welfarist	 state	 support.	 He	 shows	 how	 social	
movements	 have	 developed	 in	 opposition	 to	 government’s	 neoliberal	
policies	 and	 contemplates	 whether	 socioeconomic	 rights	 adjudication	
















Narayan,	 Deepa	 and	 Patti	 Petesch,	 eds.	 Voices	 of	 the	 Poor	 from	Many	











THE MAKING AND REMAKING OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
CONTEMPORARY LIMITS AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE ERADICATION OF POVERTY, FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
Camilo	Pérez‐Bustillo	
This	 chapter	 provides	 the	 reader	 with	 a	 thorough	 introduction	 to	 the	
complex	 relationship	 between	 poverty	 eradication	 and	 the	 recognition	
of	the	necessity	of	freedom	from	poverty	in	both	economic	and	sociocul‐
tural	terms	as	a	determining	factor	in	the	success	or	failure	of	attempts	
to	 combat	 human	 poverty	 in	 local,	 national,	 and	 transnational/inter‐
national	contexts.	The	author	points	to	the	crucial	flaws	in	the	common	
neoliberal	 paradigm	 of	 economic	 development	 and	 social	 well‐being	
insofar	 as	 its	 capacity	 to	 adequately	 encompass	 and	 rectify	 socioeco‐
nomic	problems	prevalent	 throughout	 the	Global	 South.	Ultimately	 the	
author	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 efficacy	 of	 institutionalized	 attempts	 to	
remedy	 these	circumstances	while	emphasizing	 the	necessity	of	 strong	
legal	responses	in	place	of	top‐down	strategies.	
1 Introduction 
This	 chapter	 explores	 how	 hegemonic	 versions	 of	 human	 rights	 dis‐
course	 and	 practices	 undermine	 contemporary	 struggles	 for	 social	
transformation	 and	 for	 the	 prevention,	 reduction,	 and	 eradication	 of	




discourse	 and	 content.	 It	 is	 also	 grounded	 in	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	
prevailing	policies	and	practices	that	produce	and	reproduce	global	pov‐
erty	and	inequality	as	crimes	against	humanity.		










eradication,	 including	more	 “ethical”	 processes	 of	 development,	 are	 il‐
lustrative	of	the	contemporary	dimensions	of	 liberal	and	neoliberal	he‐
gemony.	 Meanwhile,	 it	 is	 precisely	 these	 global	 “institutional	 arrange‐
ments”	that	continue	to	impose	neoliberal	forms	of	globalization,	which	
undermine	 the	 substantive	 achievement	 of	 such	 purported	 objectives,	
and	in	fact	produce	and	reproduce	poverty	and	inequality.	The	Millenni‐
um	 Development	 Goals	 (MDGs)	 and	 their	 successors,	 the	 Sustainable	
Development	Goals	 (SDGs),	 are	 representative	 examples	 of	 such	 initia‐
tives	 and	 their	 insufficiencies	 (Amin,	 2006;	 De	 Schutter,	 2011;	 CROP,	
2013;	 Pogge	 and	 Sengupta,	 2014).	 Counter‐hegemonic	 approaches	 in‐
stead	seek	to	transform	existing	structures	and	policies	in	a	fundamen‐








persons)	 can	make	 in	 this	 context	 on	 a	 global	 scale.	 This	 includes	 the	
need	 to	 rethink	 and	 remake	 contemporary	 approaches	 to	 the	 history	
and	contemporary	praxis	of	human	rights,	in	the	service	of	processes	of	
liberation,	 rather	 than	 as	 ideological	 complements	 to	 contemporary	










enous	 environmental	 rights	 activist	 from	Honduras	who	was	 killed	 on	
March	3,	2016,	following	multiple	death	threats,	in	what	has	been	widely	
reported	as	a	targeted	assassination	involving	government	complicity,	in	




Goldman	 Prize	 for	 her	 environmental	 rights	 activism	 in	 April	 2015	 (	
Alpert/Foreign	Policy	 in	Focus,	2016;	Human	Rights	Watch,	2016)	and	
was	 widely	 recognized	 for	 her	 role	 in	 helping	 coordinate	 equivalent	
movements	throughout	the	Meso‐American	region.	Megaprojects	of	the	
kind	 resisted	 by	 these	movements	 have	 prospered	 in	Honduras	 in	 the	




of	 indigenous	 origin	 and	African	 descent,	 have	 been	 forcibly	 displaced	
within	 the	 country	or	have	 forcibly	migrated	 toward	 the	United	 States	
within	 the	 last	 decade	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 imposition	 of	 these	 policies;	
many	of	these	are	unaccompanied	minors.	
Cáceres	and	the	movements	she	helped	found	and	lead	reflect	the	kinds	




prevent	 the	 country’s	 incorporation	 into	 the	 emerging	 bloc	 of	 Latin	
American	states	known	as	ALBA	that	have	sought	to	resist	US	hegemony	




has	 suggested,	 to	 encompass	 the	 universal	 “community	 of	 victims”	 re‐
sulting	from	“all	the	forms	of	suffering	produced	by	global	capitalism.	In	
this	sense,	the	South	is	to	be	found	throughout	the	world,	including	the	
North	 and	West”	 (Sousa	 Santos,	 2007).	 This	 chapter	 explores	 these	 is‐
sues	 from	 a	 critical,	 interdisciplinary,	 comparative,	 and	 intercultural	
28			Camilo	Pérez‐Bustillo	
 




far	 from	Tahrir	 (Liberation)	 Square,	 amid	 yet	 another	 challenging	mo‐
ment	 in	 its	ongoing	process	of	 social	 transformation	within	 the	overall	
landscape	 of	 the	 Arab	 Spring,	 and	 the	 contested,	 evolving	 relationship	
between	such	processes	and	the	vindication	of	the	rights	of	the	poor.	A	
key	question	at	 the	 time	we	met	 there	 (December	2012)	was	as	 to	 the	
extent	to	which	the	basic	human	rights	recognized	in	Egypt’s	then	newly	
adopted	post‐Mubarak	constitution	would	 in	 fact	be	 justiciable	and	en‐
forceable	 in	 practice.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 this	 writing	 (March	 2016),	 these	
rights	 have	 been	 trampled	 amid	 the	 increasing	 abuses	 of	 Egypt’s	 US‐
backed	 authoritarian,	 military‐dominated	 government,	 whose	 repres‐
sive	characteristics	converge	with	the	onset	of	a	veritable	“Arab	Winter”	
throughout	 the	 region	 (with	 the	partial	but	 still	uncertain	exception	of	
Tunisia)	in	related	contexts	such	as	Syria,	Libya,	Bahrain,	and	Yemen.	
This	chapter	and	related	papers	presented	at	CROP	workshops	 in	New	
Delhi,	 India,	 in	October	2011,	 in	Cape	Town,	South	Africa,	 in	November	
2012,	 in	Mexico	City	 in	February	2014,	and	 in	Foz	do	 Iguacú,	Brazil,	 in	
June	2015,	are	also	intended	to	contribute	to	shaping	the	framework,	as	
we	 approach	 the	 50th	 anniversary	 of	 Rev.	 Dr.	Martin	 Luther	 King	 Jr.’s	
call	 for	 a	 “Poor	People’s	Campaign,”	which	was	 launched	on	 the	eve	of	
his	 assassination	 in	 April,	 1968,	 for	 the	 convening	 of	 an	 international	
tribunal	of	conscience	(International	Poverty	Tribunal)	to	document	and	
assess	 the	 human	 costs	 and	 implications	 of	 contemporary	 global	 pov‐
erty.	This	 tribunal	would	act	 in	 the	spirit	of	 the	Russell	Tribunal	of	 the	
1960s	 and	 1970s	 and	 its	 principal	 successor,	 the	 Permanent	 People’s	
Tribunal	(PPT),2	and	would	focus	on	a	detailed	exploration	of	the	extent	
                                                 





as	 Jean‐Paul	 Sartre,	 Simone	 de	 Beauvoir,	 Isaac	 Deutscher,	 James	 Baldwin,	 and	





to	 which	 contemporary	 global	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 amount	 to	 a	
“crime	against	humanity,”	as	suggested	below.	
2 Central Argument and Research Questions 
Contemporary	 visions	 of	 human	 rights	 have	 been	 reshaped	 by	 social	
movements	in	the	context	of	the	Latin	American	and	Arab	“Springs”	(see	
Dussel,	 2008;	Amin,	 2011,	 2012b;	Abdou	Bakr,	 2012;	Hardt	 and	Negri,	
2011,	2012b;	Manhire,	ed.	2012;	Weisbrot,	2012),	as	well	as	by	similar	
movements	 elsewhere	 in	 Africa	 (e.g.	 Senegal,	 Mali)	 and	 of	 the	 “indig‐
nant”	or	 “outraged”	 (Binebine,	2011;	Hessel,	2011)	 in	other	settings	as	
diverse	as	Chile,	Spain,	Greece,	the	United	States,	and	Mexico	(Byrne,	ed.	




                                                                                                   
Basso	 Foundation	 in	 Rome,	 see	 http://www.internazionaleleliobasso.it/?page	
_id=209&lang=en.	 The	 PPT	 undertook	 a	 3‐year	 (2011–2014)	 process	 to	 assess	
systematic	human	rights	violations	in	Mexico,	including	issues	of	poverty	and	ine‐
quality	 related	 to	 the	 imposition	 of	 neoliberal	 “free	 trade”	 policies	 through	 the	
North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(NAFTA).	
3	 South	Africa	joined	the	grouping	at	its	summit	in	India	in	March	2012	and	hosted	
its	 fifth	summit	 in	March	2013;	the	first	summit	was	held	 in	Russia	 in	2009,	 the	






which	 includes	 those	 most	 independent	 of	 US	 domination,	 such	 as	 Cuba,	
Venezuela,	Bolivia,	Ecuador,	and	Nicaragua,	which	identify	with	the	framework	of	




negotiated	 in	 2006	 between	 Cuba,	 Venezuela,	 and	 Bolivia.	 One	 of	 ALBA’s	 most	
strategic	contributions	from	a	South‐South	perspective	is	 its	role	in	resisting	the	
US	 efforts	 to	 consolidate	 its	 regional	 hegemony	 in	 Latin	 America	 through	 the	
imposition	of	“free	trade”	agreements	such	as	NAFTA	(with	Canada	and	Mexico)	





based	 processes	 of	 poverty	 eradication	 and	 social	 transformation,	 and	
human	 rights,	 in	 such	 contexts?	What	 implications	 do	 such	 initiatives	
have	 for	 efforts	 to	 attain	 or	 go	 beyond	 the	MDGs	 and	 SDGs	 and	 other	
hegemonic	approaches	to	issues	relating	to	poverty	and	inequality,	and	
as	to	challenges	confronted	by	the	UN	system	(e.g.,	IMF,	WB,	and	WTO)	
and	 the	G‐20,	 in	an	era	of	economic,	 financial,	environmental,	and	ulti‐
mately	civilizational	crisis	on	a	global	scale?	
A	 central	 tension	 that	 cuts	 across	 such	examples	 is	 the	 contested	 rela‐
tionship	between	social	movements	of	 the	poor	“from	below,”	based	 in	
the	most	marginalized	sectors,	which	are	often	focused	on	local	and	re‐
gional	 projects	 of	 resistance	 and	 autonomy,	 and	 processes	 of	 social	
transformation	which	seek	to	prevent,	reduce,	and/or	eliminate	poverty,	
which	tend	to	be	centered	around	the	control	and	exercise	of	state	pow‐
er	 “from	 above,”	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 and	 on	 concerted	 action	 among	
states	 in	 regional	 contexts	 such	 as	 Latin	America,	 Africa,	 and	 the	Arab	
world	and	on	a	global	 scale.	An	additional	 cross‐cutting	 tension	 is	 that	
between	 the	marked	 tendency	 of	 state‐centered	 processes	 to	 seek	 ac‐
commodation,	to	varying	degrees,	with	the	demands	of	global	capitalist	




counter‐hegemonic	 movements	 from	 below	 such	 as	 those	 which	 have	
arisen	in	the	context	of	the	Latin	American	and	Arab	“Springs”	and	with‐
in	the	overall	framework	of	the	“global	justice	movement”	(Tabb,	2003)	
include	 the	 centrality	 of	 “indignation”	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 resistance	
against	systemic	injustices.	The	key	battle	cry	for	the	Zapatista	rebellion	
of	indigenous	peasants	in	the	impoverished	region	of	Chiapas	in	January,	






















Tahrir	 Square	 in	 2011,	 which	 together	 launched	 the	 Arab	 “Spring.”	
“Hogra”	 has	 been	 translated	 into	 Spanish	 (Cembrero/El	 Pais,	 2011)	 as	
what	 lies	 at	 the	 convergent	 core	of	 related	 concepts	 for	describing	 the	
subjective	experiences	produced	by	reiterated	instances	of	“disrespect”	
(or	 “disdain”	 or	 “dishonor”),	 “abuse	 of	 power,”	 and	 “injustice,”	 which	
together	generate	a	response	grounded	in	claims	demanding	the	resto‐
ration	of	“dignity.”	It	was	this	understanding	of	the	concept	drawn	from	
Arabic	and	 the	case	of	Bouazizi	 that	 led	 the	demonstrators	 to	mobilize	
against	 the	effects	of	neoliberal	policies	 in	 the	central	 squares	of	Spain	
and	 in	Greece	 in	2011,	 inspired	by	the	 images	and	words	 flowing	 from	
Cairo,	to	describe	themselves	analogously	as	the	“indignado/as”	(or	the	




The	 word	 “hogra”	 is	 not	 translatable	 to	 Romance	 languages.	 It	
implies	a	sentiment	which	combines	disdain	and	the	arrogance	of	
somehow	who	dominates	with	the	fearful	impotence	of	a	person	
















rum	 for	Alternatives,	WFA].	 That	was	 because	 of	 the	neoliberal	




tional	 wealth,	 by	 the	 multinationals	 and	 the	 local	 capitalistic	
players	as	well,	and	unemployment,	as	well	as	 the	disrespect	of	
public	 freedoms	and	human	dignity.	 In	Egypt,	 for	example,	part	
of	the	protests	is	against	selling	of	some	public‐sector	companies	
to	private	investors	leading	to	thousands	of	workers	sent	to	un‐
employment.	 Revolutionary	 forces	 are	 calling	 for	 the	 recupera‐
tion	of	the	nation‐owned	assets	that	were	privatized.	




and/or	 as	 serious	 violations	 of	 international	 law	 and	 international	 hu‐
man	 rights	 law—including	 war	 crimes,	 genocide,	 slavery,	 colonialism,	
torture,	 sexual	 violence	 and	 discrimination	 against	 women,	 racial	 dis‐
crimination	 and	 apartheid,	 and	 forced	 disappearances—have	 at	 some	
previous	moment	in	history	been	considered	legal	and	therefore	“legiti‐
mate.”	 Human	 rights	 norms	 and	 related	 conceptions	 of	 international	
criminal	law	reflect	the	evolving	ethical	consciousness	of	humanity,	with	




The	period	since	 the	events	of	September	11,	2011,	 is	one	of	 those	ex‐
amples	 of	 retreat	 from	 previously	 established	 standards	 on	 a	 global	
scale,	 which	 has	 in	 turn	 spurred	 responses	 protesting	 the	 ravages	 of	
neoliberal	 globalization	 and	 demanding	 participatory	 democracy	 and	
economic	 justice	 in	 the	period	prior	 to	 and	 following	 the	 international	
economic	 and	 financial	 crisis	of	 2008–2009.	My	approach	here	 further	
assumes	 that	 contemporary	 human	 rights	 norms	 are	 the	 historical	
product	of	the	struggles	of	social	movements	and	their	impact	on	evolv‐
ing	patterns	of	reflection,	discourse,	and	policy,	from	the	perspective	of	
those	 whose	 suffering	 has	 been	 consigned	 to	 “rightlessness.”	 This	 in‐
cludes	the	legacies	and	contributions	of	movements	of	the	poor	and	ex‐
cluded	 throughout	 history,	 against	 feudalism,	 colonialism,	 imperialism,	
slavery,	racism	and	national	oppression,	the	exploitation	of	workers,	and	
the	domination	of	women.	
The	 largely	 unwritten	 history	 of	 the	 “making”	 of	 international	 human	
rights	and	international	law	is	the	history	of	the	ebbs	and	flows	in	a	non‐
linear	 trajectory	 as	 to	 the	 extent	 of	 recognition	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 those	
most	exploited,	oppressed,	marginalized,	and	excluded	in	each	historical	
period.	Such	an	approach	demands	a	distinct	rupture	with	epistemologi‐
cal	assumptions	of	 a	positivist,	 functionalist,	 and	determinist	 character	
that	are	still	prevalent	in	many	circles.	It	also	includes	an	insistence	up‐
on	 a	 critical	 understanding	 of	 legal	 definitions	 of	 rights	 in	 any	 specific	
historical	 period	 as	 minimums,	 not	 maximums	 (“floors	 and	 not	 ceil‐
ings”),	and	thus	as	points	of	departure,	not	destinations	in	themselves.	
4 Poverty as Violence 
Why	 is	 it	 important	 to	 differentiate	 between	 hegemonic	 and	 counter‐
hegemonic	approaches	to	human	rights,	poverty,	and	global	justice,	and	















nation—based	 on	 race,	 ethnicity,	 gender,	 nationality,	 immigration	 sta‐
tus,	 disability,	 age,	 sexual	 preference,	 etc.—environmental	 devastation	
and	 climate	 change,	 and	 other	 conditions	 that	 can	 be	 characterized	 as	
violations	 of	 economic,	 social,	 cultural,	 and	 environmental	 rights);	 and	
(3)	 systemic	 violence	 (such	 as	 the	 inequalities	 of	 property,	wealth,	 in‐
come,	and	power	which	are	attributable	 to	 the	 inherent	characteristics	
of	 the	capitalist	mode	of	production,	and	to	neoliberal	globalization,	 its	
principal	 contemporary	 expression.	 Christian	 Marazzi	 (2011)	 has	 re‐
cently	 explored	 such	 dimensions	 in	 his	 exploration	 of	 the	 “violence	 of	
financial	capital”).	Serious	efforts	to	reduce	and	eradicate	poverty—and	
thus	to	prevent	 its	production	and	reproduction—must	sooner	or	 later	
address	 all	 of	 these	 dimensions	 together	 and	 their	 complex	 interrela‐
tionship,	or	will	necessarily	 fall	 short	of	accomplishing	 their	purported	
objectives.	
5 Poverty as Crime Against Humanity and the Right to 
Be Human: Ethical and Philosophical Frameworks as 
Necessary but Insufficient 
Global	poverty	 is	 the	contemporary	equivalent	of	historical	crimes	of	a	
similar	 character	 that	 had	 to	 be	wrested	 from	 the	 complicit	 silence	 or	
“norm‐avoidance”	(Pogge,	2002:	5)	that	sought	to	conceal	or	deny	them,	
by	 the	equivalents	 in	each	 corresponding	historical	period	of	 the	 com‐
bined	 pressures	 of	 counter‐hegemonic	 social	 movements	 and	 critical	
thinking.	A	combination	of	historical	and	legal	precedents	thus	leads	me	
in	 turn	 to	argue	 that	 the	 intertwined	character	of	contemporary	global	
poverty	 and	 inequality	 must	 be	 approached	 not	 “only”	 as	 a	 profound	
challenge	 to	 global	 ethics,	 development	 studies,	 and	 the	 philosophy	 of	
law	 (Sen,	 1998,	Pogge,	 2002;	 Sachs,	 2005),	 and	as	 a	 “massive	 and	 sys‐
temic”	 (2001	 CESCR	 Statement	 on	 Poverty,	 para.	 4,	 cited	 by	 Salomon,	
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temporary	Mexico,	 the	 Pinochet	 dictatorship	 in	 Chile,	 and	 similar	 con‐





rights	 to	 truth,	 justice,	 individual	 and	 collective	 reparations,	 and	 non‐
repetition	 of	 the	 culpable	 conduct)	 imposed	 by	 international	 criminal	




Article	 7	 defines	 the	 “crimes	 against	 humanity”	 which	 fall	 within	 the	
ICC’s	jurisdiction,	and	includes	specific	acts	such	as	murder,	extermina‐
tion,	 enslavement,	 forced	 deportations,	 torture,	 rape,	 sexual	 slavery,	
persecution	 forced	 disappearances,	 apartheid	 as	 well	 as	 “(k)	 (o)ther	
inhumane	acts	of	a	similar	character	 intentionally	causing	great	suffer‐
ing,	 or	 serious	 injury	 to	 body	 or	 to	 mental	 or	 physical	 health.”	 The	














But	 how	 do	 we	 mourn	 for	 the	 living	 dead,	 those	 who	 are	 not	
there.	These	…	women,	men,	and	children	 live	 in	the	present;	…	
exist	but	are	denied	visibility	and	voice;	their	actual	physical	ex‐
istence/survival	 (bare	 life	 in	 terms	 of	 Agamben)	 is	 a	 code	 for	
their	 living	death;	…	as	if	 they	were	as	yet	not	born	or	had	died	




produce	 this	 suffering	 is	 also	 then	 potentially	 the	 recognition	 of	 what	
both	have	described	 in	 differing	 but	 ultimately	 convergent	 contexts	 as	
the	most	fundamental	human	right	of	all,	the	“right	to	be	human.”	
6 Case Studies of BRICS and ALBA 
6.1  BRICS 
A	 differentiation	 between	 hegemonic	 and	 non‐	 or	 counter‐hegemonic	
approaches	must	also	be	applied	to	“South‐South”	initiatives	intended	to	
lay	the	basis	for	fundamental	social	transformations	such	as	those	need‐
ed	 in	 order	 to	 seriously	 address	 contemporary	 global	 patterns	 of	 pov‐
erty	 and	 inequality.	 I	 will	 investigate	 potential	 case	 studies	 such	 as	






held	 in	 Indonesia	 in	 1955).	 BRICS,	 for	 example—totaling	 among	 its	
members	 “40%	 of	 the	world’s	 population,	 30%	 of	 its	 landmass,	 and	 a	









It	certainly	makes	a	difference,	at	 first	approximation,	whether	it	 is	 the	
United	States,	Western	Europe,	and	Japan	who	are	calling	the	shots	with‐
in	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 former	 G‐7,	 or	whether	 it	 is	 the	 BRICS	 states	






ercised,	 and	 to	 the	 “delinking”	 of	 states	 within	 the	 Global	 South	 from	
such	control.	
But	BRICS	 as	 currently	 framed	 implies	 an	 intriguing	but	 currently	 still	
limited	 expansion	 and	 differential	 seasoning	 of	 the	 relevant	 decision‐
making	table	(which	the	2012	Delhi	Declaration	of	BRICS,	echoed	in	the	
2013	Declaration	 issued	 in	March	 in	Durban,	South	Africa,	describes	 in	
paragraph	4	 in	 terms	of	 “strengthened	representation	of	emerging	and	
developing	 countries	 in	 the	 institutions	 of	 global	 governance”	 and	 in	








of	 1997–1998,	 it	 was	 the	 consulting	 branch	 (“Economic	 Research	
Group”)	of	Goldman	Sachs	(a	key	player	of	course	in	fueling	the	specula‐
tive	 bubble	 which	 led	 to	 the	 Wall	 Street	 collapse	 in	 2008),	 in	 2001,	
which	argued	that	it	was	in	the	best	interests	of	global	systemic	econom‐
ic	and	financial	stability	to	expand	the	G‐7	through	the	addition	of	Brazil,	
Russia,	 India,	 and	China	 in	order	 to	 try	 to	make	 the	global	 system	 less	
susceptible	 to	 crises	 it	was	no	 longer	able	 to	 control	 (O’Neill/Goldman	
Sachs	ERG	2001).	From	this	perspective,	BRICS	highlights	the	incorpora‐
tion	 into	 the	 hegemonic	 global	 framework	 of	 potential	 “outliers”	 who	
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might	pose	 a	 systemic	 challenge	 in	 conjunction	with	others	 if	 not	 ade‐
quately	assimilated.		
The	 ascendancy	 of	 pseudo‐Communist	 (actually	 state	 capitalist)	 China	
and	 neoliberal,	 technocratic	 India	 thus	 combined	 together	 imply	 the	
fullest	expression	of	two	of	the	most	twisted	examples	of	capitalist	glob‐
alization,	the	creation	for	the	first	time	of	a	truly	global	market,	and	not	a	
challenge	 to	 its	 assumptions.	 This	 picture	 is	 completed	 by	 a	 neutered,	
nonideological,	Russia	which	 is	stripped	of	 the	counter‐hegemonic	pre‐




cialized	 in	 “Talking	 Left	 and	 Walking	 Right”	 (Bond,	 2006).	 To	 expect	
such	 a	 grouping	 to	 undo	 the	 configurations	 of	 poverty	 and	 inequality	
which	are	inherent	to	the	systemic	logic	of	globalized	capitalism	seems	
at	minimum	unlikely.	Nor	is	it	probable	for	such	an	association	to	priori‐
tize	 human	 rights	 issues	 overall	 given	 their	 evident	 vulnerabilities	 to	
such	issues	from	within.	Nevertheless,	BRICS	is	not	likely	to	go	very	far	if	
it	does	not	find	a	way	to	differentiate	and	maximize	its	own	unique	iden‐
tity,	 distinct	 from	 that	 of	 other	 potentially	 rival	 global	 and	 regional	
groupings	(Chellaney	and	Al	Jazeera,	2012;	Sharma,	2012).	
The	declarations	 issued	 in	March	2013	 in	Durban	and	 in	2012	 in	New	
Delhi	as	the	result	of	the	4th	and	5th	BRICS	summits,	and	since,5	are	es‐
sentially	 slightly	 reworked	 versions	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 communiqué	 one	










                                                 




“and	 to	 ensure	 strong,	 sustainable	 and	balanced	growth”	 (para.	 7,	 35);	
and	 boiler‐plate	 style	 references	 to	 regional	 experiences	 assumed	 to	
embody	experiences	along	these	lines,	such	as	the	New	Partnership	for	
Africa’s	Development	(NEPAD)	(para.	36).	NEPAD	is	heavily	emphasized	
in	 the	2013	Declaration,	 since	 the	 focus	of	 the	Durban	 summit	was	on	
strengthening	ties	between	BRICs	and	Africa.	
NEPAD	has	been	widely	criticized	for	its	emulation	of	the	South	African	
strategy	 of	 accommodation	 to	 neoliberal	 imperatives,	 reflected	 in	 the	
way	it	was	built	initially	around	a	core	group	of	five	states	(South	Africa	
plus	 Algeria,	 Egypt,	 Nigeria,	 and	 Senegal)	 with	 similar	 leanings,	 which	
have	gradually	shaped	a	broader	equivalent	consensus	within	 the	Afri‐
can	 Union	 (AU)	 as	 a	whole	 reflected	 in	 NEPAD’s	 formal	 incorporation	
into	the	AU	structure	in	2010	(para.	36).	Both	the	Durban	and	Delhi	Dec‐
larations	suggest	that	NEPAD	is	a	model	 for	the	approach	which	BRICS	







cil	 for	 the	 Development	 of	 Social	 Science	 Research)	 has	 argued	 (para.	
36)	represents	a	“setback	 in	 the	African	quest	 for	a	return	to	a	path	of	




one	 section	 (para.	 6)	 of	 the	 Delhi	 Declaration,	where	 the	 BRICS	 states	
affirm	 “that	 it	 is	 critical	 for	 advanced	 economies	 to	 adopt	 responsible	
macroeconomic	 and	 financial	 policies,	 avoid	 creating	 excessive	 global	
liquidity	 and	 undertake	 structural	 reforms	 to	 lift	 growth	 that	 create	
jobs.”	This	statement	simultaneously	applies	a	typical	series	of	formulas	
regarding	 the	 adoption	 of	 “responsible	 macroeconomic	 and	 financial	
policies”	 and	 the	 need	 to	 “undertake	 structural	 reforms”	 traditionally	
directed	by	the	IMF	and	WB	toward	emerging	economies	to	those	which	





of	what	 set	 of	 interests	 and	 values?	What	 is	meant	 by	 “structural”	 re‐
forms?	 Is	 the	 term	 only	 applicable	 to	 measures	 which	 make	 markets	
more	 attractive	 and	 safer	 for	 investment?	 What	 about	 reforms	 which	
might	 increase	 the	 possibility	 of	 living	with	 dignity	 in	 poor	 communi‐
ties?	Aren’t	poverty	and	inequality	“structural”	as	well?	
It	would	be	very	interesting	from	the	standpoint	of	the	need	for	a	mean‐
ingful	 “South‐South”	 agenda	 of	 global	 transformation	 (including	 issues	
of	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 within	 an	 expanded,	 reconfigured	 counter‐
hegemonic	human	rights	framework)	for	BRICS	to	push	the	limits	of	its	




basis	 for	 strengthening	 a	 “partnership	 for	 common	 development”	 and	
deepening	 cooperation	 among	 its	 members	 (para.	 1;	 with	 the	 exact	
shape	of	such	commonality	and	deepening	still	unspecified),	and	in	par‐





resentation	of	emerging	and	developing	countries	 in	 the	 institutions	of	
global	governance	will	enhance	their	effectiveness	in	achieving	this	ob‐
jective.”	
However,	 international	 human	 rights	 standards	 (hegemonic	 or	 other‐
wise)	are	not	specified	here	or	anywhere	else	in	the	Delhi	Declaration	as	
explicit	 components	 of	 the	 “universally	 recognized	 norms”	 referenced,	
and	the	text	moreover	seems	to	assume	that	“strengthened	representa‐
tion	 of	 emerging	 and	developing	 countries	 in	 the	 institutions	 of	 global	
governance”	might	 itself	 be	 enough	 to	 “enhance	 their	 effectiveness”	 in	











states	 from	 which	 regions	 define	 them.	 Otherwise	 their	 reorientation	
with	enhanced	representation	from	the	“South”	simply	implies	a	shift	in	
geographical	and	geopolitical	direction,	and	not	one	of	a	systemic	char‐
acter.	 Connecting	 cooperation	 among	 BRICS	 states	 as	 to	 human	 rights	
and	such	concerns	would	be	an	interesting	next	step.	
Additional	elements	of	the	Delhi	Declaration	which	suggest	the	need	for	
deeper	 transformations	 include	 its	call	 in	paragraph	10	 for	 the	 IMF	“to	













Paragraph	28	provides	 the	most	 extended	 reference	 to	 issues	of	 social	
development	 (in	 addition	 to	 specific	 reaffirmation	 of	 support	 for	 the	
MDGs	process	in	paragraph	35,	and	additional	references	to	issues	relat‐
ed	 to	 the	 environment,	 climate	 change,	 and	biodiversity	 in	 paragraphs	
29–34,	 and	 those	 related	 to	 public	 health	 in	 paragraph	 42):	
“[a]ccelerating	 growth	 and	 sustainable	 development,	 along	 with	 food,	
and	energy	security,	are	amongst	 the	most	 important	challenges	 facing	
the	world	today,	and	central	to	addressing	economic	development,	erad‐
icating	poverty,	combating	hunger	and	malnutrition	in	many	developing	
countries.	 Creating	 jobs	 needed	 to	 improve	 people’s	 living	 standards	
worldwide	 is	critical.	Sustainable	development	 is	also	a	key	element	of	





diluted	 echo	 of	 long‐standing	 frameworks	 present	 in	 the	 international	
community	 through	 the	MDG	 process	 and	 UN	 Summits	 dating	 back	 to	
the	1990s.	Nothing	is	included,	for	example,	in	terms	of	an	understand‐
ing	of	poverty	as	a	violation	of	human	rights,	or	as	to	the	human	rights	
dimensions	 more	 generally	 of	 issues	 related	 to	 poverty,	 hunger,	 and	
malnutrition.	
This	vacuum	is	particularly	notable	given	the	substantive	importance	of	
poverty	 and	 inequality	 as	 phenomena	 which	 have	 shaped	 the	 history	
and	 contemporary	 character	 of	 the	 economies	 of	 China,	 India,	 Russia,	
Brazil,	 and	 South	 Africa,	 and	 of	 the	 dense	 web	 of	 policies	 addressing	
such	 issues	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 (e.g.,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 broader	 initia‐
tives	 targeting	 issues	 of	 agrarian	 development	 or	 that	 of	 minority	
groups)	in	each	of	these	countries.	Few	peoples	in	the	world	would	be	so	
well‐positioned,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 to	 assume	 such	 a	 role	 given	 their	
accumulated	experience	and	suffering,	which	makes	the	absence	of	such	
leadership	all	 the	more	notable.	The	 ruling	sectors	of	 the	Global	North	
which	 concentrate	 80%	 of	 the	world’s	wealth	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 20%	 or	




in	each	of	 the	BRICS	states.	 It	 is	difficult	 to	 imagine	a	 substantive	shift	




to	 imagine	what	 a	 counter‐hegemonic	 approach	 to	 human	 rights	 from	
the	 perspective	 of	 the	 peoples	 of	 the	 BRICS	 countries	might	 look	 like,	
and	 to	 insist	 that	 it	 be	 promoted	within	 each	 of	 the	 bloc’s	 constituent	
states.	




ity	 than	 the	 more	 general,	 diplomatic	 language	 which	 permeates	 the	
Delhi	Declaration	 itself,	 including	an	 insistence	on	BRICS	as	a	space	for	
“progressive	 development	 trajectories”	 (emphasis	 added),	 including	
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“transformations	 for	 optimal	 representation	 and	 participation	 in	 mat‐
ters	 of	 global	 political,	 economic	 and	 financial	 governance”	 (not	 just	
economic	and	financial	governance	as	is	emphasized	in	the	Delhi	Decla‐
ration).	The	Academic	Forum	also	recommends	that	the	“BRICS	nations	
must	 seek	 to	 create	 institutions	 that	 enable	 viable	 alternatives	 for	 en‐
hancing	 inclusive	 socio‐economic	development	 agenda	within	 and	out‐
side	BRICS.	 Such	 institutions	must	eventually	 seek	 to	 set	 global	bench‐
marks	for	best	practices	and	standards.”	
Its	recommendations	also	underline	the	need	to	address	the	increasing	
activism	 of	 nonstate	 actors	 and	 to	 assess	 the	 contributions	 of	 “indige‐
nous	knowledge	and	practices	to	deal	with	common	challenges	such	as	
eco‐friendly	agricultural	practices,	efficient	water	use,	disaster	manage‐
ment	and	other	humanitarian	 issues,”	and	 to	emphasize	 issues	relating	
to	 “inclusive	 growth	 and	 equitable	 development”	 (adjectives	 absent	
from	 the	Delhi	 Declaration	 itself,	 or	 highly	 diluted).	 The	 Academic	 Fo‐
rum’s	recommendations	also	emphasize	the	need	within	BRICS	to	create	
spaces	for	exchange	between	scholars,	experts,	and	business	leaders	as	




gradual	 emergence	 of	 a	 much	 more	 democratic	 and	 inclusive	 BRICS	
“from	 below,”	 and	 much	 more	 reflective	 of	 the	 extraordinary	 wealth	
represented	by	 the	counter‐hegemonic	social	movements	 in	each	of	 its	
member	countries,	whose	imaginaries	range	much	more	widely	than	the	
relatively	constricted	visions	of	its	states.	




to	 US	 political	 and	 economic	 hegemony	 and	 in	 Venezuela’s	 vigorous,	
generally	 successful	 efforts	 to	 reduce	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 between	
2002	and	2011	(with	estimates	ranging	from	48.6%	overall	to	27.8%	in	
2010,	and	in	terms	of	extreme	poverty	from	22.2%	to	10.7%,	see	López	
Arnal	 2012,	 based	 on	 ECLAC	 2011;	 or	 of	 an	 even	 greater	 magnitude,	
from	54%	to	27.5%	overall	 and	 from	25.1	 to	7.	6%	between	2003	and	
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2007,	 implying	 a	 50%	 reduction	 in	 poverty	 as	 a	whole	 and	 of	 70%	 in	
extreme	poverty	during	the	period	in	question;	many	of	these	gains	have	




overall	 more	 moderate	 center‐left	 régimes	 in	 Latin	 America	 such	 as	
those	 of	Brazil	 and	Chile	were	more	 effective	 in	 reducing	poverty	 in	 a	
lasting	way	than	the	more	radical,	 “populist”	régimes	of	Venezuela	and	
Argentina,	 in	part	because	of	 the	correlation	in	the	latter	two	cases	be‐
tween	 reductions	 in	 poverty	 and	 their	 economies’	 greater	 dependency	
on	 the	 cyclical	 character	 of	 higher	 commodity	 prices.	 But	 all	 of	 those	
cited	on	both	sides	of	this	debate	provide	a	basis	to	argue	that	regardless	
of	 whether	 the	 reductions	 were	 greater	 or	 more	 lasting	 in	 the	 more	
moderate	 or	 more	 “populist”	 contexts,	 the	 régimes	 least	 successful	 at	
reducing	poverty	and/or	inequality	during	the	same	period	were	those	
most	 closely	 aligned	 with	 US‐imposed	 “free	 market”	 policies	 (e.g.,	 Co‐
lombia,	Mexico;	the	latter	once	initial	reductions	supposedly	attributable	
to	 new	 focalized,	 conditional	 cash	 transfer	 policies	 were	 reversed	 fol‐
lowing	the	impact	of	the	2008	global	crisis).	
Other	ALBA	leaders	such	as	Evo	Morales	of	Bolivia	and	Rafael	Correa	of	
Ecuador	 (himself	 a	 former	 economist	 at	 the	 WB)	 have	 insisted	 upon	
poverty	 prevention,	 reduction,	 and	 eradication	 as	 key	 components	 of	
national	 social	 policy,	 including	 Correa’s	 recent	 insistence	 in	 a	 speech	
delivered	at	the	Santiago	headquarters	of	the	UN’s	Economic	Council	for	
Latin	America	 and	 the	Caribbean	 (ECLAC,	 better	 known	by	 its	 Spanish	
language	initials	as	CEPAL)	in	Chile,	 that	poverty	reduction	rather	than	
increases	 in	 economic	 growth	 should	 be	 considered	 the	 measure	 of	 a	


















notably)	 between	 their	 governing	 régimes	 and	 more	 radical	 social	




such	 as	 Colombia	 and	 Chile	 where	 powerful	 grassroots	 movements	
based	in	the	countries’	most	marginalized	sectors	confront	center‐right	







devastation,	 forced	 migration	 and	 displacement,	 etc.)	 which	 has	 been	
described	as	the	essence	of	contemporary	forms	of	capitalist	neoliberal	
globalization.	 Zibechi	 and	 many	 others	 located	 within	 each	 of	 these	
countries	 suggest	 that	 despite	 their	 relative	 successes	 and	 distancing	
from	systemic	imperatives	in	certain	respects,	there	is	an	overall	conti‐
nuity	 in	 the	 imposition	 of	 “neo‐developmentalist”	 or	 “neo‐extractivist”	
imperatives	 which	 characterizes	 régimes	 such	 as	 those	 of	 Chávez	 in	
Venezuela,	Morales	 in	 Bolivia,	 Correa	 in	 Ecuador,	 Ortega	 in	Nicaragua,	
Lula	and	Rosseff	in	Brazil,	and	the	Kirchners	in	Argentina,	in	addition	to	










sa	 Santos,	 2009)	 states	 such	 as	 Ecuador	 and	Bolivia	which	 have	 rede‐
fined	 these	 polities	 as	 “plurinational”	 and	 “pluricultural,”	 arguing	 that	
the	Correa	and	Morales	régimes	are	violating	to	varying	degrees	the	pre‐
cepts	 of	 the	 states	which	 they	 helped	 create	 (like	 the	 African	National	
Congress	in	South	Africa	or	the	sectors	of	the	opposition	that	have	come	
to	occupy	some	positions	of	power	in	Egypt,	Tunisia,	or	Libya	but	have	
failed	 to	 act	 consistently	 with	 their	 origins	 or	 originally	 stated	 inten‐
tions).	
These	same	frameworks	of	 “decolonized”	constitutional	 law	have	rede‐







lated	 respectively	 in	 the	 indigenous	 languages	of	 the	Quechua	 and	Ay‐
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“I’M GONNA GET MY SHARE OF WHAT’S MINE”: NARRATIVES OF 






der.	 These	 illegal	 strategies	 of	 poverty	 alleviation	 are	 viewed	 through	
the	prism	of	popular	cultural	expressions	in	Kenya	and	Jamaica	by	per‐
forming	 artists	 Eric	Wainaina	 and	 Jimmy	 Cliff.	While	 neither	 artist	 at‐
tempts	to	justify	the	use	of	violence	and	theft	as	tools	for	economic	ad‐
vancement,	 they	do	both	 construct	 and	participate	 in	narratives	which	
explicate	 the	 motivations	 and	 even	 necessities	 which	 give	 impulse	 to	
these	 desperate	 and	 ultimately	 tragic	 endeavors	 to	 escape	 from	 the	
clutches	of	poverty.	
1 Introduction 
The	 reality	 of	 poverty	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 (post)colonial	 settings	 has	 been	
drawing	 increasing	 attention	 since	 the	 turn	of	 the	 twenty‐first	 century	
and	the	sobering	realization	that	the	first	of	the	United	Nations’	Millen‐
nium	Development	Goals,	that	is,	to	eradicate	extreme	poverty	and	hun‐
ger,	 is	 not	 achieving	 significant	 rates	 of	 success	 in	many	 crucial	 cases.	
Countries	 such	as	China	 and	 India	with	emerging	 industrial	 infrastruc‐
tures	have	been	positioned	to	maximize	their	growth	and	thus	capitalize	
on	 the	 initiatives	 of	 the	 UN’s	 member	 states.	 Nations	 in	 Sub‐Saharan	
Africa	 and	 the	 Caribbean,	 however,	 have	 not	 necessarily	 been	 able	 to	
move	 forward	 politically	 or	 economically	 in	 the	 same	 fashion.	 In	 such	
contexts,	criminal	activity	has	oftentimes	taken	the	place	of	gainful	em‐









to	 advise	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 create	 a	 “global	 context	 for	 concern	
about	the	plight	of	young	people	in	urban	settings,	the	extent	and	nature	
of	 those	 problems	 for	 African	 youth,	 and	 the	 urgency	 of	 the	 need	 for	
widespread	and	concerted	action.”2	Of	particular	relevance	to	our	study	






in	determining	 the	 causes	 and	 likely	 trajectories	of	 criminal	 activity	 in	
the	Caribbean	as	well	as	in	Kenya.	Such	feelings	of	deprivation	have	been	
outlined	and	explained	by	numerous	authors.	Ellis’s	 study5	of	 the	blos‐
soming	 of	 criminal	 activity	 in	 Jamaica	 from	 the	 1950s	 to	 the	 1980s	 is	
relevant	 to	 our	 project	 here	 in	 that	 it	 deals	 with	 precisely	 the	 period	
immediately	 following	 the	 death	 of	 the	 Jamaican	 outlaw	 Ivanhoe	
“Rhyging”	 Martin,	 who	 was	 gunned	 down	 by	 police	 in	 1948,	 and	 in	
which	 Jimmy	Cliff	 released	the	1972	 film	The	Harder	They	Come.	Other	






The	 recent	 rise	 of	 violent	 crime	 and	 criminal	 confrontation	 in	 Kenya	
with	groups	such	as	Mungiki	coming	to	the	fore	as	semi‐organized	bod‐
ies	brings	into	focus	once	again	the	ability	of	disenfranchised	(and	even	













legal	 if	not	 illegal	 lines.	 Such	a	 situation	 is	 obviously	 compounded	 in	a	







produced.	 This	 can	 be	 deduced	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 poverty	 rates	 in	 the	
early	1990s	were	at	above	30%	and	that,	according	to	Audley	Shaw,	the	








sufficient	 to	 make	 both	 individual	 and	 organized	 crime	 possible.	 The	
ambiguity	 in	which	 the	 term	 “crime”	 is	 itself	 defined	 in	both	 legal	 and	
social	terms	leaves	a	great	deal	of	intellectual	room	for	debate	and	disa‐








10	 See,	 for	 example,	 Laurie	 Gunst’s	 study	 Born	 Fi’	 Dead(1996)	 which	 does	 an	
excellent	job	of	explaining	the	ways	in	which	Jamaican	criminals	have	responded	




be	 evil,	 shameful,	 or	 wrong.”11	 These	 two	 definitions,	 when	 taken	 to‐
gether,	go	a	 long	way	toward	 indicating	 the	amorphous	and	plastic	na‐












and	 empathetic	 to	 their	 audiences	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 activate	 a	
sense	of	the	ambiguity	inherent	in	their	acts	of	theft	and	violence.	These	







regions.	 Of	 equal	 if	 not	 greater	 importance,	 however,	 are	 those	 texts	






in	 their	 respective	 countries	 through	 their	 musical	 and	 dramatic	 tal‐
ents—Cliff	 in	 Jamaica	 and	Wainaina	 in	 Kenya.	While	 I	 will	 attempt	 as	









the	 length	of	 their	careers,	 the	scope	of	my	analysis	will	necessarily	be	
limited	to	one	“work”	by	each	artist.	This	category	will	be	broadly	inter‐







notion	 of	 the	 creative	 background	of	 each	performing	 artist	 as	well	 as	
the	manner	in	which	the	works	considered	here	fits	into	and	can	be	per‐
ceived	 to	 represent	 general	 imaginative	 and	 intellectual	 tendencies	
within	the	oeuvre	of	each	performing	artist.			
Since	 the	 beginning	 of	 his	 solo	 career	 in	 2001,	 the	 Kenyan	 recording	
artist	 Eric	Wainaina	 has	 repeatedly	 made	 poverty	 and	 corruption	 the	
focus	of	his	creative	works.	His	2011	album	Love	+	Protest	continues	this	
trajectory	with	the	majority	of	the	tracks	confronting	such	issues.	He	has	
become	 an	 important	 public	 figure	 in	 Kenya	 who	 has	 taken	 an	 active	
part	 in	 the	cultural	 life	of	 the	country,	more	specifically	 in	 the	nation’s	
capital,	 Nairobi.	 He	 has	 also	 been	 a	 featured	 artist	 in	 regional	 events	
such	 as	 the	 Sauti	 za	Busara	 festival	 in	 Zanzibar	 in	 2004	and	2008	and	
has	collaborated	with	artists	from	throughout	the	African	continent	such	
as	 Oliver	 Mtukudzi	 from	 Zimbabwe	 and	 Baaba	 Maal	 from	 Senegal.	 In	
addition	to	his	musical	work,	he	has	been	involved	in	a	number	of	theat‐
rical	 productions,	 perhaps	 the	most	 renowned	 of	 these	 is	 the	musical	
Lwanda	 Magere13	 in	 which	 he	 acted	 as	 the	 protagonist.14	 Although	
Wainaina	 did	 not	 grow	 up	 poor	 and	 in	 fact	 was	 fortunate	 enough	 to	
study	at	the	Berkelee	School	of	Music	in	Boston,	he	has	made	his	Kenyan	
identity	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 his	 musical	 expression	 and	 on	 each	 of	 his	
                                                 
13	 Wainaina’s	 selection	 of	 the	 Luo	 legend	 of	 Lwanda	 Magere	 as	 the	 theme	 of	 his	
musical	is	relevant	in	and	of	itself	as	it	represents	a	manifestation	of	his	conscious	
effort	 to	 carry	 out	 artistic	 collaborations	 across	 some	 of	 the	 strongest	
discriminatory	dividing	 lines	 in	Kenyan	society	historically	and	in	contemporary	



























to	 state	 that	 the	 plot	 and	 songs	which	 together	make	 up	 the	 film	The	
Harder	They	Come	form	part	of	a	politically	and	socially	engaged	mindset	
which	have	been	behind	Cliff’s	oeuvre	since	early	on.	As	a	relevant	ex‐
ample,	 his	 most	 recent	 album	 Rebirth,	 released	 in	 201216	 features	 a	
number	of	songs	that	deal	with	social	justice	and	the	problems	faced	by	
impoverished	 individuals	and	communities.	The	album	begins	with	 the	
song	 “World	 Upside	 Down”	 where	 Cliff	 states	 in	 the	 first	 verse	 that	
“Looking	 at	 world	 today/I	 am	 impelled	 to	 say/So	much	war	 and	 pov‐
erty/While	few	enjoy	prosperity.”	In	“The	Children’s	Bread,”	Cliff	attacks	
the	capricious	greed	of	the	wealthy	and	their	cynical	waste	in	deliberate	
ignorance	 of	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 poor	 singing,	 “They	 took	 the	 children’s	
bread	and	give	it	to	the	dogs/Making	so	many	people’s	lives	so	hard.”	In	
“Reggae	Music,”	he	asserts	that	“Whenever	there	is	injustice	and	tyranny	





Reggae	 music	 is	 there/Standing	 up	 for	 the	 rights	 and	 the	 true	 light.”	






circumstances	 or	 even	message,	 it	 is	 my	 intention	 in	 this	 study	 to	 ex‐




Narayan	and	Patti	Petesch	state	unequivocally	 in	 the	collection	of	 field	
studies,	Voices	of	the	Poor	from	Many	Lands,	the	true	experts	on	poverty	
are	those	who	are	forced	to	struggle	with	this	condition	every	day.17	I	do	
not	claim	that	 the	works	studied	here	 in	 this	comparative	study	neces‐
sarily	 represent	 the	 direct	 interventions	 of	 impoverished	 individuals,	
which	can	be	utilized	by	poverty	pundits	in	order	to	realign	or	radically	
alter	 policy.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 I	 do	 feel	 that	 a	 close	 analysis	 of	 these	
works,	although	they	may	have	been	created	by	artists	who,	by	the	time	





from	which	 they	 emerged.	 These	 are	 publics	 composed	 largely	 of	 fans	
from	disadvantaged	backgrounds.		




multimedia	 in	 order	 to	 interrogate	 social	 attitudes	 toward	wealth	 and	
poverty	in	postcolonial	settings?	Simultaneously,	how	are	their	rhetori‐
cal	messages	constructed	and	what	impacts	or	effects	are	intended	to	be	






A	 close	 consideration	 of	 the	 works	 of	 Jimmy	 Cliff	 and	 Eric	 Wainaina	
permits	a	reassessment	of	definitions	and	conceptualizations	of	poverty	
as	 a	 constellation	 of	 phenomena	 both	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative.	 As	
Ruth	 Lister	 points	 out,	 both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 studies	 are	
needed	in	order	to	provide	more	complete	representations	of	the	reality	













character	 development,	 plot,	 thematic	 content	 and	 other	 elements	 of	
creative	 composition.”19	 In	 other	 contexts,	 I	 have	 used	 this	 concept	 to	
provide	inroads	into	studies	regarding	themes	as	diverse	as	sexuality,20	
gender	politics,21	and	the	use	and	abuse	of	wealth	and	money.22	It	is	my	
contention	 that	 this	 particular	 sort	 of	 hypertextuality	 can	 be	 fruitfully	
employed	 here	 in	 order	 to	 unpack	 narratives	 of	 those	who	 find	 them‐
selves	 in	 circumstances	of	 abject	poverty	 and	open	conflicts	with	 their	
respective	 societies.	 Such	 an	 appraisal	 is	 justified	by	 the	 statements	of	
Narayan	 and	 Petesch	 who,	 having	 reviewed	 qualitative	 field	 reports	
from	more	than	two	dozen	countries,	have	come	to	a	better	understand‐
ing	of	 the	 “striking	commonalities	 in	 the	experiences	of	poverty	across	








countries.”23	 It	 is	 in	 no	way	my	 intention	 to	 reduce	 the	 experiences	 of	
Jamaican	and	Kenyan	poverty	 to	 two	creative	works	 and	 subsequently	
proceed	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 these	 two	 works	 are	 identical.	 A	 careful	
scrutiny	 of	 the	 film	 and	 song	 can,	 however,	 reveal	 the	power	 of	 art	 to	
articulate	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	 the	 disenfranchised	 and	 to	 explain	
some	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 such	 individuals’	 choices	 even	when	 such	 ac‐
tions	may	on	the	surface	appear	irrational	and	even	self‐destructive.	
One	recent	study	that	I	have	found	useful	in	delineating	the	nature	and	












problems	 of	 exclusion	 in	 modern‐day	Morocco	 and	 the	 differentiation	
which	 the	 perception	 of	 deprivation	 undergoes	 according	 to	 age	 and	
gender,	such	ideas	are	also	important	in	coming	to	a	better	understand‐
ing	of	the	messages	at	work	in	these	creative	works	and	their	capacity	to	





violent	 crimes	 tend	 to	 be	 geographically	 concentrated	 in	 poor	
urban	 communities,	 with	 more	 than	 half	 of	 them	 occurring	 in	
Kingston	and	St.	Andrew,	and	almost	 three‐quarters	of	murders	
and	more	than	80	percent	of	shootings	taking	place	in	Kingston,	








In	both	 the	 song	by	Wainaina	and	 the	 film	and	 songs	 as	performed	by	
Jimmy	Cliff,	we	can	perceive	 the	declaration,	discussion,	and	dispute	of	
the	right	of	impoverished	male	characters	to	aggressively	take	what	they	
want	 from	 society.	 In	 an	 extremely	 limited	manner	 these	male	 figures	
attempt	 to	 create	 what	 Comaroff	 and	 Comaroff	 have	 called	 “parallel	
modes	of	production.”27	They	explain	that	“criminal	violence	does	not	so	
much	repudiate	 the	rule	of	 law	or	 the	 licit	operations	of	 the	market	as	





ing	 in	order	 to	 take	what	 they	need	by	way	of	 the	only	means	at	 their	




alization	 of	 relative	 deprivation	 as	 a	 phenomenon	 through	which	 indi‐
viduals	compare	themselves	to	other	members	of	 their	own	immediate	
society	 as	 bounded	 by	 the	 national	 or	 possibly	 nationally	 diasporic	
space,29	here	I	would	like	to	emphasize	the	capacity	of	individuals	to,	in	





international	 if	 not	 global	 narratives	 of	 youth,	 poverty,	 and	 resistance.	
Cliff’s	 film	 has	 been	 a	 cult	 classic	 on	 the	 international	 circuit	 for	 forty	
years	 and	 continues	 to	 prove	 relevant	 to	 young	 audiences	 throughout	












idea	 for	 the	 song	 came	 from	 conversations	 that	 he	 had	with	 his	 band	
members	 while	 on	 tour	 in	 Switzerland.31	 After	 hearing	 stories	 about	
Eastern	 European	 women	 who	 were	 travelling	 to	 Western	 Europe	 to	
land	wealthier	men	and	thus	“epuka	umaskini”	or	“run	away	from	pov‐





















an	 equally	 lengthy	 history,	 that	 of	 bank	 robbery	movies.	 In	 both	 cases	
this	violent	behavior	eventually	comes	to	engulf	and	destroy	the	protag‐
onists	themselves	who	end	their	short	lives	in	a	rain	of	bullets.	









ters	 into	a	 life	of	 crime	 that	 they	 turn	 to	due	 to	 their	 circumstances	of	
extreme	penury	and	the	seeming	impossibility	of	improving	their	lot.	In	
the	case	of	The	Harder	They	Come,	this	protagonist	is	Ivan	Martin	(based	
on	 the	character	of	 the	historical	 figure	of	 Ivanhoe	“Rhyging”	Martin,	a	




Kingston	 he	 begins	 to	 suffer	 the	 physical	 and	 emotional	 pains	 of	 real	
poverty	in	an	urban	environment.	His	attempts	to	make	his	fortune	as	a	





more	 accurately	 into	 the	 embrace	 of	 Elsa,	 a	 woman	 who	 he	 spies	
through	the	church	windows).	All	of	his	attempts	at	honest	employment	
are	 thwarted	 however,	 and	when	 he	 has	 a	 violent	 falling	 out	with	 the	
preacher,	 he	 turns	 to	 the	 life	 of	 a	 drug	 dealer	 in	 order	 to	 make	 ends	
meet.	 This	 racy	 lifestyle	 soon	 leads	 him	 into	 open	 and	 violent	 conflict	
with	the	police	and	he	kills	officer	after	officer	before	being	wounded.	He	







pistol]”	 in	 order	 to	 engage	 him	 in	 a	Wild	West	 showdown.	When	 Ivan	
raises	his	revolvers	he	is	laid	low	in	a	hail	of	gunfire.	
The	nameless	protagonist	of	the	song	“Mariana”	has	a	similarly	brief	life	





him	 to	 his	 knees	 (umenirudisha	magotini).	 In	 a	manner	 similar	 to	 Ivan	
other	 city	 dwellers	 have	 robbed	 him	 of	 his	 hard‐earned	 goods,	 in	 this	
case	 a	 bicycle	which	 the	 narrator	 had	 bought	with	 borrowed	 funds	 in	











ble	 means	 to	 achieve	 relief	 from	 their	 economic	 distress.	 In	 the	 song	
“Mariana,”	 the	 protagonist	 does	 this	 ostensibly	 in	 order	 to	 vindicate	
himself	in	the	eyes	and	affections	of	his	Mariana.	All	of	the	money	which	
he	steals	from	the	bank	he	in	fact	leaves	at	the	base	of	a	tree	for	her.	As	





are	 at	 various	 points	 subordinated	 to	 his	 inability	 to	 provide	 for	 and	
secure	his	amorous	relationship	with	Mariana.		
In	 the	 case	 of	 Ivan	 in	 The	 Harder	 They	 Come,	 his	 antisocial	 behavior	
seems	much	more	self‐interested	and	certainly	not	embedded	in	a	nar‐
rative	of	unrequited	love.	Ivan	takes	on	women	like	shirts	and,	though	he	
“conquers”	Elsa	 and	brings	her	 into	his	 orbit,	 he	 is	 shown	 in	 bed	with	
another	woman	 the	night	 that	 he	 has	 his	 first	 serious	 showdown	with	
the	 police	 and	 has	 to	 escape	 in	 his	 underwear	 after	 shooting	 various	
officers.	The	lyrics	of	the	title	track	from	the	film,	in	fact,	encapsulate	the	
                                                 
32	 See	Atomic	Jazz	Band’s	“Nitarudi	Shamba,”	Olith	Ratego’s	“Twende	Kwa	Shamba,”	
















future.	 In	 fact,	 in	 counterpoint	 to	 the	 thrill‐seeking	 Mariana	 in	





them	 to,	 in	 the	 terms	 described	 by	 Townsend	 and	 later	 by	 Nolan	 and	
Whelan,	 participate	 effectively	 as	members	 of	 society	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	
resources.33	Thus	in	both	song	and	film	the	seemingly	inescapable	reali‐
ty	of	poverty	 is	described	and	agitated	against	even	 if	 the	protagonists	
are	 not	 capable	 of	 realizing	 true	 realization	 through	 their	 violent	 and	
illegal	 actions.	As	 Lister	 points	 out,	 “One	 of	 the	most	 striking	develop‐
ments	 in	 the	contemporary	politics	of	poverty	 is	 the	growing	demands	




they	 speak	 about	 the	manner	 in	which	 young	men	 in	 postcolonial	 set‐
tings,	 doubly	 isolated	 from	 the	 centers	of	 political	 and	 financial	 power	
due	 to	 their	 status	 as	 both	disenfranchised	 and	 young,	 seize	 for	 them‐
selves	 the	symbols	of	power	and	wealth.	Though	 their	moments	of	au‐





thority	 are	 fleeting	 and	 sorely	 limited,	 focused	 as	 they	 are	 upon	 the	





poverty	 that	makes	 their	messages	much	more	 realistic	 and	 therefore	
potent.	The	myth	of	the	so‐called	free	market	is	that	it	is	a	self‐correcting	
system	that	naturally	adjusts	itself	as	an	economic	structure	in	order	to	
provide	 the	 ideal	 distribution	 of	 opportunities	 ideally	 to	 all.	What	 the	









assured	 should	 such	 individuals	 demonstrate	 their	 willingness	 to	 vio‐





Police	 are	 a	 central	 part	 of	 the	 everyday	 life	 of	 the	urban	poor,	
yet	 are	 perceived	 as	 reinforcing	 fear	 and	 divisiveness.	 Focus	
groups	in	all	communities	felt	that	the	relationship	between	the	
police	and	the	urban	poor	served	only	to	exacerbate	existing	con‐
flict	 […]	 Young	 people	 in	 particular	 argued	 that	 through	 their	
wholesale	harassment	of	youth	on	street	corners,	 the	actions	of	
the	police	 “mek	 the	youth	dem	behave	wickeder.”	Their	 actions	
instill	fear	and	hatred	amongst	the	youth.35	














almost	 certainly	 result	 in	 the	 extortion	 of	 a	 bribe	 and	 possibly	 in	 out‐
right	 physical	 abuse	 or	 worse.	 Such	 realities	 are	 candidly	 explored	 in	
youth	music	known	as	genge	 in	Kenya.	Some	of	 the	most	articulate	ex‐
amples	of	this	can	be	found	on	the	self‐titled	debut	album	of	the	group	




tired	 of	 suffering,”	 and	whispers	 to	 his	Mariana	with	 his	 dying	 breath	









and	 free	will	 itself.	Thus	Marx’s	description	of	money	as	 the	 “universal	
social	power,”38	recognizing	as	it	does	both	the	instrumental	and	socially	
integrated	nature	of	wealth	as	function,	goes	a	great	distance	in	explain‐
ing	 the	actions	of	our	primary	actors	here	 in	 their	 attempts	 to	assume	
and	 therefore	 exploit	 the	 transcendent,	 even	 if	 transient	 and	 literally	













which	 these	 texts	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 radically	 different.	 Geographically	
they	 are	 on	 opposite	 sides	 of	 the	 globe	 although	 both	 from	 the	Global	
South.	They	are	separated	by	nearly	half	 a	 century	 in	 their	 chronology	
and	 are	 performed	 in	 Jamaican	 Patois	 and	 colloquial	 Kenyan	 Swahili	
respectively.	 An	 inherently	 hypertextual	 examination	 of	 these	 works,	
however,	lays	bare	the	powerful	reverberations	of	film	and	song	as	nar‐
ratives	 of	 poverty	 and	 disempowerment	 in	 postcolonial	 settings.	 By	






A	 salient	 correlation	 can	 be	 carried	 out	 between	 these	 creative	works	
and	a	cross	section	of	the	scholarship	related	to	poverty	and	youth	em‐




the	 centers	of	 economic	power	and	authority	 in	 their	 respective	 socie‐
ties,	 understand	 their	 deprivation	 and	 attempt	 to	 strategies,	 whether	
feasible	or	not,	to	break	out	of	the	cycles	of	deficiency	and	desperation	
into	 which	 they	 have	 been	 thrust	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 factors	 largely	
beyond	 their	 control.	 The	 dismissal	 of	 acts	 of	 aggression	 and	 violent	
crime	which	are	often	 linked	 to	 the	conditions	of	 such	disenfranchised	
men	 can	 thus	 be	 understood,	 through	 a	 more	 nuanced	 exploration	 of	
these	 sociological	 and	 psychological	 dynamics	 to	 be	 the	 logical	 if	 not	
68			Aaron	Louis	Rosenberg	
 






Well	they	tell	me	of	a	pie	up	in	the	sky	 	 	 	
Waiting	for	me	when	I	die		 	 	 	
But	between	the	day	you’re	born	and	when	you	die	 	
They	never	seem	to	hear	even	your	cry	 	 	 	
	
CHORUS	 	 	 	 	 	
So	as	sure	as	the	sun	will	shine	 	 	 	 	
I’m	gonna	get	my	share	now	of	what’s	mine		 	
And	then	the	harder	they	come	the	harder	they’ll	fall,		 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
One	and	all	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	harder	they	come	the	harder	they’ll	fall		 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
One	and	all	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Well	the	oppressors	are	trying	to	keep	me	down	 	
Trying	to	drive	me	underground	 	 	 	
And	they	think	that	they	have	got	the	battle	won	 	
I	say	forgive	them	Lord	 	 	 	 	 	
They	know	not	what	they’ve	done	 	 	 	
	









CHORUS	 	 	 	 	 	
	
The	harder	they	come,	the	harder	they’ll	fall		 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
One	and	all	 	 	 	 	 	 	
What	I	say	now,	what	I	say	now	 	 	 	 	
What	I	say	now,	what	I	say	one	time	 	 	 	
The	harder	they	come	the	harder	they’ll	fall		 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
One	and	all	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR 
COMBATING POVERTY IN LATIN AMERICA? 
Pablo	E.	Pérez	and	Brenda	Brown	
Pérez	 and	Brown	 analyze	 the	 strategies	 behind	 the	 implementation	 of	
Conditional	Monetary	Transfer	Programs	(CMTP)	in	Latin	America	since	
the	 1990s.	 Those	 policies	 were	 a	 new	 attempt	 at	 engaging	 the	 perva‐
siveness	of	 unemployment.	 In	 fact,	 the	 authors	 explain	 that	 these	poli‐
cies	 come	 as	 an	 oddity	 since	 they	 have	 multiplied	 even	 after	 the	 so‐
called	progressive	governments.	





development	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 government	 proposals	 that	 fundamentally	
questioned	 the	neoliberal	 ideas	of	 the	1990s.	These	were	and	are	pro‐
posals	in	which	the	state	plays	a	key	role	in	national	development	strat‐
egies	and	their	implementation.	Such	policies	have	come	to	be	referred	
to	 as	 “new	 developmentalism”	 or	 “neodevelopmentalism.”1	 This	 new	
role	assumed	by	the	state	generates	changes	in	public	policy	in	general	
and	social	policies	in	particular.	Although	the	priority	assigned	to	output	
growth	and	employment	has	 led	most	 countries	 to	an	 improvement	 in	












beneficiaries	 can	 demonstrate	 that	 they	 have	 met	 certain	 conditions	
(popularly	 such	 transactions	 are	 referred	 to	 as	 funding	 “with	 strings	
attached”).	 Such	 policies	 supposedly	 aim	 to	 reduce	 poverty	 levels,	 not	
only	 in	 the	 short‐term—by	 way	 of	 stimulating	 monetary	 profits—but	
also	via	medium‐term	strategies	which	are	designed	to	break	 intergen‐
erational	cycles	of	poverty	via	“human	capital	accumulation.”	
In	1997,	 only	 three	 countries	 in	Latin	America	had	 such	programs	un‐
derway;	ten	years	later,	almost	all	of	the	countries	in	the	region	have	at	
least	one	program	of	 this	 type	 in	effect	 (Lavinas,	2013).	 It	 is	estimated	
that	 such	 programs	 reach	 70	 million	 people	 (Valencia	 Lomelí,	 2008).	

















the	 transformation	of	 the	 current	model	 of	 social	 protection	 in	 the	 re‐
gion.	









CCTP	 peculiarities.	 Finally,	 we	 reflect	 on	 the	 results	 achieved	 by	 the	
CCTP	programs	in	the	region.	
2 From Social Rights to Social Protection 
2.1  Risks, Rights, and Conditions for Social Protection 
All	of	the	advanced	capitalist	countries	recognize	some	form	of	a	general	
social	 right	 to	 protection	 against	 basic	 social	 risks	 such	 as	 unemploy‐
ment,	 disability,	 illness,	 and	 old	 age	 rights.	 Access	 to	 such	 assistance,	
however,	is	almost	never	unconditional,	since	to	receive	a	benefit,	claim‐




Esping‐Andersen	 (1993)	 distinguishes	 three	 classical	 types	 of	 agree‐
ments	in	modern	societies.	The	first	is	the	essentialist	model,	dominant	
in	Anglo‐Saxon	countries,	where	rights	to	such	services	are	based	on	an	
urgent	 and	 demonstrable	 need	 to	 ensure	 the	 “deserving”	 character	 of	
beneficiaries.	The	practice	of	social	assistance,	with	its	origin	in	the	tra‐
dition	 of	 the	 Poor	 Law	 of	 1834,	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 unquestioned	
right	 of	 government	 agencies	 to	 check	 the	 livelihood	 and	 income	 of	
those	who	are	applying	for	assistance.	A	second	type	of	agreement	infra‐
structure	 recognizes	 the	 essential	 role	 of	 rights	 in	 relation	 to	 formal	
work.	 This	 kind	 of	 protection	 system,	 which	 predominates	 in	 Latin	
America,	has	its	origins	in	the	tradition	of	insurance	as	developed	first	in	
Germany	and	then	throughout	Europe.	Here	rights	are	conditioned	upon	
and	 perpetually	 linked	 to	 a	 system	 of	 interaction	 between	 the	 labor	
market	and	financial	contributions.	Finally,	the	third	type	of	agreement	
guarantees	 universal	 rights	 to	 citizens,	 regardless	 of	 their	 individual	
relationship	with	the	labor	market.	The	capacity	to	request	assistance	as	
a	beneficiary	depends	upon	one’s	 status	 as	 a	 citizen	or	 resident	 in	 the	
country	for	a	certain	time.	These	systems	operate	as	ideal	types;	in	reali‐











one	 which	 is	 export‐oriented	 is	 related	 to	 the	 transformation	 of	 our	
model	of	social	protection.	These	policies,	centralized,	sectorialized,	and	
managed	from	the	state	social	policies,	will	lead	to	models	of	decentral‐
ized	social	policies,	 “targeted”	and,	 in	some	cases,	delegated	 to	 the	pri‐
vate	 sector,	 such	 as	 those	 that	 have	multiplied	 over	 the	 past	 two	 dec‐
ades.	




We	 are	 particularly	 interested	 in	 examining	 the	 institutionalization	 of	
nonparticipation	 in	wage	 labor,	 selecting	 those	 involved	 in	 the	process	
of	social	production	who	regularly	participate	 in	 the	 labor	market,	and	
analyzing	 the	 presence	 of	 those	 who	 are	 relegated	 to	 the	 category	 of	
intermittent	workers	or	 inactive	members	of	 society.	All	 of	 these	anal‐
yses	are	to	be	carried	out	under	the	umbrella	of	social	policies	and	their	
regulatory	potential.	
2.2  The State and the Reproduction of Labor Force. The Functions 
of Social Policy 
At	 this	 point	 we	 return	 to	 the	 perspectives	 of	 Offe	 (1990)	 and	 Jessop	
(2002),	for	whom	social	policy	is	primarily	a	national	strategy	intended	
to	 regulate	 the	 incorporation	 of	 labor	 force	 into	 a	 given	 labor	market	
according	to	the	necessities	of	capital	accumulation.	
If	 the	 state	wants	 to	ensure—and	quantitatively	 control—the	 transfor‐
mation	 of	 the	 labor	 force	 into	 wage‐labor,	 it	 organizes	 and	 sanctions	
different	forms	of	participation	in	the	labor	market.	We	can	readily	iden‐









working	 class	 “by	 education,	 tradition,	 and	 habit	 looks	 upon	 the	 re‐
quirements	of	that	mode	of	production	as	self‐evident	natural	laws”	(Of‐
fe,	1990).	
It	 is	 simultaneously	necessary	 that	 authorities	handle	 changes	 in	 labor	
demand;	Offe	(1990:	98)	points	out	the	need	for	the	state	and	its	various	
divisions	to	establish	“catchment	areas”	which	lie	outside	of	the	conven‐
tional	 labor	market.	 These	 are	 zones	where	 the	 labor	 force	 can	 be	 ac‐
commodated	either	permanently	 (old‐age	pensions,	payments	 for	disa‐
bled	 workers)	 or	 temporarily	 (institutions	 of	 health	 care	 and	 further	
education);	but	on	condition	that	access	to	them	must	be	controlled	by	
the	 state	 through	 admission	 requirements.	 Otherwise	 the	 “compulsion	
to	sell”	which	gives	a	strong	impulse	to	individuals	to	enter	and	remain	









tionally	 enforced.	 Offe	 considers	 such	 conditions	 an	 exchange	 transac‐
tion	 in	which	material	 benefits	 for	 the	needy	 are	 traded	 for	 their	 sub‐
missive	recognition	of	the	“moral	order”	of	the	society	which	generates	
such	needs.	




capital.	 Thus	workers	may	not	 reproduce	 their	 labor‐power	 (including	
specific	 skills,	 abilities,	 knowledge,	 work—capacity);	 (2)	When	 capital	




ened	 through	 over‐exploitation	 (excessive	 hours	 or	work	 intensity)	 or	
through	 “collateral”	 damage	 (such	 as	 accidents	or	 occupational	 diseas‐
es)2;	 (3)	workers	 find	 it	 hard	 to	defend	 their	 collective	 interests	 in	 re‐
producing	 their	 labor‐power—especially	where	 there	 is	a	 large	pool	of	
unemployed	but	employable	workers.	Therefore,	the	state	must	ensure	a	
continuous	and	adequate	skilled	 labor	supply,	as	well	as	compensating	
for	 the	 effects	 caused	by	 the	 commodification	 of	 both	 social	 reproduc‐
tion	and	social	cohesion	(Jessop,	2002).	









2.3  A New Configuration of Social Protection in Latin America 
The	proliferation	of	CCTP	 in	Latin	America	has	been	carried	out	 in	 the	
context	of	a	change	in	the	nature	of	the	social	protection	system	world‐
wide.	Over	 the	past	 three	decades,	many	welfare	 states	have	moved	 to	
downsize	or	dismantle	such	social	safety	nets,	shifting	from	comprehen‐
sive	 coverage	 toward	 more	 individualized	 models—“targeted”	 or	
“means‐tested”—and	 from	decommodified	provision	 of	 goods	 and	 ser‐
vices	to	a	greater	emphasis	on	cash	benefits	(Lavinas,	2013).	While	the	
postwar	 welfare	 state	 recognized	 the	 needs	 of	 its	 citizens	 on	 both	 an	
individual	 and	 collective	 level	 and	 based	 upon	 these	 granted	 “rights”	
that	guaranteed	equal	access	to	public	services,	the	new	model	which	is	
presently	 emerging	 offers	 “rewards”	 in	 return	 for	 fulfilment	 of	 obliga‐
tions.	This	new	social	protection	scheme	is	known	under	the	neologism	
of	 “workfare”	 which	merges	 the	word	 “work”	 to	 “welfare”	 in	 order	 to	
encapsulate	a	new	economic	and	philosophical	social	contract.	
                                                 
2	 The	private	capital	 interests	are	not	required	to	invest	 in	human	capital	or	com‐





system	 in	 the	 central	 countries,	 whose	 foundation	 is	 based	 upon	 the	
need	 to	 explain	 the	nature	of	 the	 changes	which	have	been	 realized	 in	
the	labor	market	during	the	last	quarter	of	the	twentieth	century	and	in	







This	 social	 protection	 system	 is	 based	 on	 a	 new	 strategy	 intended	 to	
manage	 social	 risks	where	 the	 objectives	 of	 equality	 and	 social	 justice	
are	 no	 longer	 concerned	with	material	 outcomes,	 but	 instead	with	 the	
creation	 of	 opportunity	 structures	 (Dean,	 2007).	 The	 primary	 role	 of	


























of	 informality	 and	 the	 limited	 and	 uneven	 development	 of	 insurance	
against	unemployment	have	an	effect	on	poor	and	insipient	risk	cover‐
age3	via	the	contributory	system.	In	this	sense,	the	CCTP	as	an	umbrella	
network	of	 systems	allows	 for	governing	bodies	 to	 reach	 (in	a	 focused	
and	residually	way)	 those	groups	that	historically	were	not	covered	by	









sion	as	a	 first	 step	 toward	a	 “social	protection	 floor”.	This	proposal	as‐
sumed	 as	 its	 objective	 the	 capacity	 to	 generate	 horizontal	 successive	
extensions	 (increasing	 the	number	of	 people	 covered	by	 social	 protec‐
tion)	as	well	as	vertical	ones	(improving	the	quantity	and	quality	of	ser‐
vices	 and	 social	 security	 guarantees).	 This	 strategy	 is	 presented	 as	 a	
“ladder	of	 social	 security”	which	 consists	 of	 three	 steps	with	 three	dif‐
ferent	 performance	 levels,	 corresponding	 to	 different	 levels	 of	 guaran‐
tees.	In	the	center	of	the	model	are	those	commonly	contributory	social	
insurance	 schemes.	 Among	 members	 of	 compulsory	 contributory	





While	we	 consider	 it	marked	progress	 that	 there	are	authorities	 ready	
and	willing	to	oversee	the	application	of	a	social	protection	floor	(espe‐
                                                 
3	 The	contributory	character	of	these	safe	and	the	high	rates	of	informality	that	the	
region	 presents	 have	 a	 negative	 effect	 on	 the	 coverage.	 According	 to	 the	 ILO	 in	





cially	 in	 terms	of	 its	 impact	on	poverty	rates),	we	understand	 this	pro‐
posal	 to	be	 grossly	 insufficient	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	does	not	 foster	a	
significant	change	in	the	tax	logic	that	prevails	in	the	region.	The	novelty	
of	this	initiative	lies	in	the	fact	that	it	is	designed	to	promote	“good	coor‐
dination”	between	 the	 contributory	 and	noncontributory	 system	 in	or‐
der	to	achieve	inclusion	of	the	entire	population	in	any	of	these	systems	
(ILO,	2014).	However,	there	remain	distinct	benefits	for	each	of	the	sys‐
tems	which	 now	 exist,	 as	well	 as	 different	 resources	 distributed	 upon	
each	of	the	“steps”	of	the	“ladder	of	social	security.”	
3 Conditional Cash Transfer Programs, Human Capital 
and Employability. The end of poverty in Latin 
America? 
3.1  Diagnosis 





two	 sets	 of	 ideas:	 the	 idea	 of	 human	 capital	 (Schultz,	 1961;	 Becker,	
1983)	 that	 aims	 to	 eradicate	poverty	 in	 the	 long	 term;	 and	 the	 idea	of	
fighting	poverty	in	the	short	term	targeting	social	spending.	The	strategy	
to	break	intergenerational	cycles	of	poverty	is	based	on	the	idea	that	any	
significant	 increase	 in	 human	 capital	 will	 result	 in	 an	 increase	 of	 em‐
ployability	that	will	allow	beneficiaries	to	leave	their	conditions	of	pov‐
erty	by	being	integrated,	 in	the	future,	 into	the	labor	market,	or	 in	 jobs	
with	higher	 incomes.	The	 low	education	 levels	 and	poor	health	of	 vul‐
nerable	sectors	are	seen	as	an	obstacle	to	prosperity	because	they	pre‐
vent	 these	 individuals	 and	 communities	 from	participating	 fully	 in	 the	
market,	both	as	workers	or	as	consumers.	
Employability4	is	defined	as	the	probability	of	a	person	to	find	a	job.	In	
the	 case	 of	 the	 array	 of	 programs	 under	 analysis	 in	 this	 chapter,	 we	
should	 understand	 such	 initiatives	 as	 forces	 promoting	 a	 type	 of	 em‐







dividual	 responsibility	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 build	 and	mobilize	 social	 net‐
works	 in	order	 to	bring	about	 the	necessary	changes.	Each	worker	ap‐
pears	in	this	vision	of	the	market	in	society	as	the	supreme	manager	of	
his	 or	 her	 own	 career	 path,	 emphasizing	 the	 individual	 character	 that	
determines	 access	or	 not	 to	 the	work	world,	 and	 therefore,	 the	 fate	 of	
being	or	not	being	poor.	Training	and	activation	pursue	the	same	objec‐
tive:	 increase	 the	 individual’s	 autonomy	 and	 empowerment	 effectively	
providing	 them	with	 the	means	 to	 carry	 out	 their	projects	 rather	 than	
simply	assist	superficially	in	their	realization.	Nowadays,	the	role	of	the	
state	is	primarily	perceived	to	be	the	provision	of	assistance	to	individu‐







are	 arising	 as	 a	 result	 of	 structural	 issues	 related	 to	 the	 accumulation	
mode	adopted,	the	structural	characteristics	of	the	Latin	American	labor	
markets,	 macroeconomic	 policies	 developed,	 and	 so	 forth.	 This	 vision	
tends	to	blame	the	victim	who	suffers	the	problems	which	are	supposed‐
ly	 being	 addressed,	 redirecting	 the	 focus	 of	 institutional	 networks	 of	




3.2  The Consensus 
Because	 they	 understand	 that	 attempting	 to	 alleviate	 social	 problems	
with	 conventional	 systems	 in	 Latin	 America	 compromises	 the	 public	
resources,	 international	 organizations	 recommend	 targeting	 on	 the	
poorest,	 giving	 them	 tools	 and	 assets	 to	 improve	 risks	 management	




this	 sense	 that	CCTP	are	considered	 to	be	 the	programs	which	use	 the	
public	 funds	 in	 the	best	way	directing	 them	toward	 those	with	greater	
needs.	












necessary	 to	 remodel	 the	 building	 of	 social	 policy	 and	 target	 public	
spending	specifically	in	these	sectors	(Isuani,	2012).	
Targeting	spending	in	CCTP	allows	for	wide	coverage	at	a	very	low	cost.	
The	 Economic	 Commission	 for	 Latin	 America	 and	 the	 Caribbean—
ECLAC—(2011)	notes	the	significant	growth	of	such	types	of	programs	
in	 Latin	 America	 during	 the	 last	 decade:	 while	 coverage	 (%	 of	 total	
population)	increased	from	5.7%	in	2000	to	19.3%	in	2010	(see	table	in	
annex	 to	 this	 chapter).	 During	 the	 same	 period	 the	 executed	 budget	
doubled,	growing	from	0.2%	to	0.4%	of	GDP.	This	is	one	of	the	main	at‐
tractions	 of	 these	 programs	 for	 governments	 as	 they	 can	 expand	 their	
social	policy	without	making	any	important	fiscal	sacrifices.	




function,	policy	makers	 (and	 the	organizations	 that	promote	 them)	ar‐
gue	 that	 distributing	 large	 amounts	 of	 money	 (close	 to	 the	 minimum	
wage	of	each	country)	to	the	needy	would	simply	cause	the	beneficiaries	
to	fall	further	into	the	poverty	trap.	The	notion	behind	this	vision	is	the	
perception	 that,	 without	working,	 if	 individuals	 are	 able	 to	 gain	 assis‐







program’s	potential	 to	reduce	poverty.	This	 is	 to	say	 that	 the	 impact	 is	
moderate	 when	 one	 considers	 both	 the	 household	 consumption	 and	
poverty	 lines	 (Valencia	 Lomelí,	 2008).	 It	 thus	 appears	 that,	 based	 on	
quantitative	data,	these	programs	can	be	successful	in	reducing	the	gap	
or	 the	 severity	of	poverty,	but	often	have	 a	 low	 impact	 on	 the	 poverty	
rate	itself	(Skoufias,	2000).	
4 A New Social Protection for a New 









export	 revenues	 (the	 2008	 crisis	 also	 generated	 a	 massive	 arrival	 of	
money	 seeking	 higher	 returns	 in	 emerging	 markets).	 These	 factors	 in	
turn	 have	 given	 governments	 a	margin	 of	 fiscal	maneuver	which	 they	
had	previously	 lacked.	The	 third	 factor	was	 institutional,	 because	after	
initial	 skepticism,	 the	WB	 and	 other	 international	 credit	 agencies	 pro‐
moted	the	CCTP,	putting	it	forward	as	an	essential	part	of	its	new	strate‐
gy	of	social	risk	management	to	which	we	have	referred	above.	
Our	perspective,	while	not	entirely	 inconsistent	with	 this	view,	 focuses	
intensively	 upon	 the	 dynamics	 of	 capital	 accumulation	 as	 evolving	 in	
Latin	America.	This	 infrastructural	system,	popularly	referred	to	as	ne‐
odevelopmentalism,	 has	 its	 counterpart	 in	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	
model	of	social	protection	in	the	region.	
What	 do	 we	 mean	 by	 neodevelopmentalism?	 Bresser	 Pereira	 (2007)	





need	 for	 a	 competitive	 exchange	 rate—that	 must	 be	 fluctuating	 but	
managed—to	 avoid	 the	 problem	 of	 Dutch	 disease,	 a	 valid	 concern	 to	
date	in	Latin	American	economies.	At	the	same	time,	the	economy	tends	
to	be	oriented	 toward	exports	 and	 the	 state	plays	a	 central	 role	 in	 the	
organization	 and	 implementation	 of	 any	 development	 strategy.	 Other	
Latin	American	scholars,	depending	on	the	perspective	with	which	each	
of	 us	 identifies	 neodevelopmentalism,	 tend	 to	 describe	 it	 as	 a	 growth	
scheme	linked	to	the	rent	of	 land	through	agricultural	products,	hydro‐
carbons,	and	minerals.	This	is	a	situation	in	which	the	state	plays	an	ac‐










Additionally,	 the	 search	 for	 new	 economic	 and	 social	 bases	 for	 capital	
accumulation	 during	 this	 period	 of	 expansion	 has	 also	 necessitated	 a	
search	for	new	forms	of	state	intervention	designed	to	ensure	increased	
valorization	 of	 capital	 and	 the	 reproduction	 of	 the	 labor	 force	 and	 its	
actors	 under	 such	 new	 conditions	 (Jessop,	 2002).	 As	 a	 result	 the	 new	
role	assumed	by	the	state	generates	changes	in	public	policy	in	general	
and	social	policies	in	particular.	
While	 the	policies	 implemented	have	resulted	 in	growth	and	 increased	
output	and	employment	which	has	led	in	most	countries	to	an	improve‐
ment	 in	 crucial	 economic	 and	 social	 indicators,	 high	 rates	 of	 poverty,	
unemployment,	and	 labor	 informality	persist	and	exclude	a	 large	num‐
ber	of	people	from	the	benefits	of	social	security	which	developmental‐









(3)	 to	 contain	 and	 canalize	 the	 socio‐labor	 conflict	 within	 certain	 ac‐
ceptable	limits.	
The	basic	structure	of	the	CCTP	involves	the	provision	of	monetary	and	
nonmonetary	 resources	 to	 families	 or	 individuals	 in	 vulnerable	 situa‐
tions,	with	the	condition	that	recipients	must	carry	out	certain	behaviors	




programs	 seeking	 to	 promote	 the	 employment	 of	 people	 of	 a	 conven‐
tional	 working	 age.	 The	 route	 out	 of	 poverty	 is	 thus	 the	 beneficiary’s	
participation	 in	 the	 labor	 market.	 A	 second	 type	 of	 program	 aims	 to	





5 The CCPT, the Intergenerational Transfer of Poverty 
and the Activation of Social Protection 
Most	CCTP	transfer	incomes	on	a	monthly	basis	to	families	living	in	pov‐
erty	 or	 indigence	 subject	 to	 compliance	 with	 certain	 duties,	 generally	
related	 to	health	and	nutritional	 controls	 and	 children’s	 school	 attend‐
ance	 in	such	homes.	The	goal	 is	 to	modify	the	family	strategies	used	to	
address	 social	 risks.	 The	 underlying	 diagnosis	 is	 that	 poor	 households	
often	face	declining	real	incomes	with	the	incorporation	of	children	and	
young	people	into	the	labor	market	through	various	forms	of	precarious	
rather	 than	 stable	 employment.	 This	 premature	 insertion	has	 negative	
effects	 in	 the	 long	 term,	 especially	with	 regard	 to	 the	 accumulation	 of	







giving	monthly	 income	 to	 low‐income	 families	 if	 they	meet	 three	 com‐
pensations:	 (1)	 that	 children	 attend	 health	 services	 and	 achieve	 good	
nutrition	 indicators;	 (2)	 that	 they	 comply	with	85%	school	 attendance	
per	month	and	promotion	of	curricular	year;	 (3)	children	 to	stay	away	
from	 economic	 activities.	 Also	 the	 Juancito	 Pinto	 bonus,	which	 runs	 in	
Bolivia	from	2006,	aims	to	eliminate	child	labor	and	increase	school	en‐




is	 attempting	 to	 link	 more	 closely	 cash	 benefits	 with	 active	 training	
measures	and	incentives	for	rapid	job	placement.	In	this	case	the	aim	is	
to	 increase	human	capital	and	 improve	 the	employability	of	 the	unem‐
ployed	(through	education,	training	and	vocational	training),	while	look‐
ing	for	a	quick	insertion	of	beneficiaries	into	the	labor	market,	encourag‐
ing	 the	 abandonment	 of	 social	 assistance	 policies	 through	 a	 system	 of	
declining	benefits.	
Most	 of	 the	 required	 compensations	 are	 associated	 with	 training	 pro‐
grams,	qualifying	practices,	training	in	jobs,	or	completion	of	their	basic	
education.	However,	 they	may	 also	 imply	 compensations	 involving	 the	
application	of	 individuals	 to	 certain	 jobs	or	 to	accept	 the	proposed	 job	
offer	 from	employment	offices.	This	 is	one	of	 the	ways	 these	PTMC	at‐
tempt	to	ensure	that	the	unemployed	maintain	habits	related	to	 the	la‐
bor	 market	 since,	 based	 upon	 various	 academic	 and	 political	 spaces,	
scholars	hypothesize	that	provision	of	an	income	without	compensation	
discourages	the	work	culture	as	such,	so	those	who	receive	this	benefit	
will	 lose	 interest	 in	 finding	 a	 job.	 In	 addition,	 this	 focus	 ensures	 that	
greater	consensus	would	be	achieved	in	the	implementation	of	benefits	
programs	targeted	toward	capturing	public	opinion	since	such	programs	
would	 not	 be	 giving	money	 for	 nothing,	 and	 fears	 about	 the	 effects	 of	









existence	different	 from	participation	 in	 the	 labor	market	 if	 it	wants	to	
ensure	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 labor	 force	 in	 wage	 labor.	 Only	 the	





the	 “Uruguay	 Works”	 program	 targeted	 at	 adults	 between	 18	 and	 65	
years,	 aimed	 at	 improving	 the	 employability	 of	 people	 living	 in	 socio‐
economic	vulnerability	through	training	and	community	value	tasks.	
However,	perhaps	 the	 clearest	 example	of	 this	 type	of	program	can	be	
found	 in	 Argentina	 around	 2004,	 when	 the	 Unemployed	 Heads	 of	
Household	 Plan	 (PJJHD)	 was	 disbanded.	 This	 program—which	 sur‐
passed	two	million	beneficiaries	during	2003—was	essential	to	increase	
aggregate	 consumption	 levels	 that	made	 possible	 the	 recovery	 of	 eco‐
nomic	activity	after	the	2001–2002	crisis	and	to	contain	social	tensions	
in	 a	 context	 of	 a	 strong	 redistribution	of	 income	against	 lower‐income	
sectors.	 However,	 with	 economic	 growth	 and	 improving	 social	 indica‐
tors,	the	government	decided	that	it	was	necessary	to	order	the	benefi‐
ciaries	to	allow	the	design	of	more	specific	policies.	To	this	end,	the	gov‐
ernment	 required	 that	 the	Ministries	of	Labor,	Employment	 and	Social	
Security	 (MTESS)	 and	 Social	 Development	 develop	 a	 classification	 of	





acteristics	 or	 conditions	 are	 difficult	 or	 impossible	 to	 relocate	 occupa‐
tionally”	 (MTESS,	 2004)	 who	 become	 dependent	 on	 welfare	 (Families	









incorporation	 of	 labor	 force	 into	 the	market	 according	 to	 the	 needs	 of	
capital	accumulation,	and	also	plays	an	important	role	 in	its	qualitative	
administration,	 ensuring	 the	 provision	 of	 skills,	 habits,	 behaviors,	 and	
abilities	necessary	 for	 its	 incorporation	 in	 the	manner	which	 the	 labor	





transaction	which	Offe	speaks	of,	 through	which,	 in	order	 to	access	so‐




actually	 a	 practice	with	 a	 long	history	 in	 Latin	America).	 Fourth,	 since	





ties	 between	 certain	 groups	 while	 ostensibly	 reducing	 them	 in	 other	
arenas	(Adelantado	et	al.,	1998).	
After	 several	 years	 of	 economic	 growth	 in	 the	 region,	 nearly	 half	 of	
workers	 remain	 trapped	 in	 conditions	 of	 labor	 informality,	 a	 sign	 that	
this	would	not	be	a	system	failure	that	can	be	absorbed	when	the	econ‐
omy	 grows	 but	 it’s	 functional	 to	 the	 dynamics	 of	 accumulation	 of	 pe‐
ripheral	capitalism.	Thus,	 some	CCTP	recognize	 these	high	 levels	of	 in‐
formality	 and	 labor	 precariousness	 that	 characterize	 Latin	 American	
labor	markets.	This	 is	the	case	of	the	Universal	Child	Allowance	for	So‐
cial	Protection	(hereinafter	AUH),	implemented	in	Argentina	in	2009	as	
a	 noncontributory	 subsystem	within	 the	 family	 allowance	 scheme	 and	
intended	 to	 alleviate	 the	 precariousness	 of	 informal	 and	 unemployed	
workers,	who	because	of	their	condition	do	not	receive	family	allowanc‐
es.	
With	 the	 implementation	of	 the	AUH	public	 spending	 scheme	 in	 social	







with	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 revolving	 around	 Resolution	 1255	 and	 the	
election	results	of	June	2009.	









Since	 one	 of	 the	 objectives	 of	 these	programs	 is	 to	 reduce	 inequalities	
between	registered	and	unregistered	workers,	it	draws	attention	to	the	
requirement	 for	 compensations	 required	 to	 program	 beneficiaries	 but	
not	those	who	belong	to	the	contributive	system.	Again,	we	find	here	the	
repressive	component	of	social	policy	at	work,	the	allocation	of	a	mone‐
tary	 assistance	 in	exchange	 for	beneficiaries	meeting	 certain	 social	be‐
havior	patterns	that	other	sectors	can	neglect.	Moreover,	we	note	that	in	
a	 context	 of	 recession	 and	 declining	 employment,	 social	 policy	 signifi‐
cantly	increases	coverage	and	extends	itself	as	a	“catchment	area”	of	the	
labor	 force,	 giving	 priority	 to	 programs	 aimed	 at	 maintaining	 income	






the	provision	 of	 income	 suggest	 the	 inherent	 complexity	 of	 breaking	 a	
paradigm	that	has	hundreds	of	years	of	existence,	in	which	the	insertion	
into	the	labor	world	is	seen	as	essential	to	ensure	an	income,	and	thus,	
                                                 










also	 deficiencies	 in	 housing,	 health,	 education,	 and	 so	 on.	 In	 turn,	 the	
emphasis	on	the	paradigm	of	activation	which	is	placed	on	labor	inser‐
tion	 creates	 certain	 questions:	 Is	 any	 form	of	 employment	 positive	 for	
social	integration?	In	turn,	what	are	the	negative	effects	that	job	insecu‐
rity	has	on	people	living	in	poverty?	In	a	context	of	deepening	problems	
linked	 to	 employment,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 rethink	 activation	 strategies	
with	 regard	 to	 the	most	 vulnerable	 people,	 since	 the	 conditions	 of	 ex‐
ploitation	of	some,	 far	 from	favoring	the	objective	of	 integration	would	
be	 worsening	 the	 situation	 of	 exclusion	 of	 some	 households	 (Pérez	
Eransus,	2006).	
Overall,	 it	 can	 reinforce	positive	 impacts	 in	 terms	of	a	 reduction	 in	ex‐
treme	poverty	rates	as	a	result	of	the	implementation	of	these	programs;	
however,	despite	its	broad	coverage	it	seems	to	be	insufficient	to	effec‐
tively	 combat	 poverty	 levels	 experienced	 by	 those	 living	 in	 the	 region	
(CEPAL,	2007).	In	addition,	it	is	clear	that	this	impact	is	significant	when	
measuring	 income	 poverty	 but	 loses	 relevance	 when	 it	 is	 used	 to	 ob‐
serve	 their	 impact	 on	 structural	 poverty,	 usually	 associated	 with	 the	
satisfaction	 of	 basic	 needs	 related	 to	 housing	 access	 and	 conditions,	
health	services,	educational	level	of	households,	issues	whose	resolution	
would	imply	another	level	of	commitment	from	public	policies.	
6 Final Considerations 
In	 this	article	we	have	discussed	some	of	 the	 features	adopted	 in	Latin	
America	related	to	the	reconfiguration	of	social	protection	systems.	We	
focus	upon	the	fact	that	the	CCTP	are	part	of	this	reformulation	of	social	
policy	at	 the	 regional	 level	which	adheres	 to	 the	new	social	protection	









ket	 according	 to	 the	 requirements	 of	 capital	 accumulation.	 These	 poli‐





ties	 to	access	basic	necessities,	but	do	not	guarantee	 their	escape	 from	
poverty	 nor	 definitively	 greater	 opportunities	 for	 upward	mobility.	 At	
the	 same	 time,	 these	 programs	 do	 not	 generate	 ownership	 rights	 and	
serve	 to	 promote	 control	 and	management	mechanisms	 of	 poverty	 by	
the	state.	Meanwhile,	 although	 they	promote	 the	access	by	 the	poor	 to	










of	 wealth,	 but	 instead	 predicated	 upon	 the	 use	 of	 existing	 public	 re‐
sources,	 sometimes	 the	contributive	system,	or	 the	demand	of	 interna‐






Instead	 their	 implementation	 reproduces	 a	 dual	 system	 of	 protection	
consistent	with	the	persistence	of	a	segmented	labor	market	character‐





lates	 institutionalized	 inequality	 itself	 (by	 requiring	 compensation	 to	
some	workers	and	not	others).	
This	 reorientation	 of	 social	 policy	 toward	 greater	 coverage	 allows	 for	
the	stimulation	of	consumption	 in	 the	domestic	market,	 reactivation	of	





problems	 of	 exclusion	 and	 unemployment.	 Progress	 has	 been	made	 in	
the	debate	among	academics	and	social	organizations	on	the	possibility	
of	 considering	 other	 forms	 of	 inclusion	 beyond	 the	working	 world.	 In	
recent	decades,	the	phenomenon	of	the	working	poor	began	to	interpo‐






tion	 in	capitalist	economies,	 even	 in	developed	ones,	 so	a	profound	re‐






Poverty,	 unemployment,	 and	 precarious	 employment	 are	 events	 fully	
functional	 to	 capitalist	 systems	 of	 accumulation,	 and	 while	 we	 do	 not	
dispute	the	basic	pillars	on	which	such	persistent	social	realities	rest,	we	
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ed	as	generally	post‐neoliberal	 and	 in	most	 cases	neodevelopmentalist	
(Féliz,	2012;	Thwaites	Rey,	2010;	Svampa,	2011).	Through	this	process	
dominant	 classes	 in	 Argentina	 have	 exorcised	 neoliberal	 ideological	
predominance	and	advanced	in	the	constitution	of	a	new	hegemonic	rule	
based	 on	 the	 original	 combination	 of	 developmentalist	 economic	 dis‐
course	 with	 an	 increasingly	 radical	 national‐popular	 political	 ideology	




emerged	 as	 dominating	 after	 three	 decades	 of	 neoliberalism,	 those	 of	
transnationalized	capital,	since	it	provided	them	with	the	means	to	build	
a	 renewed	 hegemony	 over	 society.	 However,	 the	 consolidation	 of	 this	
new	hegemonic	project	has	limited	the	potential	for	radical	change	that	
seemed	to	have	had	emerged	from	the	sociopolitical	turmoil	that	led	to	
the	violent	crisis	and	exit	 from	neoliberalism	in	Argentina	 in	 late	2001	
(Dinerstein,	 2002).	 In	 fact,	 over	 ten	 years	 after	 that	 crisis,	 the	 main	
tendencies	 outlined	 through	 neoliberal	 reforms	 have	 strengthened,	 re‐
sulting	in	the	persistence	of	wide	and	deep	social	inequalities	and	perva‐
sive	poverty	and	precarization	of	life.	
This	 article	 seeks	 to	 analyze	 the	main	 characteristics	 of	 the	 neodevel‐
opmentalist	project	in	Argentina,	its	barriers	and	limitations	to	promote	
poverty	 reduction	 and	 social	 change.	 We	 will	 show	 that	 these	 re‐
strictions	come	from	the	articulation	of	structural	continuities	with	ne‐
oliberalism	 and	 novel	 sociopolitical	 innovations.	 We	 will	 also	 discuss	
briefly	some	of	 the	potential	alternatives	 to	overcome	the	 limits	of	 this	
project.	
2 Why Neodevelopmentalism is the Supersession of 
Neoliberalism? 
Neoliberalism	 cannot	 be	 understood	 just	 as	 a	 “mode	 of	 development”	
(Neffa,	1998)	in	capitalism.	Furthermore,	it	was	a	project	of	the	capitalist	
classes	worldwide	to	regain	full	political	control	on	the	production	and	
reproduction	of	 society	 in	 its	 capitalist	 form	(Duménil	and	Lévy,	2009;	
Harvey,	2009).	Neoliberal	rule	in	Latin	America	advanced	fiercely	since	
the	 early	 seventies	 through	 several	 tactics	 that	 included,	 in	 variable	




governments	 with	 variations	 of	 orthodox	 (1989–2001)	 and	 so‐called	
heterodox	 (1983–1989)	 structural	 adjustment	 programs,	 only	 possible	







of	 public	 enterprises	 and	 services	 (social	 security,	 education,	 health,	







main	 enterprises	 in	 most	 economic	 branches:	 within	 the	 biggest	 500	
local	firms,	those	with	more	than	50%	of	foreign	capital	ownership	rose	
from	46.8%	of	them	in	1997	to	65%	in	2009	(Féliz	and	López,	2012:	53).	
A	 few	 local	 conglomerates	 were	 able	 to	 transform	 themselves	 into	
transnationalized	capitals	and/or	local	associates	of	foreign	capitals.	
The	neoliberal	project	in	Argentina	created	numerous	sociopolitical	and	
economic	contradictions	that	 led	to	a	deep	crisis	 in	the	late	nineties.	 In	
that	decade,	economic	 inconsistencies	grew	out	of	a	chronic	process	of	
public	and	private	 indebtedness,	 increasing	current	account	deficit	and	
growing	 unemployment.	 These	 tensions	 transformed	 a	 recession	 that	
begun	 in	 1998	 into	 a	 prolonged	 crisis	 that	 created	 the	 perfect	 frame‐
work	for	the	tendency	of	the	profit	rate	to	fall	to	manifest	as	stagnation,	
as	 growing	 deflationary	 pressures	 and	 eventually	 as	 massive	 capital	
flight	and	currency	devaluation	in	late	2001	(Féliz,	2009,	2011).	
Meanwhile,	economic	contradictions	coupled	with	growing	social	unrest.	
During	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 nineties,	 laboring	 classes	 regained	 their	
ability	 to	 successfully	 confront	 the	 neoliberal	 momentum.	 The	 move‐
ments	of	unemployed	workers	(mostly	young	and	female)	gained	a	place	
as	the	new	dynamic	factor	in	the	political	recomposition	of	the	working	
class.	Together	with	 fractions	of	 the	 traditional	working	 class	 (particu‐
larly,	 state	 employees	 in	 the	 provinces	 and	 teachers),	 impoverished	
peasants,	 small	 entrepreneurs,	 and	 others,	 these	 new	 social	 subjects	
were	able	to	confront	the	attempts	by	the	government	to	find	a	way	out	
of	the	crisis	by	trying	to	radicalize	the	neoliberal	project.1	In	December	
                                                 
1	 Attempts	 for	 the	 radicalization	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 project	 in	 Argentina	 included	
proposals	such	as	the	full	dollarization	of	the	economy	(i.e.,	complete	substitution	
of	national	currency	by	 the	US	dollar).	The	 first	attempts	were	made	during	 the	
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tion)	 took	steps	 to	create	conditions	 for	successful	capitalist	accumula‐
tion	and	at	the	same	time	put	a	cap	on	popular	unrest.	In	order	to	attain	
the	 first	 objective,	 the	 government	 took	 several	 measures	 (Basualdo,	
2006):	 (a)	 partial	 default	 on	 public	 debt,	 (b)	 currency	 devaluation,	 (c)	
partial	nationalization	of	dollar‐denominated	private	debt,	(d)	freeze	on	
privatized	utilities’	tariffs,	and	(e)	tax	on	selected	primary	exports.	As	a	
whole,	 they	 allowed	 for	 (a)	 the	 recovery	on	 the	profitability	 of	 private	
capital,	 (b)	a	 trade	balance	surplus	and	(c)	a	surplus	 in	public	 finances	
(Féliz	and	López,	2012).	This	came	at	a	huge	social	cost:	between	2001	
and	2002,	 real	wages	 fell	 by	19%	on	average,	 the	 income	poverty	 rate	
jumped	 to	 53%	 of	 the	 population	 in	 May	 2002,	 real	 consumption	
dropped	12.6%	during	 the	 first	 trimester	of	 2002,	 and	 the	price	 index	




y	 Jefas	 de	Hogar	Desocupados	 (Unemployed	 Heads	 of	 Households	 pro‐
gram,	 JJHD).	 In	 a	 few	 months,	 this	 program	 multiplied	 ten	 times	 the	
number	of	recipients	of	income	support,	reaching	almost	5%	of	the	pop‐
ulation	(Féliz	and	Pérez,	2007).	
These	 policies	 were	 accompanied	 by	 selective	 repression	 of	 popular	




Presidency	with	 only	 22%	 on	 the	 popular	 vote.	 On	May	 25,	 2003,	 the	
newly	elected	president	was	appointed.	While	its	“economic”	bases	were	
                                                                                                   
peronist	president	Menem	in	its	second	administration	(1995–1999).	He	was	fol‐




seeded	 earlier,	 this	 date	 can	 be	 said	 to	mark	 the	 political	 birth	 of	 the	
neodevelopmentalist	project.	
3 Structural Continuities with Reformist Policies: 
Neodevelopmentalism as the New Political Ideology 
of Capital 
As	 the	neoliberal	project	 fell	apart,	dominant	 fractions	of	capital	 in	Ar‐
gentina	pressed	for	 the	constitution	of	a	new	strategic	project.	 In	2002	
such	a	project	began	 to	be	organized	as	 the	new	strategy	 to	guarantee	
the	 continuity	 of	 capitalist	 development	 in	Argentina	 under	 the	 condi‐
tions	created	though	neoliberalism	but	at	the	same	time	as	its	dialectical	
supersession.	 This	means	 that	 while	 the	 new	 project	 was	 born	 out	 of	
(the	 crisis	 of)	 neoliberalism	 and	 it	 appropriates	 of	 its	 heritage,	 neode‐










tured	 by‐products	 of	 agricultural	 production	 and	 minerals,	 under	 the	
control	of	transnational	corporations	(Féliz	and	López,	2012:	53–55).	In	
this	 framework,	 the	production	and	appropriation	of	 land	rent	became	
one	of	the	two	main	sources	of	surplus	profitability	of	the	period	(Féliz,	
2012b).	 The	 other	 source	 of	 excess	 profitability	 was	 the	 widespread	













tal	 to	 financial	 capital	 equal	 to	 about	 half	 of	 total	 surplus	 value	 (Féliz,	
2012:	11–12).	Such	conditions	made	capitalism	unfeasible	 in	economic	
and	 political	 terms.	 Thus,	 debt	 restructuration	 became	 a	 priority.	 The	
government	paid	 the	 full	debt	 in	 cash	before	 it	was	due	 to	 the	 IMF	(in	
2006)	and	restructured	most	of	the	defaulted	debt	with	private	holders	
in	 two	 stages	 (2005	 and	 2010).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 government	 at‐





GDP	 on	 average	 between	 2002	 and	 2006	 (Féliz	 and	 López,	 2012:	 72).	
The	 third	 element	of	 the	new	macroeconomic	 strategy	was	 a	 new	 real	
exchange	 rate	 (RER)	 policy	 (Féliz,	 2012:	 6).	 The	 new	 objective	was	 to	
maintain	 the	 RER	 at	 a	 high	 and	 stable	 level	 to	 favor	 exports	 and	 keep	
imports	 down	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 sustaining	 a	 positive	 result	 on	 foreign	
trade	 and	 increasing	 foreign	 exchange	 reserves.	 During	 the	 first	 five	
years	 after	 exiting	 neoliberal	 rule	 (2002–2006),	 the	 current	 account	






quired	 that	 the	 government	 take	 additional	 steps	 toward	 insuring	 its	
legitimacy.	With	this	aim,	Kirchner’s	government	favored	what	might	be	
called	 reformist	 policy	measures	 that	 allowed	 for	 a	 partial	 recovery	 of	
living	conditions	and,	especially,	expectations	of	its	future	improvement	
(Féliz	and	López,	2010;	Pérez	and	Féliz,	2010).	After	the	crisis	of	2001,	a	
                                                 
2	 This	 implies	 that	 the	government	 accepted	 that	 the	public	debt	 (particularly,	 its	





generation	 of	 young	 activists	 born	 in	 the	 heat	 of	 struggles	 against	 ne‐
oliberalism	 led	 a	new	wave	of	 struggles	outside	 and	within	 traditional	
unions,	putting	pressure	on	its	leadership	and	on	the	state	(Féliz,	2012).	
Between	2003	and	2005,	 the	 government	was	 forced	 to	 decree	unilat‐
eral	wage	increases,	to	hike	in	several	occasions	the	minimum	wage,	and	
to	give	way	 to	demands	 for	 collective	bargaining.	While	 in	 the	nineties	
formal	labor‐capital	negotiations	stalled	as	unions	preferred	to	give	in	to	
pressure	 from	 capitalists	 through	 informal	 agreements,	 after	 2002	
worker’s	 organizations	 successfully	 demanded	 for	 negotiations	 to	 be	
instituted	in	formal	collective	agreements,	under	state	tutelage.3	
Besides	 the	 reactivation	 of	 traditional	 labor	 policies,	 the	 government	
took	 steps	 to	 contain	 social	 unrest	 outside	 more	 formalized	 employ‐
ment.	 In	an	attempt	(successful	 in	 the	end)	 to	keep	mobilization	under	
control,	 the	massive	program	 JJHD	was	progressively	 transformed	 and	




Benefit,	 AUH),	 included	 almost	 3.5	 million	 families	 with	 children	 who	





implied	 significant	 structural	 changes	 in	 the	 economy,	 the	 state	 now	
takes	 active	 steps	 toward	ensuring	both	 the	process	of	 capitalist	 accu‐
mulation	 and	 its	 legitimacy	 after	 neoliberalism.	 During	 neoliberalism,	
the	capitalist	class	insisted	that	the	state	be	a	means	for	restructuration	
and	liberalization.	The	so‐called	“roll	back	of	the	State”	was	in	fact	a	call	
for	 the	 actual	 state	 to	dismantle	 itself;	 in	 sociopolitical	 terms	 the	 state	
was	meant	 to	become	a	 residual‐police	 state.	 In	neodevelopmentalism,	
in	contrast,	dominant	classes	demanded	that	the	state	became	a	proac‐
                                                 
3	 State	 tutelage	 implied	 not	 only	 supervision	 but—in	 many	 occasions—direct	
intervention	of	the	Ministry	of	Labour	in	an	attempt	to	keep	capital‐labor	accords	
within	“rational	parameters”	according	to	macroeconomic	policy	(Féliz,	2012:	14).	









ing	 neoliberalism,	 neoclassical	 economics	was	 the	 theoretical	 justifica‐






(Féliz,	 2013).	 This	 new	 consensus	 (post	 Washington	 Consensus;	 Fine,	
Lapavitsas,	and	Pincus,	2003)	proposes	a	set	of	policy	interventions	that	
in	 Argentina	 is	 oriented	 toward	 building	 “serious	 capitalism,”	 as	 the	
President	Cristina	Fernández	de	Kirchner	(CFK)	anticipated	 in	a	recent	
speech	(Página/12,	2011).4	These	new	reforms	no	longer	imply	radical,	
pro‐capital	 structural	 reforms	 but	 mainly	 a	 sort	 of	 fine‐tuning	 in	 line	
with	the	reforms	of	second	and	third	generation	of	WB	type.5	
New	public	policies	change	significantly	but	 inherit	 the	pervasive	com‐
moditization	 and	privatization	of	 social	 relations.	Neodevelopmentalist	
policies	retain	a	confidence	on	capitalism	as	a	means	for	socioeconomic	
development.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	state	recovers	a	 legitimate	place	 in	
the	orientation	of	capitalist	reproduction.	For	that	reason,	new	policies	
included	renationalization	of	some	 formerly	privatized	enterprises	and	
social	 services.	Between	2002	and	2010	 the	national	 airline	Aerolíneas	




However,	 these	 nationalizations	 remained	 within	 neoliberal	 heritage.	
Several	 examples	 come	 to	 mind.	 First,	 all	 nationalized	 companies	 re‐
mained	organized	as	private	corporations	(of	state	ownership),	as	stock	
                                                 
4	 CKF	was	first	elected	in	2007.	





enterprises,	many	with	 stocks	 in	 national	 and	 foreign	 capital	markets,	
regulated	by	private	enterprises	commercial	legislation,	with	employees	
bound	by	(mostly	neoliberal)	private	employment	regulation,	and	so	on;	
thus,	 production	 for	 profit	 remains	 their	 top	 objective.	 Second,	 the	 re‐
nationalization	of	social	 security	 implied	 the	 transformation	of	 the	pri‐
vate	pension	funds	created	in	1993	into	a	single	state	fund.	No	attempt	




(National	 Administration	 of	 the	 Social	 Security,	 ANSES)	 in	 much	 the	
same	 orientation	 as	 in	 the	 private	 system	 since	 a	 considerable	 part	 of	
the	 resources	are	used	 to	buy	new	emissions	of	public	debt.	Third,	 the	
recently	 nationalized	YPF	has	 only	 been	 partially	 nationalized:	 25%	of	







was	 president	 between	 2003	 and	 2007,	 and	 Cristina	 Fernández	 de	
Kirchner	(his	wife)	was	elected	in	2007	and	again	in	2011	(until	2015).	
One	of	Argentina’s	paradoxes	 is	 the	Peronist	party,	which	was	 born	 in	
the	1940s	within	the	national‐popular	tradition	(NPT).	In	a	nutshell,	the	
NPT	attempts	to	channel	popular	demands	within	the	limits	of	capitalist	
rule	 by	 aiming	 for	 a	 class	 compromise,	 under	 state	 tutelage	 (Svampa,	
2011b),	 between	 national	 capitalist	 class	 and	 the	 core	 of	 the	 working	
class.	In	such	alliance,	labor	was	included	as	a	subordinate	partner	to	an	
imagined	dynamic	nationalistic	capitalist	class	that	should	create,	under	
the	promotion	and	orientation	of	 the	state,	 the	conditions	 for	develop‐
ment,	 which	 was	 basically	 understood	 as	 industrialization	 based	 eco‐
nomic	growth	plus	employment	creation	and	progressive	redistribution	
of	income.6	
                                                 
6	 While	the	NPT	in	Argentina	had	also	a	more	revolutionary	tradition,	the	reformist	








core	 economies,	 Peronism	 begun	 to	 promote	 foreign	 capital	 participa‐
tion	 in	 the	economy	(Féliz,	and	Pérez,	2004;	Féliz,	2013).	 In	 the	1990s,	
however,	 under	 Menem’s	 governments	 (1989–1995,	 1995–1999),	 the	
Peronist	party	became	the	main	promoter	of	the	neoliberal	project.	After	
a	 short	 transition	 of	 De	 la	 Rua’s	 government	 (1999–2001),	 Peronism	
regained	 political	 hegemony	 but	 abandoning	 neoliberal	 ideology	 and	
bringing	 back	 developmentalism.	 However,	 after	 neoliberalism	 and	 in	
the	 context	 of	 transnational	 capitalism,	 neodevelopmentalist	 ideology	
and	policy	are	tightly	bound	by	the	imperative	of	competitiveness	(Féliz,	
2013).	 In	 a	peripheral	 economy	 such	 as	Argentina	 this	 implies	 the	 im‐
possibility	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 national‐popular	 project	 as	 was	
traditionally	construed	within	peronist	ideology.	In	particular,	the	place	
of	a	dynamic	national	capitalist	class	is	diffused,	as	local	(transnational)	
capital	 and	 its	 worldwide	 interests	 becomes	 the	 fundamental	 actor	 in	
accumulation.	 In	 a	 sense,	 neodevelopmentalism	 is	 a	 version	 of	 the	 old	
developmental,	national‐popular	project	without	its	(national)	class	sub‐
ject.	






between	 capital	 and	 labor,	 interact	 in	 a	 particular	 historical	 period	
bringing	 about	 specific	 barriers	 and	 limits	 to	 the	hegemonic	project	 of	
development.	





Barriers	 within	 a	 development	 project	 represent	 disequilibria	 whose	




ing	 limits	requires	 the	supersession	and	replacement	of	 the	hegemonic	
project.7	
4.1  High Inflation, Low Competitiveness and Poor Fiscal 
Performance: Three Barriers to Neodevelopmentalism 
In	 neodevelopmentalism	we	 can	 identify	 three	 important	 barriers	 that	
come	about	from	the	movement	of	its	own	contradictions.	










Up	 until	 2007	 growing	 aggregate	 demand	 (particularly	 in	 export	 and	
consumption)	was	accommodated	mostly	by	the	use	of	existing	produc‐
tive	 capacity,	 since	 investment	 grew	 slowly	 and	 tilted	 toward	 luxury	
housing	construction	(Féliz	and	López,	2012).	However,	from	2008	lack	
of	 adequate	 investment	 begun	 to	 create	 structural	 productive	 bottle‐
necks	in	several	branches	(Katz,	2012).	Coupled	with	the	market	power	
of	price	 setting	capitals	 in	most	 sectors	due	 to	high	concentration,	 this	
has	led	to	sustained	inflation	of	over	20%	annual	rate.8	Such	high	infla‐




8	 In	 2007,	 the	 government	 attempted	 to	 “hide”	 inflation	 through	 a	 political	
intervention	 of	 the	 state’s	 statistical	 office	 Instituto	 Nacional	 de	 Estadísticas	 y	
Censos	 (National	 Institute	 of	 Statistics	 and	 the	 Census,	 INDEC).	 Through	 this	
intervention	 it	 kept	 “official”	 inflation	 rate	 usually	 below	 the	 10%	 annual	 rate.	
However,	 there	 is	 significant	 social,	 academic,	 and	 political	 consensus	 and	
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tion	 rate	 became	 a	 significant	 barrier	 to	 the	 ability	 of	 the	neodevelop‐
mentalist	 project	 to	 fabricate	 consensus	 based	 on	 redistribution	 of	 in‐
come	and	inclusion	through	employment.	Inflation	at	high	rates	tend	to	
stagnate	 wages	 even	 for	 the	 most	 organized	 fractions	 of	 the	 working	
class.	
High	 inflationary	 tendencies	 push	 developmentalism	 in	 Argentina	
against	a	 second	 important	barrier:	growing	 lack	of	 international	 com‐
petitiveness	of	capital.	One	of	the	main	changes	in	macroeconomic	poli‐
cies	 after	 2001	 was	 the	 attempt	 to	 sustain	 a	 high	 and	 stable	 real	 ex‐
change	 rate	 (RER).	 The	 “expensive”	 dollar	was	 the	 key	 element	 in	 the	
competitiveness	policy	(Frenkel	and	Rapetti,	2004).	With	a	highly	deval‐
ued	currency,	 local	 capitals	were	 to	be	able	 to	 compete	 internationally	
(even	 if	 their	 structural	 competitiveness	 was	 thin)	 since	 devaluation	
meant	a	huge	immediate	reduction	in	relative	unit	labor	costs:	participa‐
tion	of	labor	costs	in	total	costs	for	big	corporations	fell	53.5%	in	2002–
2003	 in	 comparison	with	 the	average	 for	1993–2001.9	This	policy	was	
coupled	 with	 generalized	 and	 growing	 subsidies	 for	 electricity	 and	
transport.	Total	direct	subsidies	 to	corporations	 reached	4%	of	GDP	 in	
2011	(Bona,	2012:	107).	While	these	subsidies	also	benefited	the	work‐
ing	 class	 (through	 lower	 tariffs	 for	 some	public	 services),	 they	worked	









lack	 of	 investment	 expenditure	 and	 low	productivity	 growth	 put	 pres‐
sure	on	relative	real	 labor	unit	costs	(Féliz,	2009),	which	are	the	struc‐
tural	source	of	competitiveness	within	capitalism	(Shaikh,	1991).	







The	 systematic	use	of	devaluation	as	a	means	 to	 recover	 lost	 competi‐
tiveness	 was	 initially	 limited	 since	 the	 government	 attempted	 to	 use	
nominal	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 to	 curb	 inflation.	 Only	 after	 2007	 when	









resources	 had	 actual	 (structural)	 international	 competitiveness.10	 For	
the	 rest	 of	 them,	 superexploitation	 of	 labor	 and	 public	 subsidies	were	
the	main	source	of	competitive	ability,	albeit	an	insufficient	one.11		
This	 leads	 to	 the	 third	significant	barrier:	 the	 fiscal	barrier.	 In	 the	 first	
few	years	of	this	period,	the	state	was	able	to	generate	a	significant	fiscal	
primary	 surplus	 that	 allowed	 it	 to	 fulfil	 interest	 payments	 on	 restruc‐
tured	public	debt	without	resorting	to	increasing	indebtedness.	Howev‐










restriction	 of	 the	 state	 had	 been	 progressively	 loosened	 after	 the	 re‐
nationalization	of	social	security	since	surplus	resources	are	“loaned”	to	
the	state’s	Central	Administration.	Later	on,	the	creation	of	the	Fondo	de	
                                                 
10	 Besides,	 this	 sectors	 are	 dominated	 by	 the	 biggest	 transnational	 corporations	
(e.g.,	in	agrobusiness,	Monsanto	and	Danone;	in	mining,	Barrick	Gold).	






ic	 Charter	 of	 the	Banco	 Central	 de	 la	República	Argentina	 (Argentina’s	
Central	 Bank,	 BCRA)	 facilitated	 central	 government’s	 borrowing	 from	
the	BCRA.	However,	primary	fiscal	deficit	kept	rising.	
The	most	 ardent	 social	 contradictions	 were	manifest	 within	 the	 state.	
Financial	 creditors	have	a	 reduced	weight	but	 the	state	 still	prioritizes	
debt	payments.12	The	 fait	of	productive	capital	becomes	 tantamount	 to	
development	as	such;	thus,	promoting	its	competitiveness	through	fiscal	
aid,	 exchange	 rate	 policy,	 and	other	means	 is	 a	 key	policy	 goal.	 As	 the	
social	and	political	promises	of	neodevelopmentalism	became	sources	of	
political	 stability	 and	 consensus,	 social	 and	 labor	 policies	 become	 of	
greater	importance.	
In	 its	 essential	 determinants,	 barriers	 within	 the	 neodevelopmentalist	










its	 that	 derive	 from	 the	 property	 of	 low‐cost	 natural	 resources;	 thus,	








keeping	 the	economy’s	 investment	 rate	at	 just	22.4%	of	GDP	(Manzan‐
elli,	2011:	26).	In	the	context	of	expanded	aggregate	demand,	the	lack	of	
                                                 





At	 the	 same	 time,	 significant	 employment	 growth	with	 low	 investment	
has	led	to	poor	productivity	growth	and	thus	to	falling	competitiveness.	
Besides,	as	growth	in	productivity	remains	low,	the	limited	possibilities	
(within	 capitalism)	 for	 using	 relative	 surplus‐value	 strategies	 restricts	
the	ability	for	increasing	fiscal	pressure	on	productive	capital.	
Barriers	 and	 structural	 restrictions	 were	 building	 up	 for	 neodevelop‐
mentalism	 in	 Argentina.	 The	 ideological	 construction	 of	 the	 forces	 in	
government	 (Kirchnerism’s	 version	 of	 Peronism)	 proposed	 a	 demand‐
led	growth	strategy	(Amico,	2008),	which	was	in	line	with	the	demands	
of	the	social	forces	that	emerged	and	headed	the	neoliberal	project	to	its	
political	 crisis.	 However,	 Kirchnerism’s	 inability,	 and	 unwillingness,	 to	
displace	structural	restrictions	inherited	from	neoliberalism	turned	bar‐
riers	into	ever‐growing	limits.	Some	of	the	main	political	promises	of	the	
peronist	 national‐popular	 version	 of	 capitalist	 development	 became	
impossible	to	attain.	
4.2  From Barriers to Limits within Neodevelopmentalism 
The	 sociopolitical	 hegemony	 of	 the	 neodevelopmentalist	 discourse	 in	
Argentina	has	 been	based	on	 the	notion	 that	 a	demand‐led	 growth	 re‐
gime	 through	 reindustrialization	 will	 guarantee	 the	 progressive	 redis‐
tribution	 of	 incomes	 and	 employment‐based	 social	 inclusion	 (Rougier	
and	Schorr,	2012:	68;	Féliz,	2013).	According	 to	 this,	economic	growth	
based	 on	 industrialization	 will	 allow	 a	 process	 of	 “development	 from	
within”	 (export	 led),	which	 contrasts	with	 the	 developmentalist	motto	
“development	towards	the	inside”	characteristic	of	the	so‐called	import	
substitution	stage	(Sunkel,	1991).	
However,	 the	 barriers	 that	 the	 neodevelopmentalist	 project	 posses	 on	
itself	grow	into	limits	to	the	possibilities	of	development	within	its	own	
national‐popular	 framework.	 Furthermore,	 those	 limits	 bring	 forth	 the	
















cant	 transnationalization	 of	 production	 (particularly,	 manufacturing)	
creates	 a	 very	 real	 limitation	 to	 the	 possibilities	 of	 industrialization	 in	




ry	 commodities	 and,	 at	 the	most,	 of	 these	 commodity’s	 basic	manufac‐







dustry’s	 real	 GDP	 grew	more	 than	 total	 GDP	 between	 2002	 and	 2011	
(107.2%	 and	 95.4%,	 respectively)	 in	 contrast	with	 1998,	 the	 previous	
peak,	 industry’s	 growth	 is	 not	 so	 significant	 (51.4%	 to	 59.5%,	 respec‐
tively).	
Limits	to	Employment	and	Wage	Growth		




between	 the	 4th	 quarter	 of	 2002	 and	 the	 4th	 quarter	 of	 2011)	 were	
marked	by	the	partial	 improvement	in	living	conditions	for	most	of	the	
working	people.	This,	however,	has	been	a	 slow	process:	 in	2005,	 four	
years	after	 the	2001	crisis,	 formal	salaried	workers	had	 just	 recovered	
their	 pre‐crisis	 (2001)	 real	wages;	 informal	workers	 had	 to	wait	 until	
Neodevelopmentalism	in	Argentina			117	
 
2010	 to	 reach	 that	 level	 and	 state	 employees’	 wages	were	 still	 32.6%	
below	its	2001	level	in	2013.13	
Employment	growth	and	the	recovery	in	wages	led	for	quite	a	few	years	
to	an	 increasing	participation	of	wage	 in	aggregate	 income	(Fernández	
and	González,	2012).	In	2008,	workers	reached,	according	to	the	official	
statistics,	a	43.8%	participation	in	value	added,	similar	to	the	1993	esti‐
mation	 (44.7%).	After	2008	 there	 is	no	official	data,	 in	part	due	 to	 the	
mentioned	 problem	with	 the	 estimation	 of	 inflation.	 Several	 estimates	
show	that	in	the	five	years	to	2013	the	participation	of	wages	in	income	
had	receded	significantly	mainly	to	 increasing	 inflation	and	also	due	to	
the	 reduction	 in	 the	 rate	 of	 employment	 creation:	 urban	 employment	











“democratic”	 50–50	 is	 in	 fact	 not	 so	 democratic.	 Second,	 in	 the	 1940s	
when	 the	mythical	50%	had	been	achieved,	most	working	 families	had	





income.	 This	 is	 a	 sign	 of	 one	major	 limit	 of	 Argentina’s	 economy:	 the	
extended	precariousness	of	employment.	

















space.	Even	 if	 statistically	nonregistered	employment	 is	 “a	problem”	of	
small	enterprises,	most	big	firms	make	extensive	use	of	indirect	forms	of	




omy	 presents	 record	 growth	 rates	 and	 unemployment	 statistics	 are	
close	to	 its	 lowest	 levels	 in	30	years.	Wages	have	remained	all	 the	way	







lyzed	by	Marini	 (2007)	and	 that	he	called	superexploitation	of	 labor:	a	
significant	proportion	of	the	working	class	lives	with	incomes	far	below	







nificantly.	 The	 country	 that	 in	 the	 seventies	 had	 reached	 a	 significant	
position	 in	 terms	 of	 capitalist	 economic	 development	 (Azpiazu	 and	
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Schorr,	 2010)	 now	 seems	 stuck	 as	 a	 peripherical	 value‐space	 that	 has	
been	 pigeonholed	 by	 transnational	 corporations	 as	 supplier	 of	 cheap	
agricultural	manufactures	and	primary	products,	in	contrast	with	those	
that	 have	 been	 placed	 as	 suppliers	 of	 cheap	 industrial	 manufactures	




ue.	 More	 than	 deindustrialization,	 that	 is	 an	 ambiguous	 idea	 (Grigera,	
2011),	 capitalist	 restructuration	 during	 neoliberal	 rule	 allowed	 capital	
to	structurally	shift	power	in	the	shop	floor	in	its	favor,	taking	advantage	
of	 new	 technological	 developments	 to	 dismantle	 the	 so‐called	 fordist	
social	and	technical	association	of	labor.	The	capitalist	use	of	technology	
has	favored	the	flexibility	and	movement	of	constant	capital,	 thus	mak‐
ing	 it	easier	 for	capitals	 to	regionally	 fragment	the	 labor‐force	(Ceceña,	
2000).	The	immediate	consequence	of	such	process	has	been	the	politi‐
cal	decomposition	of	labor	(Cleaver,	1985).	
The	 resulting	 income	dynamic	 creates	a	 situation	where	between	15%	
and	30%	of	the	urban	population	in	Argentina	lives	in	conditions	of	sta‐
tistical	 income	 poverty,	 while	 close	 to	 10%	 borders	 statistical	 hun‐
ger.15,16	The	severity	of	the	problem	of	production	of	poverty	in	Argenti‐
na	can	be	put	into	perspective	with	a	brief	historical	comparison.	In	the	









                                                 
15	 Since	 official	 estimates	 have	 been	 seriuosly	 questioned,	 here	 we	 refer	 to	
alternative	estimations	(ATE‐INDEC,	2012).	
16	 We	talk	of	statistical	hunger	since	estimations	refer	to	people	whose	incomes	are	
below	 the	 money	 value	 of	 a	 mininum	 food	 consumption	 basket.	 This	 basket	
represents	 the	 minimum	 consumption	 of	 calories	 required	 to	 avoid	 hunger.	








functionings	 (Sen,	 1997)	 is	much	more	 extended:	 the	 lack	 of	 adequate	
housing	remains	a	problem	for	almost	3	million	families,	and	it	has	not	
been	reduced	at	all	in	a	decade	due	to	failed	public	programs	and	insuffi‐
cient	 family	 incomes;	 public	 transportation	 is	 in	 crisis,	 even	 after	mil‐
lions	of	dollars	in	subsidies	have	been	poured	into	a	public	(but	mostly	
privatized)	system;	public	education	and	health	are	 in	poor	shape,	and	
greater	 numbers	 of	 poor	 middle‐class	 families	 spend	 ever‐growing	
shares	 of	 their	 incomes	 in	 expensive	 and	 insufficient	 private	 sector	
schemes.	 Privatization	 and	 precarization	 of	 everyday	 life	 has	 become	
rampant	fact	in	today’s	Argentina.	
5 Beyond Neodevelopmentalism? The Political 
Economy of Radical Social Change 
As	neodevelopmentalism	builds	barriers	 and	 limits	 to	 its	 own	political	
and	 economic	 reproduction,	 so	 social	 movements,	 popular	 organiza‐
tions,	and	radical	political	forces	begin	to	find	ways	to	propose	an	alter‐
native	 orientation	 for	 capitalist	 development	 in	 the	 periphery,	 if	 not	 a	
way	to	opt	out	from	capitalist	rule	altogether	(Féliz,	2009b).	













5.1  Toward a Political Economy of Labor 
An	alternative	political	economy	has	to	confront	the	capitalist	rationality	
that	 tends	 to	 be	 imposed	 by	 the	 force	 of	 dominant	 social	 relations.	 In	
fact,	 working	 people	 confront	 that	 hegemonic	 tendency	 through	 their	
daily	struggles	to	improve	their	living	conditions	within	society	(i.e.,	the	




by	placing	people	 and	 their	 immediate	 relationships	 at	 the	 center	 (Le‐














peripherical	 extractivist	 industrialization,	 and	 precarization	 of	 life	 and	
labor.	
                                                 
17	 Let’s	 remind	 that	M	stands	 for	money,	C	 for	a	series	of	 commodities	 (LF,	 labour	
force,	 and	MoP,	 means	 of	 production),	 P	 is	 a	 productive	 process	 that	 allows	 to	
create	new	commodities	(C′)	but	to	valorize	the	original	value	(M′>M).	
18	 This	rejection	to	the	practices	of	capital	is	not	always	(nor	mostly)	conscientious.	
However,	 as	 Dussel	 (1998)	 explains	 labour	 has	 an	 immanent—constitutive—
exteriority	 regarding	 capital	 that	 allows	 it	 to	 confront	 its	 tendency	 to	 include	














tals	 to	 subsist.	 This	 tendency	 is	 the	 original	 source	 of	 precarization	 of	
labor	(Féliz	and	Chena,	2005).	Working	people	confront	such	tendencies	
by	 organizing	 collectively	 in	 trade	 unions,	 by	 building	 base	 collectives	
and	neighborhood	assemblies,	 thus	 showing	 that	 cooperation	and	 soli‐
darity	are	the	best	strategy	for	improving	and	defending	their	conditions	
of	living.	To	the	decentralized	(even	individual)	bargaining	proposed	by	
firms,	 workers	 have	 historically	 proposed	 association.	 In	 such	 a	 way	
they	have	tried	to	overcome	the	mediation	of	capital	in	the	labor	market,	
trying	 to	 impose	 through	 the	 state	 legislation	 that	 will	 provide	 better	
and	more	stable	conditions	for	work.	
In	 the	 second	 place,	 the	 hierarchical	 organization	 of	 capitalist	 produc‐
tion	 is	 questioned	 by	modalities	 of	 workers’	 cooperation.	 In	 this	 way,	
workers	look	to	displace	the	separation	imposed	by	capital	on	them	and	
the	means	of	production.	The	PEL	shows	how	capital	is	inefficient	since	
it	 privileges	 profitability	 and	 not	 cost	 reduction.	 Capital	 results	 to	 be	
completely	unnecessary	since	workers	on	their	own	can	have	the	ability	
to	manage	enterprises	with	 lower	costs	of	 supervision	 (Bowles,	 1985).	
In	Argentina,	a	movement	of	workers’	coops	account	for	the	potential	of	
autonomous	worker’s	organization.	
Third,	 against	 production	 for	 production	 sake	 (for	 private	 profit),	 the	
PEL	recovers	the	need	to	produce	for	the	satisfaction	of	needs	and	privi‐
leges	the	protection	of	the	environment.	Argentina’s	neodevelopmental‐
ist	 project	 is	 based	 on	 a	 process	 of	 indiscriminate	 appropriation,	 use,	
and	destruction	of	the	riches	from	the	soil	and	the	underground.	Agricul‐
tural	production	with	limitless	use	of	agrochemicals	and	open‐pit	mega‐







UAC)	and	 the	Movimiento	Nacional	Campesino	 Indígena	 (National	Peas‐
ant	 Indigenous	 Movement,	 MNCI)	 are	 examples	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	







tion	 of	 money.	 With	 privatization	 of	 the	 common,	 capital	 pretends	 to	
become	 the	only	mediation	 for	 the	production	and	reproduction	of	 life	
(De	Angelis,	2007).	The	PEL	proposes	increasing	public	spaces,	common	
(and	in	common)	production	of	vital	needs	and	the	extension	of	rights	to	
public	 services	 to	 confront	 its	mercantilization.	 In	 such	 a	 line,	we	 find	
the	 struggles	 for	 open	 source	 software	 and	 the	 public	 production	 of	
medicines	 for	 free	distribution,	 the	 recuperation	of	 community	 spaces,	
public	education	and	health	free	and	universal.	
As	a	synthesis,	the	PEL	confronts	the	values	of	capital	with	the	dreams,	
desires,	 and	wishes	of	 the	working	people.	 It	privileges	 solidarity	over	
selfishness,	the	unity	of	the	people	over	the	regional	concentration	and	
centralization	 of	 capital,	 vital	 time	over	 abstract	 labor	 time,	 the	move‐
ment	of	people,	 cultures,	 and	experiences	over	 the	exchange	of	money	
and	commodities.	Those	values	can	orient	another	development	project	
that	can	be	constituted	from	today’s	experiences	(Féliz,	2009b).	
5.2  From the Political Economy of Labor to Radical Policies for 
Social Change 
From	 those	 basic	 foundations,	 social	movements	 and	 popular	 political	
organizations	 in	Argentina	have	been	proposing	alternatives	 to	 the	ne‐





Macroeconomic	 policy	 should	 give	 priority	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	 condi‐
tions	for	production	and	reproduction	of	workers’	daily	needs.	This	im‐
plies	 radically	 improving	working	 conditions	 by	 increasing	wages	 and	
reducing	precarization.	The	 increase	 in	 the	mass	of	wages	will	provide	




consumption	 (manifestation	 of	 the	 cultural	 dependency	 of	 dominant	
classes;	Furtado,	1974)	that	has	become	a	drain	on	foreign	currency	and	
deviates	 to	 unproductive	 use	 of	 available	 resources	 and	 surplus	 value,	
and	(c)	reduction	of	the	economy’s	transnationalization	to	give	domestic	
social	actors	(not	necessarily	capitalist,	but	mainly	social	and	public	en‐
deavours)	 greater	 weight	 in	 decisions	 regarding	 investment.	 Taking	
steps	in	this	direction	will	allow	for	a	radical	change	in	the	direction	of	
aggregate	 demand	 (from	 surplus‐value	 to	 popular	 consumption)	 to	 be	
satisfied	 in	 the	short	 run	with	adequate	 local	 (or	regional)	supply	 thus	




tives	 of	 a	 new	 social	 security	 scheme.	 To	 complement	 and	 accentuate	
income	 redistribution	 in	 the	 labor	 market,	 the	 social	 security	 system	
should	be	universalized,	 isolating	 the	 right	 to	basic	 goods	and	services	
from	work.	Through	a	radical	tax	reform	that	taps	resources	from	exist‐
ing	sources	(i.e.,	financial	capital,	rents	from	natural	resources,	extraor‐
dinary	profits,	which	are	now	exempt	or	 lightly	 taxed),	 the	 state	 could	








One	 of	 the	 most	 pressing	 limitations	 of	 public	 policies	 is	 the	 lack	 of	
popular	 participation	 in	 their	 definition,	 control,	 and	 management.	 A	
popular	 program	 should	 create	 the	means	 to	 transform	 the	 state	 (and	
society)	from	a	bureaucratic,	hierarchical	machine	into	an	instrument	of	
popular	self‐management	of	common	tasks.	In	such	direction,	state	poli‐
cies	 should	 promote	 and	 finance	 the	 autonomous	 self‐organization	 of	







6 Preliminary Conclusions 










reality	 of	 neodevelopmentalism	 in	 a	 peripheral	 economy	 in	 the	 era	 of	
transnational	capital.	
These	 contradictions	 have	 not	 yet	materialized	 in	 an	 outright	 crisis	 of	
the	 neodevelopmentalist	 project	 (that	 would	 signify	 its	 limit	 as	 devel‐
opment	project)	since	political	forces	in	the	state	(peronist	Kirchnerism)	
have	been	 able	 to	 displace	 barriers	 and	 contain	 its	 potential	 for	 crisis.	
However,	as	barriers	and	limits	become	ever	more	pressing,	the	elabora‐
tion	of	alternative	policies	(and	alternative	political	alliances	to	put	them	
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ALTERNATIVE PATHS OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN SUB-
SAHARIAN AFRICA: A CASE FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION 
PROGRAMS BY THE POOR 
Jude	Ssempebwa	and	Jacqueline	Nakaiza	
Jude	Ssempebwa	and	Jacqueline	Nakaiza’s	study	of	 the	elaboration	and	
execution	 of	 “social	 transformation”	 programs	 in	 Uganda	 and	 Kenya	
together	with	data	from	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo,	Mozam‐
bique,	and	Rwanda	provides	a	much	needed	stock	taking	of	the	project‐
ed	 lofty	 aims	 and	 oftentimes	 stunted	 potential	 gains	 of	 these	 politico‐
economic	 agendas.	The	 researchers	 investigate	 a	 series	 of	 difficult	 and	
complex	 questions	 relating	 to	 the	 means	 by	 which	 the	 efficiency	 and	




a	 convincing	 case	 for	 the	 elaboration	 and	 enactment	 of	 user‐friendly	
strategies	which	solicit	and	usefully	incorporate	input	and	participation	
by	 individuals	 and	 communities	 living	with	 poverty	 rather	 than	 those	
plans	 which	 utilize	 trained	 individuals	 and	 a	 top‐down	 approach	 to	
problem	identification	and	resolution.	
1 Introduction 
In	many	 Sub‐Saharan	 African	 countries	 social	 transformation	 is	 at	 the	
nucleus	 of	 the	political	 economy	of	 poverty.	Defined	 as	 the	process	 by	
which	 households	 improve	 their	 ascribed	 status,	 social	 transformation	
has	also	received	notable	attention	from	scholars,	activists,	and	NGOs	in	
and	outside	the	region.	Subsequently,	there	is	an	enormous	and	diverse	
body	of	 literature	on	the	subject.	Flagship	among	the	foci	of	 this	 litera‐
ture	is	the	interplay	between	economics	and	politics;	the	policy	options	
for	social	transformation	that	this	interplay	presents;	and	the	implemen‐





indicates	 that	 governmental,	 diplomatic,	 civil	 society,	 and	 charitable	
organizations	have	 invested	heavily	 in	poverty	 alleviation	programs	 in	
the	region	(see,	e.g.,	Moyo,	2009).	Second,	it	indicates	that	many	house‐
holds	 are	 stagnating	 in	 extreme	poverty,	 notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	
successive	 household	welfare	 surveys	 have	 reported	 notable	 improve‐
ments	in	household	welfare.	Why?	What	explains	the	persistence	of	ex‐
treme	poverty	despite	years	of	enormous	investment	in	poverty	allevia‐
tion	 programs?	Why	have	 some	poverty	 alleviation	 programs/projects	
been	more	 successful	 in	 alleviating	poverty	 than	others?	What	 lessons	
may	 be	 drawn	 from	 both	 the	 successful	 and	 less	 successful	 pro‐
grams/projects	for	policy	reform?	
Review	of	the	literature	(e.g.,	Crook,	2000;	Daxbacher,	2004;	Dorr,	1992;	
Mehrotra	and	Delamonica,	2007)	 leads	 to	 the	conclusion	 that,	hitherto,	
these	 questions	 had	 not	 attracted	 satisfactory	 scholarly	 attention.	 Ra‐
ther,	 the	 literature	occurs	 in	 three	major	categories:	 (1)	poverty	status	
reports,	 discussing	 the	 causes,	 nature,	 incidence,	 and	 consequences	 of	
poverty	(e.g.,	Abuka	et	al.,	2007;	Ayako	and	Katumanga,	1997;	Bird	et	al.,	







2001;	 Johnson,	 2004;	 Kisekka,	 2011;	 Lawson,	McKay	 and	 Okidi,	 2003;	
Muhumuza,	2007;	Mukui,	2005;	Nduhukhire‐Owa‐Mataze,	1999;	Steven‐
son	and	St‐Onge,	2005).	Thus,	a	gap	in	knowledge	on	the	political	econ‐
omy	of	poverty	and	social	 transformation	 in	 the	 region	pertains	 to	 the	
fact	 that	 even	 though	 some	 of	 the	 authors	 in	 each	 of	 the	 categories	 of	
related	literature	make	an	indication	of	the	reasons	underlying	the	per‐








researchers	 based	 at	 the	 Catholic	 University	 of	 Eastern	 Africa,	 Uganda	
Martyrs	 University	 (UMU),	 Université	 Catholique	 de	 Graben,	 Univer‐




ernment’s	 revolving	 loan	 programs	 in	 Kenya;	 (2)	 growth	 of	 a	 savings	
and	internal	lending	community	and	the	correlates	of	stagnation	in	and	
mobility	from	poverty	in	central	Uganda;	and	(3)	perceptions	of	poverty	
and	 poverty	 alleviation	 programs	 in	 DRC,	 Mozambique,	 and	 Rwanda.	
The	chapter	discusses	the	studies	with	the	conclusion	that,	despite	their	
diversity,	two	findings	that	are	common	to	all	of	them	are	that:	(1)	pov‐
erty	 alleviation	 programs/projects	 were	 more	 successful	 in	 instances	
where	the	poor	at	whom	they	were	targeted	were	involved	in	the	defini‐
tion	 of	 poverty;	 and	 (2)	 many	 poverty	 alleviation	 programs/projects	
were	 implemented	among/for	people	who	did	not	perceive	themselves	
as	being	poor	and	these	tended	to	be	ineffective.	Thus,	the	chapter	pro‐
pounds	a	case	 for	a	paradigmatic	shift	 in	 the	political	economy	of	pov‐
erty	and	social	 transformation	 in	 the	 region—from	relegating	 the	poor	
as	 passive	 consumers	 of	 poverty	 alleviation	 programs/projects	 to	 ap‐
preciating	 them	as	partners	 in	 the	design	and	 implementation	of	 these	
programs/projects.	
2 Lessons from Selected Successful and Unsuccessful 
Poverty Alleviation Programs 
The	studies	conducted	in	Kenya	and	Uganda	examined	four	similar	pov‐
erty	 alleviation	 programs	 (i.e.	 Caritas	 Kenya’s	 Self‐Help	 Program	 and	
Government	of	Kenya	[GoK]’s	Revolving	Loan	Fund;	and	Nkozi	Agribusi‐
ness	Training	Association	[a	Savings	and	Internal	Lending	Community],	








ventions	 that	 address	 the	 factors	 that	 exclude	 the	 country’s	poor	 from	
gainful	economic	activities	(GoK,	2007).	Pursuant	to	this	vision,	the	gov‐
ernment	 is	 implementing	 a	 devolved	 fund—including	 a	 constituency	






and	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 (2011),	 for	 example,	 the	 poverty	 eradication	
revolving	 loan	 fund	 is	 aimed	 at	 providing	 the	 poor	with	 access	 to	 the	
capital	that	they	need	to	break	their	vicious	cycle	of	poverty	and	exclu‐
sion.	However,	as	in	many	parts	of	the	Global	South	where	similar	pro‐
grams	 have	 been	 implemented,	 the	 fund	 has	 not	 been	 as	 effective	 as	
hoped.	 Fears	 have	 been	 expressed	 that,	 in	 some	 provinces,	 it	 is	 not	
reaching	the	most	deserving	poor.	For	instance,	a	Centre	for	Governance	
and	Development	report	faults	the	constituency	development	fund	thus:	
The	 [constituency	 development	 fund]	 CDF	 is	 one	 of	 the	 popular	
initiatives	in	Kenya’s	development	history	and	which	has	elicited	
greater	debate	on	the	potential	of	devolving	resources	to	local	de‐
velopment	 level.	 The	 implementation	 of	 the	 fund	 has	 however	
witnessed	challenges	relating	particularly	to	issues	of	governance.	
In	 many	 ways,	 this	 has	 also	 affected	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation	
thus	 compromising	 the	 Fund’s	 effectiveness	 and	 efficiency.	 Ac‐
cording	to	the	Fund’s	quarterly	bulletin,	the	main	challenges	…	re‐
volve	 around	 operational	 issues	 of	…	 formation	 of	 [constituency	
development	 committees]	 CDCs,	 types	 of	 fundable	 projects	 and	
procurement	procedures	…	 the	major	challenges	 facing	 the	Fund	
are	inequalities	in	constituency	attributes	…	the	Fund	experiences	
gross	 data	 inadequacy	 …	 projects	 are	 also	 poorly	 chosen	 with	
those	 having	widespread	 spill	 over	 benefits	 to	 some	 constituen‐




ies,	 especially	 in	monitoring	 the	 Fund’s	 efficient	 utilisation.	 In	 a	
number	 of	 instances,	 clear	 documentation	 has	 been	 noted	 in	
which	 politics	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 decision	making	 in	 the	
Fund’s	management.	 Quite	 often,	 individuals	 and	 regions	within	
the	constituency	that	are	supportive	of	the	incumbent	[Member	of	
Parliament]	 MP	 often	 receive	 preferential	 treatment	 (Centre	 for	
Governance	and	Development,	2007:	pp.	15–16).	
Conversely,	there	are	reports	that	Caritas	Kenya	(a	charitable	socioeco‐
nomic	 development	 arm	of	 the	Kenya	Catholic	Bishops’	 Conference)	 is	
implementing	a	household	self‐help	development	program	that	 is	com‐
parable	 to	 the	 revolving	 loan	 fund	 component	 of	 the	 GoK’s	 devolved	
fund	 albeit	 the	 former	 is	 transforming	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 very	 poor	 in	 a	
cost‐effective	and	sustainable	way	(see,	e.g,,	Murori,	2010).	
A	team	of	researchers	based	at	the	Catholic	University	of	Eastern	Africa	
delved	 into	 the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	 household	 self‐help	
development	 program—to	 gain	 insight	 into	 the	 factors	 responsible	 for	
its	 effectiveness.	 This	 was	 done	 following	 an	 ex‐post	 facto	 design,	
through	which	the	design	and	implementation	of	the	program	were	con‐
trasted	 with	 those	 of	 the	 GoK’s	 revolving	 loan	 fund,	 to	 highlight	 best	
practices	 in	 the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 poverty	 alleviation	 pro‐
grams	 (Lukwata	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Data	were	 collected	 from	managers	 and	


















Gender	  Women	  Men	and	women	
Scope	of	activities	  Participants’	priority	needs	  Enterprise	develop‐
ment	
Funding	  Participants’	savings		  GoK	










































2.2  Nkozi Agribusiness and Training Association and Government of 
Uganda’s Revolving Loan Fund 
It	 is	noteworthy	that	the	conclusion	from	the	study	of	Caritas’	program	
corroborates	 evidence	 from	a	host	 of	 studies	 suggesting	 that	 interven‐
tions	against	poverty	in	whose	design	and	implementation	the	poor	play	
a	prominent	 role	 tend	 to	 require	 significantly	 less	 financial	 investment	
and	to	be	more	effective	than	those	that	don’t.	For	instance,	CRS	(2010)	
reports	 that	 Savings	 and	 Internal	 Lending	 Communities	 in	 East	 Africa	
have	not	only	succeeded	in	banking	traditionally	unbanked	poor	people	
but	 also	 mobilized	 phenomenal	 savings	 that	 have	 been	 loaned	 out	 to	
these	poor	with	impressive	recovery	rates.	 Incidentally,	 in	a	number	of	
instances,	 these	 communities	have	prospered	while	more	heavily	 capi‐
talized	 government	 and	 commercial	 credit	 schemes	 are	 failing	 in	 the	
same	communities.	Table	2	presents	an	example	from	Uganda.	
	
Table	 2:	 Growth	 of	 Nkozi	 Agribusiness	 Training	 Association	 (2010–
2012)	






2010	 53	 226	 605	 831	 3,923,900	 0	
2011	 92	 524	 1,300	 1,824	 117,043,950	 90,414,700	





savings	 and	 internal	 lending	 community	 in	 a	 rural	 county	 of	 central	
Uganda,	 reached	 6,352	 people	 who	 generated	 a	 turnover	 of	 UGX	





3 Case for Poverty Alleviation Programs by the Poor 
The	main	lesson	from	the	study	of	the	critical	success	factors	in	Caritas	
Kenya’s	Self‐Help	Program	and	Nkozi	Agribusiness	and	Training	Associ‐
ation	 is	 that	 involving	 the	 poor	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 poverty	 and	 in	 the	
designing	 and	 implementation	 of	 poverty	 alleviation	 programs	 could	
enhance	the	effectiveness,	efficiency,	and	sustainability	of	the	programs.	
The	 inference	here	 is	 that	 efforts	 to	 alleviate	poverty	 should	prioritize	
poor‐people‐led	poverty	alleviation	programs.	This	proposition	and	the	




3.1  Correlates of Stagnation in and Mobility from Poverty in Central 
Uganda  
Study	 of	 the	 correlates	 of	 stagnation	 in	 and	 mobility	 from	 poverty	 in	
central	 Uganda	 addressed	 one	 main	 question:	 how	 come	 the	 poverty	
alleviation	programs	that	are	enabling	some	households	in	the	region	to	
transit	 from	poverty	 are	 not	working	 for	 the	 households	 stagnating	 in	






is	 linked	 to	 vulnerability,	 low	 levels	 of	 educational	 attainment,	 lack	 of	
income	diversification,	 illness,	regional	 imbalance,	macroeconomic	bot‐
tlenecks,	 dysfunctional	 social	 practices,	 political	 instability,	 insecurity,	
displacement,	 gender	 disparity,	 corruption,	 and	 indolence.	 The	 litera‐
ture,	including	the	country’s	poverty	reduction	strategy	papers,	affirmed	
that	 several	 governmental,	 private	 sector,	 charitable,	 civil	 society,	 reli‐
gious,	multinational,	and	diplomatic	organizations	are	trying	to	address	
these	 factors	 and,	 at	 the	 household	 level,	 successive	 surveys	 have	 re‐
ported	notable	improvements	in	the	quality	of	life	(cf.	Uganda	Bureau	of	







(e.g.,	 through	war	 and	 bad	 governance)	 than	 it	 provides	 opportunities	
for	 transformation	 (cf.	 Collier,	 2011).	 However,	 in	 a	 context	 where	
knowledge	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 causes	 of	 poverty	 has	 informed	 the	
design	 and	 implementation	 of	 interventions	 and	 some	 households	 are	
transiting	from	poverty	despite	the	production	of	poverty	at	the	macro‐
economic	 level,	 these	 factors	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 satisfactorily	 account	 for	
the	stagnation.		
Accordingly,	the	study	attempted	to	account	for	stagnation	in	and	mobil‐
ity	 from	poverty	 in	 the	country—trusting	 that,	although	stagnation	de‐
spite	 implementation	 of	 poverty	 alleviation	 programs	may	 not	 be	 sur‐
prising,	accounting	for	it	may	enhance	the	effectiveness	of	the	programs.	
Data	were	collected	 from	a	random	sample	of	323	households—drawn	
from	 various	 parts	 of	 the	 country—using	 a	 semi‐structured	 question‐
naire.	 The	 questionnaire	 was	 divided	 into	 three	 sections:	 household	




and	 stagnating	 in	 poverty.	 They	 touched	 on	 attributes	 of	 access	 to	
healthcare,	 education,	 assets,	 clean	 water,	 sanitation	 facilities,	 income,	
food	security,	land,	and	quality	accommodation—because	related	litera‐
ture	 identified	 them	 as	 key	 indicators	 of	 social	 status	 in	 the	 area.	 The	
third	 section	 touched	on	 the	 respondents’	 view	of	wealth	and	poverty,	
the	status	of	their	households	regarding	the	two,	and	the	things	to	which	
they	would	attribute	this	status.		
The	 respondents’	 scores	on	 the	household	 status	 scorecard	were	 com‐
puted	 into	an	 index	codenamed	“household	welfare	 index.”	The	house‐
holds	were	categorized	as	rural,	semi‐urban,	or	urban,	depending	on	the	
neighborhood	where	 they	were	 located.	For	each	of	 the	categories,	 the	
mean	 score	 on	 the	 household	 welfare	 index	 was	 established	 and	 the	
households	were	further	categorized	into	transiting	from	and	stagnating	







Neighbourhood	 Transiting	 Stagnating	 Total	
Rural	 71	 79	 150	
Semi‐urban	 53	 58	 111	
Urban	 40	 22	 62	
Total	 164	 159	 323	
Source:	Ssempebwa	et	al.	(2012).	
	







Rural	 Semi‐urban	 Urban Rural	 Semi‐urban Urban
n	=	71	 n	=	53	 n	=	40	 n	=	79	 n	=	58	 n	=	22
Access	 to	 basics	 (food,	 shel‐
ter	&	bills)	
59	 42	 33	 40	 39	 64	
Education	 1	 2	 3	 ‐	 3	 ‐	
Good	health	 4	 5	 5	 6	 8	 10	
Income	1	(cash)	 17	 19	 28	 25	 19	 18	
Income	2	(regular	source)	 15	 13	 18	 9	 7	 5	
Income	 3	 (diversified	
source)	
3	 9	 5	 3	 7	 27	
Paid	employment	 4	 8	 8	 9	 10	 9	
Assets	1	(real	estate)	 30	 36	 40	 29	 43	 55	
Assets	2	(cars,	phones,	etc.)	 15	 17	 3	 8	 10	 5	
Self‐employment	 –	 –	 8	 3	 7	 9	
Livestock	 15	 –	 –	 11	 12	 9	
Social	 capital	 (children,	 rela‐
tives	&	friends)	
3	 –	 3	 1	 5	 5	
Source:	Ssempebwa	et	al.	(2012).	
	



















Transiting	 38	 51	 69	 158	
Stagnating	 30	 25	 101	 156	
Total	 	 68	 76	 170	 314	
Source:	Ssempebwa	et	al.	(2012).	
	
The	 main	 difference	 between	 the	 respondents’	 and	 the	 researchers’	




the	 researchers’	 scorecard	 characterized	 as	 transiting	 from	 poverty	
characterized	themselves	as	being	poor	while	30	(representing	19%)	of	
the	 respondents	 the	 scorecard	 characterized	 as	 stagnating	 in	 poverty	
characterized	 themselves	 as	 being	 rich.	 In	 accounting	 for	 the	 status	 of	
their	 households,	 some	 of	 the	 respondents	 provided	 reasons	 for	 this	
disparity	(Table	6).	
	





 In	 between	 [poverty	 and	wealth]	 be‐
cause	there	is	still	need	for	progress	
 Middle	class	…	not	yet	there	
 Medium	rich:	 transiting	 from	poverty	
because	 the	household	head	 is	work‐
ing	hard	
 Poor	 because	 [household	 heads]	 not	
in	formal	employment	





healthy	 and	 can	 work	 …	 [I]	 own	 a	
plot	and	a	house	






 In	 between	 [poverty	 and	wealth]	 be‐
cause	[the	household	is]	working	hard	
to	 deal	 with	 changes	 in	 the	 environ‐
ment	and	prices	
 [A]	 Poor	 household	 because	 a	 lot	
more	is	still	desired	
 Middle	 class	 because	 [even	 if	 they]	
have	 achieved	 some	 things,	 more	 is	
yet	to	be	achieved	
 …in	 the	 middle	 because	 [they]	 still	
need	other	things	
 Poor	 [because]	 they	 have	 no	 car	 and	
animals	[livestock]	
 Medium:	 I	 can’t	 meet	 all	 my	 needs	
however	 I	 try	 to	 meet	 some	 [of	 the]	
needs	
 Midway	 between	wealth	 and	 poverty	
because	 in	 as	 much	 as	 I	 am	 able	 to	
provide	 for	my	 family,	 I	 am	 not	 very	
wealthy	in	terms	of	assets		
 I	 am	moving	 toward	 riches	because	 I	
have	 food,	 medical	 care,	 can	 pay	
[school]	 fees	 for	my	 children	 …	 I	 am	
thinking	 of	 buying	 more	 land	 and	 I	
have	a	job	so	I	am	working	
 In	 between	 [poverty	 and	wealth]	 be‐
cause	 I	 can	 afford	 most	 of	 the	 daily	
needs	 though	 I	 still	 find	 difficult	 in	
getting	 others	 [but]	 I	 am	 self‐
employed	and	hard	working	
 In	 between	 wealth	 and	 poverty	 …	
though	I	have	not	invested	much,	I	am	













 Wealthy	 because	 owns	 a	 house	 and	
plot	[of	land]		




 At	 least	 I	own	a	house;	 I	do	not	con‐
sider	myself	poor	
 Rich	because	[I	am]	not	renting	
 I	 am	 wealthy	 because	 I	 have	 devel‐
oped	good	ideas	through	training	
 Rich	because	we	are	healthy	














S/N	 Reasons	 for	 upward	
mobility	
n	 %3 Reasons	for	stagnation	 n	 %4	
1	 Education*	 12	 7	 Low	 level/	 lack	 of	 educational	
attainment	
5	 3	
2	 Gainful	employment*	 29	 18 Un/underemployment	 43	 27	
3	 Inheritance*	 11	 7	 Inherited	 syndrome	 of	 disad‐
vantage	
3	 2	
4	 Access	to	markets*	 32	 20 Lack	of	market	 27	 17	
5	 Frugality*	 54	 33 High	[consumption]	expenditure	 58	 36	
6	 Access	 to	 productive	
resources*	
37	 23 Lack	of	capital	(money,	land,	etc.)	 120 75	
7	 Social	capital*	 44	 27 Social	and	political	exclusion	 16	 10	
8	 Good	health*	 8	 5	 Sickness	 33	 21	
9	 Hard	work	 116 71 Livestock	diseases**	 24	 15	
10	 Serendipity	 11	 7	 Bereavement**	 8	 5	
11	 Mobility	 5	 3	 Taxes**	 35	 22	
12	 Remittances	 22	 13 Climate	change**	 66	 42	
13	 	 	 	 Poor	overhead	infrastructure**	 44	 28	




Eight	 of	 these	 factors	 are	 traditionally	 known	 to	 be	 positively	 related	
with	mobility	from	poverty.	Indeed,	eight	of	the	factors	the	respondents	
who	 characterized	 their	 households	 as	 poor	 or	 stagnating	 in	 poverty	
cited	for	the	stagnation	of	their	households	contrasted	the	factors	direct‐














by	 the	 households’	 members’	 educational	 attainment,	 involvement	 in	
gainful	employment,	 inheritance,	 access	 to	markets,	 frugality,	 access	 to	
productive	 resources,	 social	 capital,	 good	 health,	 serendipity,	mobility,	
and	remittances.	However,	the	finding	that	majority	of	the	respondents	
from	these	households	expressed	discontentment	with	 the	households’	
statuses	 (Table	 5)	 gives	 credence	 to	 the	 view	 that	 although	 their	 hard	
work	is	supported	by	these	factors,	they	work	hard	because	they	are	not	
contented	 with	 their	 situation	 (Table	 6).	 Conversely,	 the	 stagnating	
households’	 syndrome	 of	 disadvantage	 is	 compounded	 by	 their	 con‐
tentment	with	their	status	(Table	5).		
Accordingly,	 this	 study	demonstrates	a	basic	point:	despite	 their	 indis‐
putable	 challenges,	 many	 of	 the	 stagnating	 households	 are	 stagnating	
because	they	are	contented	with	their	situation.	This	position	appears	to	
corroborate	Bird	 and	 Shinyekwa’s	 (2005)	 view	 that	 some	people	 stag‐
nate	 in	poverty	because	 they	are	 indolent	albeit	superficially.	Although	
the	 finding	 that	households	 stagnating	 in	poverty	were	contented	with	
the	 statuses	 of	 their	 households	 suggests	 that	 these	 households	 are	
complacent,	 it	 is	 the	 researchers’	 scorecard	 that	 characterized	 them	as	
stagnating	 in	 poverty.	 Incidentally,	 there	were	 disparities	 between	 the	
attributes	 of	 this	 scorecard	 (i.e.	 access	 to	 healthcare,	 education,	 asset	
ownership,	 quality	 of	 water	 and	 sanitation,	 income,	 food	 security	 and	
dwelling)	and	some	of	the	things	respondents	in	the	stagnating	category	
characterized	as	wealth	 (e.g.,	 children).	 It	 is	also	notable	 that	 these	 re‐
spondents	did	not	 simply	 characterize	 their	households	 as	well‐off	 (cf.	








society	 and	has	objective	 indicators,	 those	 fighting	 to	 alleviate	poverty	
need	to	synchronize	their	definition	of	these	indicators	with	that	of	the	
poor	 whose	 transition	 from	 poverty	 they	 are	 trying	 to	 facilitate.	 Con‐
versely,	review	of	related	literature	indicates	that	the	poverty	alleviation	
programs	that	have	been	implemented	in	Uganda	focused	on	attributes	
of	 poverty/wealth	 that	 are	 similar	 to	 those	 in	 the	 researchers’	 score‐
card—analogous	 to	 fixing	 square	 pegs	 in	 round	 holes.	 This	 appears	 to	
account	 for	 the	 failure	 of	 these	 programs	 to	 positively	 transform	 the	
stagnating	households.	The	 finding	 that	 the	 stagnating	 households	had	
access	 to	 the	 things	 they	considered	 to	constitute	wealth	 suggests	 that	
the	poor	 are	 able	 to	 pursue	 and	 achieve	wealth	 the	way	 they	 know	 it.	
Thus,	closing	the	gap	between	their	perception	of	development	and	that	
of	 development	 planners/	 practitioners,	 with	 the	 result	 that	 the	 poor	
perceive	development	the	way	those	promoting	it	perceive	it,	could	en‐





3.2  Evidence from DRC, Mozambique, and Rwanda 
Teams	of	 researchers	based	at	Université	Catholique	de	Graben	 (DRC),	
Universidade	 Catholica	 do	Mocambique	 (Mozambique),	 and	 Universite	
Catholique	de	Kabgayi	(Rwanda)	surveyed	the	perceptions	poor	people	
in	their	countries	hold	about	their	poverty	and	needs	and	related	their	







ly,	 however,	 the	 teams	also	 found	 that	many	of	 the	poverty	 alleviation	
programs	identified	in	the	study	areas	neither	disaggregated	the	poor	by	
their	 perception	 of	 their	 poverty	 nor	 exploited	 the	 resources	 the	 poor	
believed	themselves	 to	possess	 to	 the	poor’s	advantage,	which	appears	
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to	 account	 for	 the	 ineffectiveness	 of	 the	 programs	 in	 enhancing	 social	
transformation.	
4 Implication for the Political Economy of Poverty in 
the Global South 
The	foregoing	discussion	suggests	that	poverty	alleviation	programs	are	
more	 effective	 if	 they	 involve	 the	 poor	 in	 defining	 poverty,	 assessing	
their	needs	and	in	designing	and	implementing	poverty	alleviation	pro‐
grams.	 This	 proposition	 rhymes	 well	 with	 literature	 underscoring	 the	
need	 to	 contextualize	 poverty	 (e.g.,	 Harvey	 and	 Reed,	 1992;	 Hashemi,	
Schuler	and	Riley,	1996;	UMU,	2009;	UMU,	2010).	Conversely,	observa‐
ble	practice	in	many	large‐scale	poverty	alleviation	programs	(mainly	by	
governments	 and	 multilateral	 development	 organizations)	 in	 Sub‐
Saharan	Africa	 is	 at	 variance	with	 the	proposition.	This	 appears	 to	 ex‐
plain	the	persistence	of	poverty	in	the	region	despite	investment	of	co‐
lossal	 financial	 resources	 in	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 poverty	 alleviation	 pro‐
grams	 (cf.	 Collier,	 2007;	Moyo,	 2009).	This	 being	 the	 case,	 it	 is	 recom‐
mended	that	organizations	working	to	alleviate	poverty	from	the	region	
elicit	and	integrate	the	input	of	the	poor	into	the	design	and	implemen‐
tation	 of	 poverty	 alleviation	 programs.	 This	 will	 not	 only	 ensure	 that	
poverty	alleviation	projects/programs	reach	the	people	they	are	intend‐
ed	 to	 reach	 but	 also	 that	 they	 do	 so	 in	 an	 effective,	 cost‐effective,	 and	
sustainable	way.	
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SCOPE AND USEFULNESS OF “RIGHT TO INFORMATION” AS 





the	potential	and	 limitations	of	RTI	as	 a	 strategy	 for	both	empowering	
those	 living	 in	 poverty	 and	 facilitating	 their	 attempts	 to	 emerge	 from	
such	crippling	circumstances	socially	and	economically.	The	information	












accordingly.	 Academic	 thinking	 related	 to	 poverty,	 which	 has	 in	 some	
cases	had	a	relevant	impact	on	political	thought	and	policy	articulation,	
has	 travelled	 from	 the	 decided	 “narrowness”	 of	 what	 has	 come	 to	 be	
known	as	the	Basic	Needs	Approach	(see	Streeten	et	al.	1981)	to	what	is	
frequently	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Capabilities	 Approach	 (see	 Sen,	 1985,	
1988)	which,	by	many	estimates,	the	present	authors	included,	is	a	great	
deal	broader	 in	scope	and	much	more	 flexible	 in	 its	potential	 foci.	 In	a	
related	 and	 even	 analogous	 manner,	 anti‐poverty	 strategies	 have	 also	
registered	 a	 significant	 shift:	 moving	 from	 the	 “needs”	 orientation	
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the	 creation	 and	 evolution	 of	 something	 akin	 to	 a	 market‐based	 ap‐
proach	 to	 fighting	poverty.	According	 to	certain	scholars	 these	 tenden‐
cies	feed	into	at	the	same	time	as	they	respond	to	the	rising	tide	of	a	ne‐
oliberal	 revival	of	 sorts	which	holds	as	 a	 crucial	 tenet	 the	 centrality	of	
deficit	reduction	in	addressing	financial	crises	throughout	the	globe,	the	
majority	 of	 which	 are,	 apparently,	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 southern	 hemi‐
sphere	(See	Watson,	2012).	








of	 acting	with	 the	 direct	 and	 active	 support	 of	western	 donors.	 In	 the	






















particularly	 in	 the	 contexts	 of	 Global	 South	 and	 transition	 countries	
where	such	knowledge	might	not	otherwise	be	readily	available	to	those	
















be	considered	relevant	but	secondary	 factors	 in	poverty	 treatment	and	
reduction.	
Therefore,	as	a	result	of	and	in	careful	consideration	of	the	complex	and	
difficult	 circumstances	 in	which	RTI	has	been	 thrust	both	 theoretically	
and	practically,	this	chapter	attempts	to	adequately	respond	to	two	ma‐
jor	research	questions.	In	the	case	of	the	first,	it	is	our	intention	to	inves‐
tigate	 in	what	manner	precisely	RTI	 can	 contribute	 toward	working	 in	




tualize	 and	 respond	 to	 these	 rather	 complex	 research	 agendas,	 this	





living	 in	 conditions	 of	 poverty.	 The	 topics	 of	 the	 case	 studies	 here	 are	




khas	 land	 is	allocated	and	utilized.	The	cases	 feature	women,	men,	and	
groups	 which	 are	 comprised	 of	 individuals	 of	 both	 genders.	 We	 have	








ing	 and	 therefore	 giving	 to	 the	world	 as	 a	whole.	 In	 second	 place,	 the	
country	has	introduced	the	RTI	Act	(RTIA)	and	has	been,	on	the	surface	
at	 least,	 aggressively	 promoting	 its	 implementation	 for	 a	 number	 of	
years	now.	 It	 is	also	worthy	of	mention	 that	 this	decision	was	made	 in	
large	part	as	the	result	of	a	civil	society	advocacy	movement.	One	of	the	
major	 selling	 points	 of	 the	 movement,	 which	 allowed	 it	 to	 gain	 such	
momentum	and	achieve	such	results,	was	 the	compelling	 idea	 that	RTI	
would	 enhance	poverty	 alleviation	by	 further	 empowering	 the	poor	 to	
exercise	their	rights.	With	the	third	year	of	the	RTIA’s	implementation,	it	
will	be	good	to	see	how	far	the	law	has	been	capable	of	 living	up	to	its	






steps	 be	 carried	 out	 to	 ensure	 that	 poor	 people	 can	 adopt	 it	 with	 full	
ownership	and	empowerment.	This	is	not	the	case	if	RTI	remains	closely	





The	chapter	 is	 composed	of	 six	major	 sections	 including	 this	 introduc‐
tion.	 The	 core	 discussion	 of	 the	 chapter	 starts	 in	 the	 second	 section	
where	we	begin	 our	 investigation	by	 exploring	 the	 conceptual	 founda‐




and	Nowak,	 2002;	 Sen,	 2004,	 2005).	The	 third	 and	 fourth	 sections	 are	
designed	to	shed	light	on	the	complex	realities	behind	poverty	and	RTI	
scenarios	 of	 Bangladesh	 in	 the	 period	 under	 consideration.	 Section	 5	
analyzes	 the	 case	 studies	 of	 RTI	 application	 by	 poor	 and	marginalized	
peoples	 in	 line	 with	 the	 research	 questions	 which	 have	 been	 stated	
above.	 Finally,	 the	 chapter	draws	 its	 synthetic	 conclusions	 based	upon	
these	theoretical	and	practical	bases	of	knowledge.	
2 Right to Information as Anti-Poverty Tool: Conceptual 
Foundations  
The	idea	of	RTI	is	originally	not	associated	with	poverty	and	its	associa‐
tion	 with	 human	 rights	 is	 also	 a	 more	 recent	 phenomenon	 than	 one	
might	think.	RTI	as	a	social	imperative	emerged	in	the	eighteenth	centu‐
ry	 in	 Scandinavian	 countries	 and	 started	 gathering	 pace	 in	 the	 post‐	
World	War	II	era.	As	early	as	1766,	the	joint	parliament	of	Sweden	and	
Finland	(at	that	time	both	of	these	now	distinct	entities	constituted	parts	
of	 Swedish	 Empire)	 passed	 the	 Access	 to	 Public	 Records	 Act	 that	 is	
commonly	regarded	as	 the	 first	RTI	 law	 in	history.	 In	1946,	 the	United	
Nations	 General	 Assembly	 in	 its	 very	 first	 session	 adopted	 Resolution	
59(I)	that	states,	“Freedom	of	Information	is	a	fundamental	human	right	
and	[…]	the	touchstone	of	all	the	freedoms	to	which	the	UN	is	consecrat‐
ed.”	 Article	 19	 of	 the	 Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (UDHR)	
further	strongly	recognized	the	right	to	information	as	an	essential	part	
of	the	fundamental	right	to	freedom	of	expression.1	This	was	reiterated	












emerging	 fields	 of	 development	 thinking	 including	 attempts	 at	 a	more	
profound	understanding	of	the	nature	and	causes	of	poverty	in	multiple	






which	 others	 should	 respect.	 The	moral	 appeal	 of	 human	 rights	
has	been	used	for	a	variety	of	purposes,	from	resisting	torture	and	
arbitrary	 incarceration	 to	 demanding	 the	 end	 of	 hunger	 and	 of	
medical	neglect.	
Sen	(1980,	1985a,	1985b)	has	pioneered	research	agendas	focusing	up‐
on	 and	 drawing	 inspiration	 from	human	 rights,	 subsequently	 applying	
such	 ideas	 in	economic	 thinking	by	emphasizing	 the	 importance	of	de‐
veloping	human	capabilities	as	opposed	to	economic	growth	as	the	core	
motivator	 in	 the	amelioration	of	situations	of	poverty	globally.	The	hu‐
man	 capabilities	 concept	 or	 the	 capabilities	 approach	 stipulates	 that	
human	 life	 needs	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 combination	 of	 various	doings	
and	beings.	These	are	various	forms	of	functioning	that	range	from	ele‐





                                                 
2	 UDHR	Article	19	(2):	“Everyone	shall	have	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression;	this	
right	 shall	 include	 freedom	 to	 seek,	 receive	 and	 impart	 information	of	 all	 kinds,	







ployed	 in	 order	 to	 connect	 human	 rights	 and	 human	 capabilities	 con‐
cepts.	This	 is	what	Sen	(2005:	152,	155)	is	referring	to	when	he	points	
out	 that	 “(t)he	 concepts	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 human	 capabilities	 have	
something	of	a	common	motivation.”	This	is	a	point	that	he	later	elabo‐
rates	upon,	explaining	that,	“human	rights	are	best	seen	as	right	to	cer‐
tain	 specific	 freedoms	 (and)	 capabilities	 can	 be	 seen	 broadly,	 as	 free‐
doms	of	particular	kind.”	He	also	equates	terrible	deprivations	with	the	
lack	 of	 freedom	 as	 demonstrated	 through	 an	 individual’s	 capacity	 to	
escape	destitution.	He	argues	 that	people	 remain	poor	not	only	due	 to	
indolence	 and	 inactivity,	 as	 highlighted	 in	 numerous	 examples	 which	
might	be	culled	from	previous	literature	on	poverty,	but	also	because	of	




to	 as	 the	 human	 rights	 approach	 to	 poverty	 reduction,	 Hunt,	 Osmani,	
and	 Nowak	 (2002)	 found	 there	 to	 be	 a	 nearly	 perfect	 consistence	 be‐
tween	 this	method	 and	 the	 capabilities	 approach	 to	 poverty	 just	men‐






as	 the	 fundamentals	of	minimal	human	dignity	 in	conceptualizing	pov‐
erty.	
What	ultimately	 took	 shape	 as	 the	 result	of	 the	work	of	Hunt,	Osmani,	




measures	 intended	 to	 reduce	 poverty	 and	 reestablish	 adequate	 social	








national	 human	 rights	 normative	 frameworks,	 accountability,	 nondis‐
crimination	and	equality,	participation,	and	other	human	rights	(OHCHR,	
2004:	iv,	13–20).	
The	 new	 direction	 in	 conceptualizing	 poverty	 brought	 to	 light	 and	 ex‐
plained	 by	 the	 capabilities	 approach	was	widely	 disseminated	 and	 fed	
into	a	programmatic	level	of	activity	through	the	UN’s	human	rights	ap‐
proach	 to	poverty	 reduction.	Backed	by	a	 comprehensive	and	dynamic	
understanding	of	poverty	which	is	based	upon	the	capabilities	approach,	
there	was	scope	for	wider	strategies,	and	the	development	of	tools	and	
techniques	 to	 be	 used	 to	 attack	 poverty.	 Thus,	 the	 availability	 of	 and	
access	 to	 information	 in	 the	 form	 of	 entitlement	 and	 rights	 discourse	
was	also	given	priority	as	part	of	“other	human	rights	of	particular	im‐
portance	 to	 poverty	 reduction	 strategies	 (OHCHR,	 2004:	 20).”	Without	
securing	 the	 right	 to	 information,	poor	people	will	not	be	empowered;	
they	will	be	unable	to	demand	accountability	and	secure	participation	in	
any	 meaningful	 way.	 RTI	 is	 therefore	 one	 among	 other	 human	 rights	
(that	 I	 would	 like	 to	 term	 as	 fourth‐generation	 human	 rights)	 which	
takes	its	place	beside	what	are	considered	to	be	more	fundamental	civil	
and	 political	 rights	 (first‐generation	 human	 rights);	 economic,	 social,	
and	 cultural	 rights	 (second‐generation	 human	 rights);	 and,	 third‐
generation	human	 rights	 as	women’s	 rights,	 children’s	 rights,	minority	
rights,	indigenous	peoples’	rights,	rights	of	the	peoples	with	disabilities,	
and	so	on.	











The	 poverty	 rate	 is	 gradually	 decreasing	 in	 Bangladesh	 but	 absolute	
poverty	is	increasing	with	population	growth.	The	recent	Household	and	
Income	 Expenditure	 Survey	 (HIES)	 has	 shown	 that	 while	 the	 poverty	
reduction	 rate	was	 8.9%	 in	 2000–2005,	 poverty	 reduction	was	 less	 in	












during	 1991–2010.	 They	 argue	 that	 if	 the	 poverty	 reduction	 rate	 does	
not	accelerate,	then	it	is	likely	that	the	share	of	the	poor	as	a	part	of	the	

















4 RTI Situation in Bangladesh 
An	RTI	 law	 compels	Government	Organizations	 (GOs)	 as	well	 as	 other	
entities	as	stipulated	under	its	provisions	to	disclose	information	of	pub‐
lic	 interest	 to	 common	 citizens.	 The	 idea	 behind	 these	 laws	 is	 that	 by	
accessing	 and	 utilizing	 such	 information	 citizens	 will	 be	 able	 to	 claim	
their	 rightful	 entitlements	 from	 the	 government	 and	 other	 authorities	
responsible	 while	 making	 these	 figures	 of	 power	more	 transparent	 in	
their	actions	and	more	accountable	to	their	citizens	and	constituencies.	
By	 adopting	 the	 Right	 to	 Information	 Act	 2009,	 Bangladesh	 joined	 90	
other	 countries	 in	 the	world	 that	 have	 enacted	 similar	 laws	 to	 entitle	
their	 citizens	 to	 exercise	 their	 right	 to	 information	 legally	 and	 rapidly.	






of	 such	 authorities	 from	 whom	 information	 is	 to	 be	 obtained.	 Article	
2(d)	describes	information	providing	units.	Articles	4–9	have	elaborate	
provisions	 for	right	 to,	preservation	of,	publication	of	and	access	 to	 in‐
formation	including	how	to	file	a	request	for	information	and	the	precise	
procedures	 for	providing	such	 information.	Article	10	of	 the	 law	stipu‐
lates	the	establishment	of	designated	officers	of	the	information	provid‐
ing	 units	 for	 providing	 information.	 Articles	 11–23	 constitute	 detailed	
provisions	pertaining	 to	 the	establishment,	 financial	matters,	and	offic‐
ers	and	employees	of	information	commissions.	Articles	24–29	are	con‐
cerned	with	 those	 remedies	 and	 recourses	 to	be	 sought	under	 the	 law	
when	such	directives	mentioned	above	are	not	adequately	carried	out.	
Based	 on	 the	 powers	 vested	 in	 government	 under	 Article	 33	 of	 RTIA,	
Right	to	Information	Rules,	2009	was	introduced	into	law	on	1	Novem‐
ber,	 2009.	This	document	 lays	down	administrative	procedures	 for	 re‐
ceiving	 information	 request,	 providing	 information,	 appeal	 application,	
use	of	internet,	information	request	fees,	and	information	request	forms.	
An	Information	Commission	was	established	under	Article	11	(1)	of	the	




composition	 of	 this	 investigation	 were:	 Professor	 Dr.	 Golam	 Rahman,	
Chief	 Information	 Commissioner	 (CIC),	 and	Nepal	 Chandra	 Sarker	 and	
Professor	Dr.	Khurshida	Begum	Sayeed,	Information	Commissioners.	
The	RTI	Rules	2009	stipulate	a	precise	application	 form	which	 is	 to	be	
used	 in	 order	 to	 make	 information	 requests	 to	 designated	 officers	 of	
information	providing	units.	The	 information	requested	should	be	pro‐
vided	 to	 the	 applicant	within	 the	 specific	 time	 unless	 that	 information	
falls	under	the	provision	of	Section	7	(information	that	is	not	mandatory	
to	provide).		
According	 to	 the	Annual	Report,	 2011	of	 the	 Information	Commission,	
the	 total	number	of	 information	 requests	made	 in	2011	using	 the	pre‐
scribed	 form	was	 7,808.	 Among	 them,	 the	GOs	 and	 the	NGOs	 have	 re‐
ceived	 7,671	 (98%)	 and	 137	 (2%)	 applications	 respectively	 (Infor‐
mation	Commission,	2012:	48).	This	is	a	decidedly	paltry	sum	if	we	take	
into	 account	 the	 vast	 size	 of	 the	 country’s	 population	 and	 their	 pre‐
sumed	 information	 needs.	 There	 are	 thirty‐six	 Information	 Providing	

















ant	 from	 the	 highly	 responsive	 IPUs	who	 have	 fielded	 the	 information	








by	 their	 lack	of	awareness	about	or	negative	attitude	 to	 the	 law.	
Most	 of	 them	 are	 unaware	 about	 it,	mainly	 because	 the	 Govern‐
ment	has	done	little	more	than	basic	publicity	about	the	 law	and	
its	 intents.	Those	 that	have	heard	about	 the	 law	and	sat	 through	
awareness‐building	exercises	either	did	not	understand	it	fully	or	
accept	it	seriously	(RIB,	2011).	
5 RTI as Anti-Poverty Tool: Case Studies from 
Bangladesh 
This	 chapter	 is	now	going	 to	 illustrate	 the	 scope	and	 the	usefulness	of	
RTI	 as	 an	 anti‐poverty	 tool	 through	 a	 set	 of	 micro	 case	 studies	 taken	
from	throughout	Bangladesh.	These	micro	cases	will	be	analyzed	in	the	
light	 of	 the	 conceptual	 foundation	 of	 RTI‐poverty	 linkages	 based	 upon	
the	capabilities	approach	and	the	human	rights	approach	to	poverty	as	
discussed	 earlier.	 RTI	 presents	 anti‐poverty	 potentials	 for	 various	 sec‐
tions	of	the	poor	in	a	wide	range	of	areas	particularly	in	securing	public	





to	 capture	 a	 broader	 understanding	 of	 the	 scopes	 and	 uses	 of	 RTI	 in	
fighting	poverty.	








being	 organized	 at	 that	 time	 by	 D.Net.	 She	 learned	 about	 government	
social	 safety	 net	 programs	 such	 as	 that	 offered	by	Vulnerability	Group	
Development	 (VGD)	 from	 the	weekly	 awareness	 sessions	 of	 her	 group	
which	she	attended.	As	a	result	of	this	new	found	awareness	she	came	to	
the	 decision	 that	 a	 VGD	 card	would	 be	 helpful	 to	 her.	 She	 established	
contact	with	 the	 local	Union	Parishad	(UP)	Chairman	and	 filled	out	 the	
appropriate	forms	in	order	to	register	her	application	for	a	VGD	card.	In	








eligible	 for	 acquiring	a	VGD	card	or	not,	 and	how	VGD	cards	were	dis‐
tributed.	The	UP	Secretary	 complied	with	 the	RTI	application	and	pro‐
vided	the	information	about	the	allotment	of	VGD	cards,	which	showed	




5.2  Shamima Akter Secures VGD Cards for Village Women 
Shamima	Akter	 is	 an	18‐year‐old	high	 school	 student	 from	a	 small	 vil‐
lage	 located	 in	 the	Vimkhali	Union	of	 Jamalganj	Upazilla	 in	 Sunamganj	
district	 in	 northeastern	 Bangladesh.	 She	 is	 also	 the	 local	 president	 of	
Ekota	Youth	Network,	 a	 youth	 group	devoted	 to	 civic	 engagement	 and	
participatory	local	governance	which	cooperates	and	coordinates	activi‐
ties	with	 the	 SHARIQUE	project	of	 INGO	 Intercooperation.	As	a	part	of	
these	 cooperative	 endeavors,	 the	 group	members	 received	 training	 in	
RTI	and	learned	about	their	rights	from	Intercooperation.	
At	the	end	of	2010,	Shamima	came	to	know	that	Upazilla	administration	
was	 preparing	 a	 new	 list	 for	 VGD	 beneficiaries	 for	 the	 Financial	 Year	





information	 request	 about	 the	VGD	 list	on	 January	2011	with	 the	 local	
UP	 Chairman	who	 showed	 a	marked	 reluctance	 to	 respond.	 Later	 that	




and	 the	 names	 of	 four	 other	women,	 who,	 in	 fact,	 were	 eligible,	 were	
included	 forthwith.	 The	VGD	 selection	 committee,	 headed	 by	 the	UNO,	
approved	the	report	of	the	review	committee	as	well	as	the	revised	list.	
On	 February	 2011,	 Shamima	 finally	 received	 the	 revised	 list	 from	 the	
Union	 Parishad.	 Shamima	 and	 her	 group	 could	 then,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	
information	which	they	received,	verify	if	the	beneficiaries	selected	were	
actually	eligible	according	to	the	established	criteria.	
5.3  Jobeda Begum is Able to Maximize Benefits from Social Safety 
Net Programs 
Jobeda	Begum	is	a	divorcee	single	mother	of	two	children	from	a	village	
located	 in	 the	Bhalukagachchi	Union	of	Putya	Upazilla	 in	Rajshahi	Dis‐
trict.	 In	her	search	for	an	adequate	livelihood,	she	came	to	know	about	
different	social	safety	net	programs	organized	and	implemented	by	the	
government	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 the	 lot	 of	 vulnerable	 peoples	 such	 as	






grams	 in	 the	 area,	who	was	 going	 to	benefit	 from	 these	programs	and	
the	details	of	the	procedures	which	needed	to	be	followed	in	order	to	be	
included	on	the	beneficiary	 list	of	 the	programs	 for	 the	FY	2010–2011.	
The	 secretary	 provided	 her	with	 all	 of	 the	 information	which	 she	 had	
requested.	
Jobeda	 shared	 the	 information	 with	 her	 fellow	 villagers.	 They	 noticed	
that	some	of	 the	programs	did	not	appear	 to	be	 implemented	properly	
according	to	the	pertinent	regulations.	The	villagers	set	up	a	Project	Im‐









on	 the	 list	and	 these	people	 received	different	 forms	of	 livelihood	sup‐
port	from	government	social	safety	net	programs.	
5.4  Rafiqul Islam Secures VGF Allocation 
Rafiqul	 Islam	 is	 a	 farmer	 who	 resides	 in	 Cox’s	 Bazar	 district	 in	 South	





Preparedness	 Centre	 (BDPC)	 in	 2009	 and	 learnt	 about	 RTI	 law	 while	
undergoing	the	NGO	training	program.	
When	he	heard	that	the	government	was	going	to	begin	distributing	rice	
in	 his	 union	 under	 the	 Vulnerable	 Group	 Feeding	 (VGF)	 scheme,	 he	
asked	the	Project	Implementation	Officer	(PIO)	of	his	Upazilla	about	the	
quantity	 of	 rice	 that	 each	 VGF	 card	 holder	would	 receive.	 Despite	 the	






rice	was	 to	be	allotted	per	person.	Aware	 that	 this	was	not	 the	correct	








5.5  Mosharef Hossain Majhi Secures Agricultural Supplies 
Mosharef	 Hossain	 Majhi	 is	 a	 farmer	 from	 Barisal	 District	 in	 Southern	
Bangladesh.	The	Upazilla	Agriculture	Officer	(UAO)	of	his	home	upazilla	
Banaripara	 runs	 the	 Integrated	 Pest	 Management	 (IPM)	 club	 and	 the	
Integrated	 Crop	 Management	 (ICM)	 Farmer’s	 Field	 School	 through	
which	pesticide	equipments	 are	distributed	and	 farmers	are	 trained	 in	
their	use.	UAO	 is	 supposed	 to	allocate	 these	 services	 following	 specific	
procedures	 and	 guidelines	 that	 are	 not	 always	 followed	 properly.	
Mosharef	 learned	 about	 RTIA	 from	 local	 journalist	Mizanul	 Islam	who	
earlier	attended	a	workshop	on	RTIA	given	by	NU.	





ber,	 2010	but	 this	 official	 sustained	 the	UAO’s	decision.	Mosharef	 then	
appealed	 to	 the	Deputy	Director,	Department	of	Agricultural	Extension	
(DAE)	of	Barisal	region	who	forwarded	it	to	Additional	Director	General	
(DG).	 The	 latter	 also	 sustained	 the	 refusal	 of	 information.	 Finally,	




information	 and	 for	 labeling	 agriculture‐related	 information	 as	 confi‐
dential.	 The	 Commission	 found	 nothing	 confidential	 in	 the	 requested	




5.6  Poor Women Get Access to Maternal Health Care 
A	landless	organization	associated	with	NGO	Nijera	Kori	(NK)	at	Gangni	
upazilla	 of	 Meherpur	 district	 in	 western	 Bangladesh	 learned	 about	 ir‐
regularities	in	the	allocation	of	cards	under	the	Maternal	Health	Voucher	
scheme	through	which	poor	pregnant	women	are	entitled	to	health	ser‐
vices	 for	a	maximum	amount	of	8,000	Taka	until	 the	child	 is	born.	The	
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group	 members	 heard	 from	 many	 poor	 expectant	 women	 resident	 in	
that	 locality	 that	 the	maternal	health	voucher	cards	were	mainly	being	





They	 asked	 the	 following	 questions:	 How	 many	 cards	 are	 distributed	
monthly	under	 the	Safe	Motherhood	Health	Voucher	project?	What	are	
the	criteria	for	selection	of	families	for	distribution	of	cards?	Who	is	re‐
sponsible	 for	 selecting	 the	 beneficiaries	 and	 distributing	 the	 cards?	
What	 are	 the	 benefits	 and	 services	 that	 card	holders	would	 get?	What	
are	the	registration	fees?		
In	 reply	 to	 their	 information	 request,	 the	 applicants	were	 only	 able	 to	




200	 men	 and	 women,	 and	 submitted	 a	 memorandum	 signed	 by	 hun‐
dreds	of	people	of	the	locality	to	the	Civil	Surgeon	(CS),	the	senior	most	
government	 health	 official	 of	 the	 district.	 They	 also	 sent	 copies	 of	 the	
memorandum	 to	 other	 government	 high	 officials	 in	 the	 locality	 and	
heads	of	local	governments.	The	applicants	of	the	landless	organization	
also	met	with	 the	Mayor	 of	Meherpur	 town,	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Upazilla,	
and	Upazilla	Health	Officer.	As	a	result	of	these	multiple	actions,	the	CS	
launched	an	investigation	into	the	allegations	and	found	them	to	be	true.	
The	 accused	 health	 official	 was	 transferred	 as	 a	 penalty.	 The	 CS	 dis‐
closed	 detailed	 information	 about	 the	 “Maternal	 Health	 Voucher	
Scheme”	including	the	profiles	of	the	beneficiaries,	beneficiary	selection	
criteria,	 and	 procedures.	 The	 village	 people	 came	 together	 to	 identify	
potential	local	beneficiaries	and	proposed	the	names	of	twenty	pregnant	
poor	women	who	then	received	the	health	card.	
5.7  Landless Peoples Secure Access to Land Records 
While	 agriculture	 is	 an	 important	 sector	 of	 the	 Bangladesh	 economy,	
65%	of	rural	populations	are	still	 landless.	An	important	aspect	of	land	









Ramgati	 upazilla	 of	 Laxmipur	 district	 in	 southern	 Bangladesh	 sought	
information	on	khas	 land	available	in	the	locality	and	their	distribution	




Land	 Office	 instead.	 Riaz	 and	 over	 a	 hundred	 fellow	 members	 of	 the	
landless	 organization	 staged	 a	 demonstration	 in	 front	 of	 the	 Upazilla	
Land	Office	in	November	of	2010.	The	AC	(Land)	met	with	the	group	and	
promised	 to	 provide	 them	 with	 the	 requested	 information	 within	 the	
specified	 time	 as	 per	 RTIA	 should	 they	 apply	 by	 submitting	 an	 infor‐
mation	request	to	him.	After	Riaz	complied	accordingly,	he	received	pho‐
tocopies	 of	 the	 information	 on	 December	 2010.	 The	 information	 was	
then	used	to	formulate	the	action	plan	of	the	landless	organization.	
5.8  Fishermen Win Access to Khas Water Body 
Sonaidanga	water	reservoir	of	around	57	acres	is	a	khas	water	body	at	









for	 commercial	 fishing,	 an	 activity	which	 threatens	 to	 deplete	 and	 de‐
stroy	the	ecosystems	surrounding	the	reservoir.	











In	 this	 situation,	 the	 landless	 organization	 adopted	 strategies	 of	 both	





to	 his	 superior,	 the	 Additional	 Deputy	 Commissioner	 (Revenue),	 who	
sent	those	documents	to	the	Department	of	Land	Records	(DLR)	in	Dha‐
ka	for	assessment.	The	findings	of	the	investigation	confirmed	the	com‐










of	 the	 police,	 there	was	 a	 protest	 of	 400	men	 and	women	 against	 the	
enclosures	 and	 police	 inaction.	 Then	 the	 landless	 organization	 them‐
selves	removed	the	bamboo	enclosure.	The	illegal	occupiers	complained	












variety	 of	 backgrounds	 and	 are	 faced	with	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	 complex	
problems	 as	 they	 include	both	men	 and	women:	widows,	 students,	 di‐
vorcee	 single	mothers,	 farmers,	 landless	 farmers,	 and	 fishermen.	 They	




It	 was	 discussed	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter	 that	 the	 capabilities	 approach	
tends	 to	 view	 poverty	 as	 the	 absence	 of	 certain	 freedoms	 that	 would	
otherwise	 enable	people	 to	 achieve	 and	 retain	 certain	 capabilities	 that	
ensure	 that	 they	can	enjoy	a	better	quality	of	 life.	Additionally,	 the	hu‐
man	 rights	 approach	 to	 poverty	 reduction	 asserts	 that	 each	 and	 every	
society	should	treat	the	project	of	reducing	poverty	among	its	impover‐
ished	populations	as	an	obligation	founded	upon	legal	rather	than	simp‐
ly	 ethical	 and	 moral	 principles.	 Poverty	 reduction	 is	 deemed	 possible	
through	 empowerment,	 human	 rights,	 accountability,	 nondiscrimina‐
tion,	equality,	and	participation.	If	these	are	enhanced	in	the	case	studies	
discussed	above,	 then	we	 should	as	observers	 consider	 that	 these	 suc‐
cesses	are	a	manifestation	of	the	scope	as	well	as	usefulness	of	RTI	as	an	
anti‐poverty	tool.	
The	case	studies	definitely	show	that	RTI	can	empower	the	poor	 if	 it	 is	







counterparts,	 they	 are	 still	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 rural	 power	 structures	 as	
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they	 are	 merely	 small	 landholders	 without	 large	 asset	 bases.	 RTI	 has	
enabled	 them	 to	 exercise	 their	 citizen	 entitlements	 despite	 the	 many	
manipulations	carried	out	by	the	UP	Chairman	(in	Rafiq’s	case)	and	nu‐




RTI.	While	 as	 landless	 individuals,	 the	members	of	 these	organizations	
were	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 rural	 power	 structures	 individually.	 However,	
being	 organized	 into	 issue‐based	 groups,	 they	were	more	 empowered	
than	other	 landless	 individuals	who	were	not	organized.	RTI	processes	
available	 through	 RTIA	 made	 available	 channels	 through	 which	 these	
organizations	were	able	to	influence	local	decision	making	and	therefore	






of	 second‐	and	 third‐generation	categories.	As	Rezia,	 Shamima,	 Jobeda,	
and	Rafiq	secured	their	social	safety	net	entitlement	through	RTI	appli‐
cation,	they	were	able	to	exercise	their	basic	economic	and	food	rights:	
aspects	 of	 their	 lives	 which,	 when	 improved,	 brought	 about	 a	 vast	
change	for	the	better	in	their	situations.	RTI	also	facilitated	the	securing	
of	 women’s	 rights	 for	 Rezia,	 Shamima,	 and	 Jobeda.	 Through	 securing	
government	 agricultural	 supplies	 by	 applying	 RTI,	 Mosharef	 also	 se‐







tal	 and	 vertical	 accountability	 in	 government	 services	 specially	 those	
which	crucial	to	the	maintenance	and	improvement	of	the	limited	liveli‐








ly	 justifiable	manner.	 Shamima’s	 information	 request	 initially	 was	 not	
able	to	generate	horizontal	accountability	due	to	the	UP	Chairman’s	neg‐
ligence.	But	 this	 initial	 request	was	 instrumental	 in	generating	vertical	
accountability	 when	 the	 UNO,	 the	 superior	 of	 the	 UP	 Chairman,	 re‐
sponded	to	her	questions	and	carried	out	the	necessary	investigations	of	
relevant	 data	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 do	 so.	 Securing	 of	 accountability	
went	much	deeper	in	the	case	of	poor	women	getting	access	to	maternal	
health	 care	with	 revelation	 and	 prevention	 of	 ongoing	 corruption	 and	





As	 per	 constitutional	 provisions,	 no	 citizen	 of	 Bangladesh	 can	 be	 dis‐
criminated	against	on	the	basis	of	any	difference	such	as	race,	color,	reli‐
gion,	sex,	socio‐economic	situation,	and	so	on.	In	other	words,	equality	of	
all	 peoples	 is	 overtly	 and	 legally	 stipulated.	 Lack	 of	 information	 with	
regard	to	government	services	for	poor	people	creates	loopholes	which	
are	 breeding	 grounds	 for	 underhanded	 manipulation	 and	 widespread	
corruption.	In	the	case	of	poor	women	getting	access	to	maternal	health	
care,	the	maternal	health	voucher	cards	were	initially	distributed	among	
wealthy	women	of	 the	 locality.	This	was	not	 just	a	violation	of	 the	 law	
but	 also	 anti‐constitutional	 since	 there	 was	 discrimination	 against	 the	
poor	at	work.	The	RTI	was	instrumental	in	revealing	and	addressing	the	
discrimination	 which	 had	 previously	 been	 taking	 place.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
fishermen	winning	access	to	khas	water	body,	poor	fishermen	were	dis‐
criminated	 against	 while	 the	 local	 government	 officials	 were	 unduly	






Participation	 is	 an	 important	 capability	 that	 can	 make	 the	 difference	










the	 cases	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter.	 The	 information	 request	 made	 by	
Jobeda	 in	 fact	 led	 to	 a	 participatory	 process	 of	 preparing	 the	 properly	
composed	social	safety	net	beneficiaries	 list.	When	the	 landless	organi‐
zation	 was	 trying	 to	 ensure	 poor	 women’s	 access	 to	 maternal	 health	
care,	 being	 an	 organized	 group,	 they	 were	 already	 seasoned	 in	 the	
thorny	process	of	participation.	RTI,	however,	helped	them	to	purpose‐
fully	 channel	 their	 participation	 toward	 influencing	 decision	 making	
within	 local	 administration	 and	 thus	 aided	 them	 greatly	 in	 achieving	
their	objectives.	
7 Concluding Observations 
The	analyses	 so	 far	of	 the	micro	case	studies	 from	Bangladesh	demon‐




micro	 cases	 is	not	matched	with	evidence	of	 information	 requests	 car‐
ried	out	under	RTIA	reported	by	 the	 Information	Commission’s	annual	
report	of	2011.	This	 is	not	only	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	a	 total	of	7,808	 in‐
formation	requests	 for	one	year	are	 to	be	deemed	 to	be	very	 low.	 It	 is	
also	true	that	many	of	 the	 information	requests	were	not	even	actually	
made	 by	 the	 poor	 themselves.	 The	 eagerness	 to	make	 information	 re‐
quests	under	RTI	is	found	to	be	significantly	greater	among	more	afflu‐
ent	 sections	 of	 society,	 such	 as	 the	 middle	 and	 upper	 middle	 classes.	
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Moreover,	many	of	 the	 information	 requests	 submitted	 cannot	be	 con‐
sidered	 fully	 self‐driven.	 The	 information	 requests	 submitted	 by	 the	
poor	are	often	 facilitated	by	 the	NGOs	and	CSOs4	rather	 than	emerging	










er,	 the	majority	of	poor	people	have	no	 idea	how	 to	make	 information	
request	despite	the	fact	that	they	require	information	on	a	daily	basis	in	
order	 to	 improve	 the	 quality	 of	 their	 day‐to‐day	 life.5	 In	 this	 circum‐
stance,	NGOs	and	CSOs	also	have	a	role	to	play	in	order	to	educate	poor	
people	 about	RTIA	 and	 its	 proper	 application	 and	potential.	 Education	
and	facilitation	by	NGOs	and	CSOs	withstanding,	for	RTI	to	realize	its	full	
potential	as	a	successful	anti‐poverty	tool,	poor	people	themselves	ulti‐
mately	have	 to	be	 in	 the	driving	seat	rather	 than	 that	of	a	passive	pas‐




thus	 be	 capable	 of	 using	 RTIA	 in	 exercising	 their	 government	 entitle‐
ments.	
                                                 
4	 Opinion	 expressed	 by	 Syeed	 Ahamed,	 CEO,	 Institute	 of	 Informatics	 and	
Development	(IID),	a	Dhaka‐based	think	tank	working	to	bridge	information	gap	
in	society.	









fice	 of	 the	High	 Commissioner	 for	Human	Rights	 (OHCHR),	 United	
Nations.	
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PERI-URBAN DWELLING AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION  
IN AFRICA 
Innocent	Chirisa	
This	 chapter	 focuses	 upon	 one	 of	 the	most	 persistent	 problems	 facing	
what	are	now	frequently	referred	to	as	“developing”	countries,	in	partic‐







ous	 reasons	 behind	 their	 proliferation	 and	 the	 continuing	 basic	 prob‐
lems	 which	 they	 experience	 and	 represent	 to	 the	 cities	 and	 nations	
where	 they	 are	 found.	 The	 author	 concludes	with	 a	well‐reasoned	 call	
for	increased	institutional	responsibility	and	transparency	in	such	coun‐




Peri‐urbanization	 is	 pushing	 Africa	 toward	 extreme	 poverty	 owing	 to	
circumstances	 associated	 with	 the	 dynamics	 of	 politics	 in	 peri‐urban	
areas	 (Muzondo	 et	 al.,	 2004;	 Jenkins	 and	 Andersen,	 2011).	 This	 is	 de‐
spite	evidence	of	an	improving	gross	domestic	product	(GDP)	in	a	num‐
ber	of	nations	across	the	continent.	By	way	of	example,	the	Kenyan	GDP	
real	 growth	 rate	 for	 2011	 stood	 at	 4.3%,	 with	 a	 per	 capita	 GDP	 of	
US$1,700.	Rwanda,	whose	agricultural	sector	contributes	about	40%	of	
its	 GDP,	 had	 a	 per	 capita	 GDP	 of	 US$	 355,	 66	 in	 2011.	 The	 aforemen‐




In	 most	 cities	 of	 the	 developing	 world,	 the	 provision	 of	 proper	 infra‐
structure	 for	 sanitation,	 road	 access,	 drainage,	 and	 water	 supply	 lags	
behind	 the	 growth	 experienced	 in	 such	 urban	 areas.	 Coping	 strategies	















Peri‐urbanization	 is	 usually	 accompanied	 by	 both	 personal	 and	 envi‐
ronmental	 health	 constraints,	 owing	 essentially	 to	 inadequate	 infra‐
structure	 provision	 (Merkel	 and	 Otai,	 2007,	 Yongsi,	 2009;	 cf.	 Kalimba	
and	 de	 Langen,	 2007).	 In	 Africa,	 it	 is	 largely	 an	 expression	 of	 poverty	
(Muzondo	 et	 al.,	 2004;	 Barry	 and	 Rüther,	 2005;	 Arimah,	 2010).	 This	
chapter	 critically	 analyzes	 peri‐urbanization	 as	 both	 a	 theoretical	 and	
practical	aspect	of	survival	in	an	increasingly	urbanized	world.	The	pur‐
pose	of	 the	chapter	 is	 to	demonstrate	 that	people	are	adapting	 to	pov‐
erty	 by	 capitalizing	 on	 opportunities	 that	 certain	 spaces	 offer	 (Al‐
Khayat,	 2008;	 Kipper	 and	 Fischer	 eds.	 2009).	Most	 African	 peri‐urban	
dwellers	 are	 often	 used	 by	 politicians	 in	 their	 bid	 to	 stay	 in	 power	 as	
they	constitute	a	“market”	for	political	promises	(Nabutola,	2004;	Kudva,	
2009).	
2 Theoretical and Analytical Framework 









impede	 urban	 poverty	 reduction	 …	 the	 “political	 agency	 of	 the	
poor”,	[being]	the	capacity	of	the	poor	to	“select,	reward	and	sanc‐
tion	 the	 leaders,	 institutions,	 policies,	 formal	 rules	 and	 informal	
norms	that	directly	affect	their	lives”	matters….	[A]	key	reason	for	
the	persistence	of	urban	poverty	and	 the	 inability	of	 the	poor	 to	
bring	 about	 conditions	 that	 improve	 their	 lives	 substantially,	 is	
that	 they	 lack	 in	 political	 agency.	 This	 is	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 in	
many	 countries	 the	 poor	 are	 perhaps	 the	 single	 largest	 interest	
group	 (if	 seen	 as	 a	 cohesive	 group)	 and	 that	 they	 may	 have	 in	
principle	democratic	or	 representative	political	means	 to	pursue	
their	collective	interest.	
The	 excerpt	 shows	 that	 poverty	 and	 politics	 are	 closely	 intertwined.	





owners’	 greater	 belief	 in	 their	 efficacy	 of	 action;	 and	 owners’	 greater	
connection	 to	 place.”	 It	 is	 this	 connectedness	 to	 a	 place	 that	 Chirisa	
(2010)	defines	as	the	“stewardship	of	place.”	The	ensuing	paragraphs	try	
to	expose	the	reality	of	the	peri‐urban	dwelling	using	theories	of	vulner‐














or	 child‐headed	 households	 are	 strongly	 linked	 with	 poverty.	 These	
complexes	are	compounded	by	external	risks,	shocks,	stresses,	and	dep‐
rivation.	 The	 vulnerability	 theory	has	 been	 criticized	 as	 being	 general‐
ized,	 oversimplified,	 and	 of	 doubtful	 validity.	 The	 theory’s	 inability	 to	
account	for	subgroup	variations	in	the	central	characteristics	associated	
with	poverty	partly	explains	why	David	(1970)	dismissed	it	as	offering	




The	 resilience	 theory	 shows	 the	extent	 to	which	poor	households	 con‐
front	 and	 manage	 poverty.	 Resilience	 is	 the	 expression	 of	 “…positive	
adaptation	 despite	 significant	 life	 adversity”	 (Strumpfer,	 2003:	 70;	 cf.	








uals	 experience	 adversity	 and	 overcome	 it	 explain	 how	 resilience	 de‐
creases	as	risks	increase.	Cultural	contexts	and	the	location	of	individu‐
als	 are	 of	 great	 significance	 (Luthar	 and	 Zelazo,	 2003).	 Narrowness	 in	
focus,	 limited	 attention	 to	 broader	 structural	 dynamics	 in	 society	 and	
ethnocentricism	have	been	cited	as	obvious	weaknesses	in	the	resilience	
theory	 (Iwasaki,	 Bartlett,	 MacKay,	 Mactavish,	 and	 Ristock,	 2005).	 De‐
spite	 the	 weaknesses	 mentioned,	 the	 theory	 provides	 a	 critical	 frame	
through	which	to	analyze	the	resilience	of	peri‐urban	dwellers	in	Africa	
vis	à	vis	the	vagaries	of	life.	They	usually	lack	the	necessary	facilities	and	
resources	 to	 lead	 a	meaningful	 life	 but	 continue	 to	 thrive	 in	 (spite	 of)	
adversity.		
The	Capability	and	Functioning	Theory	by	Amartya	Sen	will	shed	some	











(Robeyns,	 2005).	 To	 scholars	 like	 Robeyns,	 the	 capability	 approach	 is	
not	a	 theory	 to	explain	poverty,	 inequality	or	well‐being.	Rather,	 it	 is	a	
tool	and	a	framework	within	which	to	conceptualize	and	evaluate	these	
phenomena.	 Thus,	 people’s	 ability	 to	 function	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 they	
want	to	engage	in,	and	to	be	who	they	want	to	be	is	what	Sen	terms	func‐
tionings	(Robeyns,	2005).	The	capability	approach	does	not	a	determine	








ties,	which	have	seen	 the	poor	becoming	 innovative	 in	a	bid	 to	sustain	
themselves	without	being	dependent	on	the	government.		
Another	way	 of	 viewing	 the	 peri‐urban	 poor	 is	 through	 Robert	 Cham‐
bers’	 (1983)	clusters	of	disadvantage,	which	explains	poverty	as	a	 trap	
and	 a	 vicious	 cycle.	 In	 Chambers,	 poverty	 is	multidimensional	 and	 en‐
tails	clusters	of	disadvantage	that	are	poverty	proper	(that	is,	in	financial	
terms),	 physical	 weakness,	 isolation,	 vulnerability,	 and	 powerlessness.	
These	five	clusters	of	disadvantage	interact	with	each	other	to	trap	peo‐










vided	 that	 the	 tenets	 of	 theories	 advanced	 by	 Sen	 and	 Chambers	 and	
others	are	 fully	 grasped	and	 the	people	are	empowered	 to	 shape	 their	
destiny	 with	 resilience	 and	 determination	 based	 on	 effective	 poverty‐
fighting	strategies.	






3.1  Ecological Challenges 
Rapid	 population	 growth	 in	 peri‐urban	 areas	 coupled	with	 inadequate	
resource	capacity	and	resources	lead	to	serious	environmental	degrada‐
tion.	This	manifests	 in	 the	 form	of	pollution,	deforestation,	 and	uncon‐
trolled	 development	 on	 fragile	 land	 such	 as	 wetlands.	 Most	 informal	
settlements	in	Africa,	as	elsewhere,	lack	adequate	basic	services	and	are	
usually	 located	 in	 the	 peri‐urban	 and	 environmentally	 sensitive	 areas	
such	as	flood‐prone	areas	(Muzvidziwa,	2005)	which	then	suffer	ecolog‐
ical	disturbances.	Most	housing	units	in	the	informal	settlements	of	Cape	
Town,	 for	 instance,	 are	 located	 on	 disused	 landfills	 and	wetland	 areas	
that	are	ecologically	fragile	and	prone	to	flooding.	Large	amounts	of	fecal	
waste	are	discharged	directly	into	the	environment,	and	a	lot	of	refuse	is	
dumped	 in	wetland	areas,	 causing	 serious	 ecological	 problems	 such	 as	
the	depletion	of	biodiversity.	Practices	such	as	deforestation	are	associ‐
ated	 with	 expansive	 brick	 molding	 as	 households	 seek	 to	 fire	 and	
strengthen	bricks.	Moreover,	most	of	the	peri‐urban	poor	rely	on	wood‐













ple,	 there	 are	 a	 good	 number	 of	 environmental	 resources	 for	 develop‐
ment.	 These	 include	 forests,	 freshwater	 systems	 and	biodiversity	 (City	
Council	of	Nairobi,	2007),	which	have	development	potential	in	the	form	
of	 tourism	 and	 agriculture,	which	 are	 vital	 carbon	 sinks	 for	 the	 entire	
city.	In	peri‐urban	Kinshasa,	organic	waste	has	been	converted	into	high‐
quality	organic	 fertilizer	 through	mechanical	 composting,	 and	 the	poor	
are	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 managing	 the	 processes.	 Recycled	 and	 treated	




cant	 biodiversity	 and	 unique	 conservation	 value.	 The	 peri‐urban	 poor	
have	learnt	to	tap	into	the	ecological	asset	and	make	a	livelihood	out	of	
it.	
3.2  Institutional Constraints 





ly,	 only	 about	 35%	 is	 collected	 and	 disposed	 of	 by	 the	 Kampala	 City	
Council	 (KCC).	 The	 rest	 is	 disposed	 of	 or	managed	 indiscriminately	 by	
the	private	sector.	Institutional	obstacles	in	the	informal	peri‐urban	set‐





the	 peri‐urban	 settlements.	 Limited	 administrative	 capacity	 and	 finan‐
cial	resources,	weak	institution,	poor	governance,	and	lack	of	capacity	to	






is	 crippling	 the	 capacity	 to	meet	 the	demands	of	 ever‐growing	popula‐
tions.	 Although	 civil	 society	 organizations	 often	 assume	 responsibility	
for	 the	provision	of	services	 in	 the	peri‐urban	areas,	a	good	number	of	
them	 lack	 the	 capacity	 to	 adequately	 fill	 the	 huge	 gap	 left	 by	 the	 gov‐
ernment	 in	 these	 settlements.	 This	 is	 largely	 because	 of	 the	piecemeal	
and	project	approach	that	they	use.	Effective	operation	by	nonstate	or‐
ganizations	 is	 usually	 hampered	 by	 erratic	 funding,	 nonrepresentation	
at	various	levels	of	governance	and	lack	of	technical	support.	Less	than	
half	 (43%),	 for	 example,	 have	 received	 technical	 support	 from	 other	
organizations	 in	Nairobi.	 In	Ethiopia,	peri‐urban	areas	are	managed	by	
sub‐city	 administrative	 units	 such	 as	 the	 “kebeles,”	 institutions	 which	
are	faced	with	a	number	of	challenges	such	as	 lack	of	capacity	to	effec‐
tively	 perform	 their	 duties.	 These	 include	 inadequate	 working	 proce‐
dures,	 institutional	 facilities,	and	manpower	(UNHABITAT,	2008a).	The	
institutions	are	also	not	fully	empowered	especially	in	terms	of	revenue	
collection,	 planning	 systems,	 and	 expenditure,	 and	 central	 city	 admin‐
istration	rarely	supports	them	in	terms	of	planning	and	services.	
In	 city	of	Kigali,	NGOs,	 the	private	 sector,	 community	associations,	 and	
district	 authorities	 are	 operating	 with	 limited	 technical	 and	 financial	
means.	There	is	no	institutional	umbrella	for	the	implementation	of	cer‐
tain	projects	 (Republic	of	Rwanda,	2010).	 Institutions	 such	as	 the	Giza	
Beautification	 and	Cleaning	Authority	 (GBCA),	which	 is	 responsible	 for	
garbage	collection,	are	failing	to	cope	with	the	daily	rate	of	garbage	pro‐









2008).	 Municipalities	 are	 outsourcing	 service	 delivery,	 which	 should	




is	 the	 involvement	 of	 peri‐urban	 dwellers	 in	 the	management	 of	 their	
own	affairs,	as	advocated	for	by	many	international	institutions.	
3.3  Socioeconomic Challenges 
In	most	 cases,	 the	most	 vulnerable	 groups	 in	 peri‐urban	 areas	 are	 de‐
nied	 access	 to	 microfinance	 to	 start	 or	 boost	 their	 micro‐enterprises	
(Tsinda,	2011).	This	creates	a	vicious	cycle	of	poverty,	as	no	or	low	lev‐
els	of	investment	in	informal	businesses	result	in	low	capital	growth.	In	
peri‐urban	 Lilongwe,	 for	 example,	 the	 informal	 sector	 does	 not	 have	
adequate	 infrastructure,	 including	markets	 and	 credit	 facilities.	 Such	 a	
dearth	in	basic	infrastructure	and	services	has	also	hampered	the	devel‐
opment	of	adequate	entrepreneurial	skills	among	the	poor	(Fransen	and	
Dijk,	 2008;	 UNHABITAT,	 2011).	 This,	 in	 turn,	 explains	 the	 high	 unem‐
ployment	rates	in	the	city	and	its	periphery	(Alder,	1995;	Mathare	Zonal	




provide	 several	 economic	 opportunities	 through	 which	 residents	 can	
improve	 their	 socioeconomic	 status.	 The	 peri‐urban	 areas	 generally	
provide	low‐cost	access	to	the	city,	with	few	barriers	of	entry	to	opera‐
tions.	Home‐based	industries	have	been	noted	as	having	the	potential	to	
improve	 the	 average	 household	 income	 and	 general	 welfare	 of	 the	




trepreneurship	 (Abdelhalim	 and	 Samra,	 2010;	 Lawanson	 and	
Olanrewaju,	2012).	Responsible	authorities	can	also	use	this	opportunity	








3.4  Political Challenges 
Political	power	and	authority	 in	 informal	settlements	 is	often	vested	 in	
powerful	 individuals	or	groupings—the	slumlords	or	warlords.	Moreo‐





ods,	when	 infrastructure	 is	a	highly	 saleable	good.	Peri‐urban	 informal	
settlements	lack	public	sector	and	law	enforcement	agencies,	leading	to	
chaos,	rampant	vandalism	to	public	property,	further	entrenching	levels	
of	 poverty.	 Nonetheless,	 a	 functional	 approach	 to	 slum	 challenges	 re‐
veals	 a	 number	 of	 opportunities	 that	 even	 the	 donor	 community	 can	
exploit	(Dafe,	2009;	Struyk	and	Giddings,	2009;	Annez	and	Linn,	2010).	






4 Evidence of Peri-urbanization and Related 
Phenomena in Africa 
Following	are	case	studies	drawn	from	different	regions	in	Africa,	name‐
ly	 North	 Africa,	 East	 Africa,	 West	 Africa,	 Central	 Africa,	 and	 Southern	
Africa.		




tlements	 are	 characterized	 by	 crowdedness,	 squalor,	 unpaved	 roads,	
scanty	water,	as	well	as	poor	sanitation	and	waste	management,	which	
are	 usually	 associated	 with	 an	 increasing	 incidence	 of	 communicable	
diseases.	Most	 peri‐urban	 Khartoum	 dwellers	 have	 embarked	 on	 peri‐
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thrives,	 as	 residents	 are	 involved	 in	 a	 range	 of	 activities	 including	 car	
repairs,	 blacksmithing,	 and	 vending	 at	 the	 local	markets	 and	 the	most	
vulnerable	groups	scavenge	for	food	from	rubbish	dumps.		
Approximately	70%	of	urban	dwellers	 in	Egypt—some	12	million	peo‐
ple—live	 in	 informally	 built	 homes	 on	 privately	 owned	 or	 public	 land,	
which	are	 sprawled	haphazardly	around	major	urban	centers.	The	 fact	
that	over	6	million	of	the	informal	home	dwellers	live	in	peri‐urban	Cai‐
ro	has	been	viewed	as	evidence	of	 the	 failure	by	 the	Egyptian	Govern‐
ment	to	provide	affordable	housing	(Kipper	and	Fischer,	2009).	The	in‐
formal	 structures	 come	 in	 various	 forms—makeshift	 stone	 houses,	
wooden	shacks,	and	crumbling	brick	structures,	all	evidence	of	unregu‐
lated	 construction	 of	 houses.	 As	 in	 Khartoum,	 settlements	 are	 inade‐
quately	 serviced	 with	 poor	 roads	 and	means	 of	 public	 transportation.	
The	 dwellings	 are	 poorly	 ventilated	 and	 garbage	 collection	 is	 inade‐







4.2  East Africa  
Like	Cairo,	Kampala	 in	Uganda	has	a	 large	percentage	of	 its	population	
(about	60%)	residing	 in	 informal	settlements	 in	poor	 living	conditions.	
The	houses	built	by	inhabitants	are	sub‐standard,	and	made	out	of	such	
materials	as	mud	blocks,	clay	blocks,	mud	and	wattle,	and	burnt	clay	or	
earth	 bricks	 (Musana,	 2011).	 Inadequate	 formal	 housing	 delivery	 has	
forced	 large	 numbers	 of	 people	 to	 settle	 in	 the	 city’s	 peri‐urban	 areas	






In	 the	 slums	 of	 Kampala,	 the	 dearth	 of	 basic	 social	 amenities	 such	 as	
potable	water,	 electricity,	 education,	 health	 care	 service,	 and	 adequate	
shelter	is	a	common	phenomenon.	The	2005	National	Household	Survey	
indicated	that	a	large	proportion	of	households	occupy	single	rooms,	in	
crowded	conditions,	 their	 incomes	are	generally	 low,	and	 that	many	of	
the	city’s	residents	are	employed	in	the	informal	sector,	mostly	in	small	
businesses	and	on	a	subsistence	basis	(Musana,	2011).	Besides,	there	are	











over	 time.	 A	 study	 conducted	 by	 the	 Urban	 Development	 and	 Works	
Bureau	in	2000	indicated	that	the	total	area	covered	by	squatter	settle‐
ments	in	Addis	Ababa	is	2,000	hectares.	Over	300,000	people	in	600,000	
squatter	 housing	 units	 were	 living	 in	 this	 place.	 A	 large	 percentage	
(84.8%)	of	 the	housing	units	were	walled	 in	wood	and	mud	but	 in	 the	
new	squatter	settlements,	more	than	one‐third	of	the	housing	units	were	
made	of	block	walls;	82.2%	of	the	households	were	using	electricity	for	




lets,	 and	 the	majority	 (63.2%)	 had	 no	 toilet	 facilities	 at	 all.	 Moreover,	
about	 64.8%	 of	 the	 households	 obtained	 water	 supplies	 from	 water	
vendors,	while	33%	of	the	household	obtained	it	from	both	vendors	and	
unprotected	rivers.	Only	2.2%	of	 the	household	heads	 reported	having	
access	 to	 piped	 water	 supply.	 These	 statistics	 reveal	 that	 households	
were	living	under	adverse	conditions	and	in	abject	poverty.		




laundry,	 hairdressing,	 serving	 as	 traditional	 birth	 attendants,	 pruning,	
brewing	 local	 beer,	 and	 preparing	 food	 are	 sources	 of	 income	 for	 the	
majority	 of	 women.	 A	 few	 young	 females	 are	 employed	 as	 servers	 or	
cleaners	 in	private	hotels.	Other	sources	of	revenue	such	as	peri‐urban	
agriculture	and	horticulture	have	been	instrumental	in	shaping	the	live‐
lihood	 status	 of	 residents.	 Products	 from	 such	 activities	 include	 fruits,	
herbs,	vegetables,	and	mushrooms.	Urban	horticulture	meets	about	30%	
of	 the	 total	vegetable	 requirements	and	60–70%	of	 the	 leafy	vegetable	
requirements	 of	 Addis	Ababa	 (Bahir,	 2010).	 This	 has	 been	 a	 source	 of	
income	and	nutrition	as	well	as	promoting	peri‐urban	food	security.		





poor	 sanitation,	 inadequate	 and	 unclean	water,	 makeshift	 shelter,	 and	
very	unstable	 social	 networks.	The	bulk	of	 the	houses	 is	made	of	mud	
and	wattle	with	iron	sheets.	Between	60%	and	93%	of	slum	households	
rely	on	water	vendors	for	water.	Sewerage	and	human	waste	disposal	in	
informal	 settlements	 pose	 a	major	 threat	 to	 health.	Municipal	 services	
do	not	cover	most	of	these	areas	due	to	the	shortage	of	refuse	collection	
vehicles.	 Other	 inhabitants	 of	 the	 informal	 settlements	 obtain	 water	
from	 illegal	 water	 line	 connections,	 while	 others	 use	 sewage‐
contaminated	 water	 from	 nearby	 rivers	 (APHRC,	 2002).	 Effluent	 and	




other	 pollutants	 drain	 into	 the	 valley	 from	 surrounding	 communities	
and	 facilities.	Moreover,	 irregular	 solid	waste	 collection	 also	 results	 in	
large,	 exposed	 dumpsites	 (Lawanson,	 Yadua	 and	 Salako	 2012).	 In	
Kibera,	the	use	of	rainwater	is	unhealthy	as	“…it	is	mixed	with	the	stool	
that	people	throw	anywhere	even	on	the	roof”	(APHRC,	2002:	7),	a	phe‐
nomenon	 otherwise	 known	 as	 flying	 toilets.	 In	 1995,	 there	 were	 134	
informal	settlements	with	77,589	inhabitants	in	and	around	the	city.	By	
2007,	the	combined	population	of	these	informal	dwellers	was	estimat‐
ed	 at	 1,886,166	 (City	 Council	 of	 Nairobi,	 2007).	 Rents	 in	 the	 informal	
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settlements	 are	 pegged	 between	 KShs	 500	 and	 700	 per	 month	 for	 a	
house	 with	 significant	 water	 supply	 and	 toilet	 facilities	 (UNHABITAT,	
2005).	Peri‐urban	Nairobi	is	often	targeted	by	politicians,	especially	dur‐
ing	 election	 periods,	 in	 their	 quest	 for	 support	 and	 votes	 (Nabutola,	
2004;	Dafe,	2009).	
Only	one‐third	of	 the	people	 living	 in	Kenya’s	 informal	settlements	are	
employed	 in	 the	 formal	 sector;	 two‐thirds	work	 in	 the	 informal	 sector	
(UNHABITAT,	 2005).	 To	 cope	with	 adversity	 and	 poverty,	 residents	 in	
the	 informal	 settlements	 build	 their	 livelihoods	 on	 their	 resource	 en‐
dowments,	 namely	 skills	 and	 abilities,	 land,	 savings,	 equipment,	 and	
formal	or	informal	support	groups	and	networks	(APHRC,	2002).	A	nu‐
tritional	 survey	 conducted	 in	 2009	 by	 Oxfam	 GB,	 Concern	Worldwide	
and	Care	 International	 in	 two	villages	of	Kibera	 in	Kenya	revealed	 that	
90%	of	the	residents	faced	severe	food	shortages	as	a	result	of	unstable	
sources	 of	 income.	 They	 were	 resorting	 to	 reducing	 the	 quantity	 of	
meals	 they	 consumed,	 thereby	 reducing	 diet	 diversity.	 Informal	 sector	
practices	 include,	 among	 other	 things,	 firewood	 collection	 or	 charcoal	
burning,	petty	trade,	repairs,	carpentry,	and	metalwork.	
4.3  West Africa and Central Africa 
In	Lagos	Nigeria,	the	growth	of	informal	settlements	is	attributed	to	rap‐
id	urbanization	 in	the	city	(Jibril,	2006),	and	the	fact	 that	 two‐thirds	of	
the	population	living	in	slum	neighborhoods.	The	slums	have	been	built	
on	 fills	 or	 perched	 on	 stilts	 over	 open	water.	 Sewage	 and	 solid	 waste	




gence	 of	 informal	 settlements,	 which	 are	 an	 eyesore.	 Lagos’	 informal	




In	Central	Africa,	 the	Rwandan	capital	of	Kigali	 is	 characterized	by	 the	











4.4  Southern Africa 
In	 Mozambique,	 Maputo	 has	 been	 described	 as	 an	 urbanized	 “cement	
city”	with	informal	peripheral	neighborhoods	inhabited	by	the	majority	
of	 the	 population	 (UNHABITAT,	 2010).	 Conditions	 in	 peri‐urban	 areas	
are	characterized	by	disorderliness,	making	it	difficult	to	provide	essen‐
tial	 infrastructure	 and	 other	 municipal	 services.	 The	 majority	 of	 resi‐
dents	 rely	on	pit	 latrines	and	have	a	poor	solid	waste	disposal	system.	
Woody	 biomass	 consumption	 dominates	 the	 areas	where	 there	 is	 lim‐
ited	electricity.	Public	lighting	is	scanty	and	compromises	the	security	of	
the	 residents.	 Informal	 economic	 activities	 thrive	 in	 the	 peri‐urban	 in‐
formal	 settlements,	 taking	 the	 form	 of	 street	 vending,	 petty	 trade	 and	




per	 annum	 (UNHABITAT,	 2011).	 This	 rapid	 urban	 expansion	 explains	
the	city’s	failure	to	provide	basic	services	and	the	development	of	infor‐
mal	 settlements.	 In	 2008,	 about	 76%	 of	 the	 population	were	 informal	
dwellers	 (UNHABITAT,	 2011).	 Low‐income	 areas	 and	 informal	 settle‐
ments	make	up	73%	of	 the	residential	 land	share.	Residents	have	 little	
or	no	access	to	social	infrastructure	and	basic	urban	services.	Houses	are	













of	 the	 population	 in	 the	 informal	 settlements	 are	 serviced	 with	 basic	
infrastructure.”	Livelihood	and	survival	strategies	 in	the	 informal	areas	
of	Cape	Town	are	very	diverse	and	include	employment	as	casual	labor,	
scrap	 collection,	 begging,	 selling	 petty	 commodities	 and	 running	 plaza	
shops	and	shebeens	and	making	repairs.	Home	industry	entails	baking,	
hairdressing,	dressmaking,	and	children	day	care	centers	 (mainly	done	




their	 very	 low	 incomes.	 Informal	 settlements	 are	 far	 from	 commercial	
centers,	 such	 that	 residents	 are	 economically	 disadvantaged	 (City	 of	
Cape	Town,	2007).	




5 Conclusion and Policy Options  
The	 foregoing	 discussion	 reveals	 that	 Africa	 and	 its	 cities	 are	 moving	
along	a	very	unsustainable	path,	as	evidenced	by	examples	drawn	from	
the	 sub‐regions	of	North	Africa,	West	Africa,	 Southern	Africa,	 and	East	
Africa.	 Peri‐urban	 informalization	 typified	 by	 poverty	 of	 households,	
institutions,	 and	 the	 state	 at	 large	 has	 produced	 unplanned	 and	 disor‐
derly	spatial	settlements.	Substandard	and	overcrowded	housing,	 inad‐
equate	electricity,	water	and	 sanitation,	 road,	 solid	waste	management	
services,	and	deteriorating	urban	livelihood	options	are	the	hallmarks	of	
peri‐urban	 informal	 settlements.	Mega‐slums	are	mainly	 located	 in	 the	
peri‐urban	areas.	Failure	by	 the	 state	 to	provide	 infrastructure	and	 in‐
vestment	 opportunities	 and	 its	 incapacity	 to	 implement	 housing,	 envi‐
ronmental,	and	urban	policies	are	the	chief	reasons	for	this.	 Innovative	
solutions	and	 strategies	developed	by	 the	urban	poor	 to	 improve	 their	









ity.	 Evidence	 from	 elsewhere	 shows	 that	 an	 integrationist	 model	 that	
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ANALYSIS OF WOMEN’S ORGANIZATIONS AS DRIVERS OF 





en	 constitute	 the	 bulk	 of	marginalized	 people,	 yet	 their	 life	 conditions	
remain	 unproblematized	 at	 the	 policy	 level.	What	 sort	 of	 social	 trans‐
formation	is	required	for	these	women?	Who	should	lead	this	transfor‐
mation?	This	 chapter	explores	 the	 theme	of	 social	 transformation	as	 it	
relates	 to	 structural	 poverty	 and	 gender	 issues.	 It	 questions	 whether	
women’s	movements	and	grassroots	organizations	in	Zimbabwe	can	act	
as	catalysts	for	this	social	transformation.	Through	a	nuanced	analysis	of	
the	 nature,	 activities,	 capacities,	 and	 ideologies	 underpinning	women’s	
movement,	the	author	present	a	complex	picture	of	contradiction,	collu‐
sion,	 differentiation,	 success,	 and	 failure	 of	 the	women’s	movement	 in	
poverty	 alleviation	 in	 Zimbabwe.	 This	 highlights	 the	 different	 actors	
within	women’s	activist	movements	while	narrowing	the	focus	on	vari‐





and	 neoliberal‐led	 projects	 designed	 to	 promote	 poverty	 alleviation,	
Africa’s	poorest	are	found	further	at	the	margins.	Poverty	in	Zimbabwe,	
however	defined,	is	highly	gendered	in	ways	that	have	ensured	women	
remain	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 impoverished.	 This	 chapter	 explores	 the	
theme	of	 social	 transformation	as	 it	 relates	 to	addressing	gendered	di‐
mensions	 of	 structural	 poverty.	 It	 questions	 whether	 the	 women’s	
movements	and	grassroots	organization	 in	Zimbabwe	can	act	 as	 social	
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catalysts	 and	 change	 agents	 for	 this	 social	 transformation.	 Through	 a	
nuanced	analysis	of	nature,	 activities,	 capacities,	 and	 ideologies	under‐
pinning	women’s	organizations,	this	chapter	presents	a	complex	picture	
of	 contradiction,	 collusion,	 differentiation,	 success,	 and	 failure	 of	 the	
women’s	movement	in	aiding	poverty	alleviation.	In	analyzing	the	wom‐
en’s	movement	 in	 Zimbabwe,	 the	 chapter	 begins	with	 Eerdewijk’s	 and	
Mugadza’s	assertion	that:	
The	 contemporary	 status,	 and	 the	 future,	 of	 the	women’s	move‐
ment	 in	 Zimbabwe	has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	much	discussion	 and	
debate.	In	the	early	2000s,	a	returning	concern	was	that	“women’s	
movements	 have	 lost	 their	 vibrancy	 and	 resilience,	 and	 are	 no	
longer	 as	 effective	 in	 representing	 women’s	 interests	 in	 their	
counties,	 as	 they	 were	 in	 their	 formative	 years”	 (Masvaure	 and	
Wamwanduka	2008,	p.	1).	
Essof	also	positioned	her	2013	book	Shemurenga	 in	 relation	 to	discus‐
sions	in	the	early	2000s,	when	“some	questioned	whether	women’s	or‐
ganizing	 actually	 constituted	 a	 movement,”	 others	 argued	 that	 the	
movement	 had	 been	 “weakened	 ideologically,”	 whereas	 others	 “recog‐
nised	a	movement	but	saw	it	as	weak	and	dismantled”.	
Women	 in	 Zimbabwe	 are	marginalized	 from	mainstream	economic	 ac‐
tivities	despite	the	fact	 that	they	are	52%	of	the	population.	This	 is	be‐
cause	 the	majority	of	women	are	domiciled	 in	 rural	 areas	 and	 as	 such	





2 History of Women’s Organization 
The	history	of	women	organizations	in	Zimbabwe	can	be	directly	linked	
to	 the	 Christian	 missionary	 movement	 in	 colonial	 Rhodesia.	 The	 very	


















have	 continued	 in	 postcolonial	 Zimbabwe.	 Women	 are	 taught	 about	
cooking,	home	design,	sewing	and	involved	in	various	health	and	entre‐
preneurial	 activities	 in	 church	 groups.	 It	 is	 only	 around	 1923	 that	 the	
first	 signs	 of	 women	 organizing	 within	 the	 public	 sphere	 begin	 to	
emerge.	Chiweshe	and	Bhatasara	(forthcoming)	note	that	in	1923	wom‐
en	 were	 part	 of	 the	 Southern	 Rhodesia	 Bantu	 Voters	 Association	 and	
they	successfully	organized	a	boycott	of	the	beer	halls	in	1934.	Colonial	
structures	 in	 many	 ways	 suppressed	 women	 from	 actively	 organizing	









As	 Zimbabwe’s	 fight	 for	 independence	 intensified	 during	 the	 1970s,	
women	 became	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 armed	 struggle.	 This	 had	 an	





rule	would	 usher	 in	 gender	 equality.	 In	 understanding	 gender	 and	 the	
liberation	movement	in	Zimbabwe,	Groves	(2007)	argues	that:	
Gender	 politics	 appeared	 increasingly	 institutionalised	 within	
ZANU,	 allowing	 the	 party’s	 Women’s	 League	 to	 declare	 publicly	
that	 “for	 the	 revolution	 to	 triumph	 in	 its	 totality	 there	 must	 be	
emancipation	 of	 women”	 (in	 Seidman,	 1984:	 419)	 …	 Nhongo‐
Simbanegavi	 reports	 that	 “it	 carried	 pictures	 of	 formidable‐






post‐colonial	 forms,	 the	 African	 State	 has	 discriminated	 consistently	











en’s	 emancipation.	 The	 government	 implemented	 some	 progressive	
measures	such	as	the	Legal	Age	of	Majority	Act,	which	gave	women	adult	
status	at	 the	age	of	18.	Overall	women’s	organizations	were	 largely	or‐
ganized	 around	 the	 state	 with	 very	 little	 being	 done	 to	 challenge	 the	
patriarchal	 status	quo.	What	 the	 liberation	 struggle	had	done	however	
was	to	provide	opportunities	for	some	women	to	gain	education	outside	






the	 country,	 lead	 in	various	 spaces	of	 the	 struggle,	 and	 show	 that	 they	
could	do	what	men	can	do	also.	







in	 the	 women’s	 movement	 as	 organizations	 such	 as	 Musasa	 emerged.	
Such	organizations	defied	the	paternalistic	and	partriachial	structures	of	
the	 state	 and	 demanded	 radical	 change	 in	 the	 situation	 of	 women.	 In	
1983,	 however,	 women	 activists	 had	 already	 began	 to	 challenge	 the	
state	with	the	formation	of	a	Women’s	Action	Group	to	protest	the	arrest	
of	women	moving	on	the	streets	alone	at	night	(Makanje,	Shaba	and	Win	





















damental	 shift	 in	 how	a	 society	 is	 organized.	 Such	 shifts	 are	 radical	 in	






cal	 materialism,	 which	 would	 keep	 in	 possession	 the	 effort	 to	 under‐
stand	the	historical	 forces	of	change	but	also	bring	the	attention	to	 the	
totality	 of	 social	 relations	 and	 the	 core	 factors	 that	 shape	 people	 and	
society	as	a	whole,	not	only	by	class	struggle,	but	through	all	aspects	of	
life”	 (Mukaramurenzi,	 2011:	 5).	 The	 theory	 of	 complimentary	 holism	
provides	 for	 four	 spheres	 of	 social	 life:	 economic,	 kinship,	 community,	
and	political.	Social	 transformation	depends	on	what	 takes	place	 in	 the	







requires	 us	 to	 understand	what	 gender	means	 and	what	 it	 signifies	 in	
those	four	spheres.	Transforming	multiplicity	of	relations	of	subordina‐
tion	 that	 women	 find	 themselves	 under	 requires	 an	 understanding	 of	
gender	 inequalities	 in	 all	 spheres	 of	 society.	 To	 better	 illuminate	 this	
idea,	the	paper	invokes	the	concept	of	intersectionality,	which	allows	for	
a	 better	 analysis	 of	 how	 the	 spheres	 interact	 and	 intersect	 to	 create	
women’s	 subordinate	 position	 (Crenshaw,	 1991).	 Intersectionality	 ac‐
cepts	that	women	carry	multiple	and	conflicting	identities	mainly	based	
on	class,	religion,	caste,	and	ethnicity,	which	affect	their	involvement	and	
action	 in	women’s	groups.	Ramtohul	(2012)	argues	 that	 the	concept	of	








Bahati	 Kuumba	 (2002:	 504)	 notes	 that	 “activism	 of	 women	 and	 their	
organizations	sprang	from	their	particular	positioning	within	systems	of	






Women’s	 organization	 in	 Zimbabwe	 can	 be	 categorized	 in	 different	
ways.	 In	 terms	 of	 size,	 there	 are	 national,	 regional,	 and	 community‐
based	women’s	organizations.	National	organizations	such	as	Women	in	
Politics	Support	Unit	have	a	wider	reach	and	focus	on	issues	at	a	nation‐
al	 scale.	 Operations	 of	 national‐level	 organizations	 are	 geared	 toward	
achieving	 a	 higher	 level	 impact	 at	 policy	 level	while	 community‐based	




are	 registered,	 legally	 recognized	 entities	 which	 are	 funded	 and	 have	
written	 constitutions	 with	 rules	 and	 regulations.	 Such	 organizations	








not	 registered	 and	 are	 not	 recognized	 by	 the	 state.	 The	 groups	 are	
ephemeral	in	nature,	depending	on	continued	social	capital.		
Women’s	organizations	are	located	in	different	locations	namely	urban,	
peri–urban,	 and	 rural	 areas.	 The	 majority	 of	 organizations	 are	 urban	
based	though	they	still	have	programming	within	rural	areas.	Some	have	
offices	 in	 the	 rural	 areas	 they	 operate	 in	 but	 these	 face	 challenges	 in	
terms	of	electricity,	communication,	and	networking	access.	Location	is	
important	 in	 terms	of	 visibility	 and	access	 to	donors	and	 it	 also	deter‐





sociation	 for	 example	 are	 involved	 in	 understanding	 how	 inheritance	
and	 customary	 laws	 affect	 women.	 Few	 organizations	 are	 involved	 in	
women	empowerment	yet	a	change	in	policy	or	laws	alone	will	not	lead	
to	equality	 in	other	spheres	of	 life.	With	sexual	violence	being	a	preva‐




an	 increase	 in	 youth‐based	organizations	while	 those	 focusing	 on	 chil‐
dren	such	as	the	Girl	Child	Network	have	operated	for	years.		
There	are	also	organizations,	especially	at	donor	and	international	level,	
that	 are	 not	 necessarily	women’s	 organizations	 but	 do	 a	 great	 deal	 to	
promote	gender	equality.	Such	organizations	are	involved	in	either	fund‐
ing	women’s	 organizations	 or	 implementing	women	 related	 programs.	
One	 example	 are	 organizations	 such	 as	 SIDA	 and	 USAID	 which	 have	
largely	funded	women’s	organizations	operating	in	various	parts	of	the	






up	 for	 a	 session	with	her	 care‐givers	one	day,	 to	 find	 the	 village	
filled	with	DfID	Land	Cruisers	and	people	from	the	district	whom	
she	 had	 not	 met	 before.	 Apparently	 this	 was	 the	 “˜delivery’	 of	
DfID’s	 gender‐based	 violence	 programme.	 The	 DfID	 team	
swooped	in,	gave	everyone	free	Coca‐Cola	and	a	text	to	keep	about	
GBV,	and	then	swooped	out	again.	The	free	drink	and	the	hoohah	
attracted	 scores	 of	 participants,	 who	 could	 be	 recorded	 on	 the	
programme	report.	Job	done?	A	combination	of	tight	auditing	and	
external	agenda‐setting	influences	the	evaluation	of	projects,	and	
this	 in	 turn	 affects	 the	project	 design.	 In	 order	 to	 be	 reportable,	
outcomes	must	 be	 measurable.	 In	 order	 to	 be	measurable,	 they	
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must	be	 tangible.	There	 is	a	common	complaint	 is	 that	aid	agen‐
cies	only	recognise	“things”	as	outcomes,	not	relationships.2	
There	 are	 also	 international	 organizations	 which	 come	 in	 two	 broad	
categories	working	within	the	women’s	sector	in	Zimbabwe.	Firstly,	are	
the	UN	agencies	working	in	various	ways	to	promote	women’s	interests.	
UN	Women	 is	 directly	 involved	 and	 can	 be	 categorized	 as	 an	 interna‐
tional	 women’s	 organization.	 UN	 Women’s	 mandate	 in	 Zimbabwe	 is,	








triachial	norms	but	 rather	 focus	upon	piecemeal	activities	 such	as	gar‐
dens,	revolving	funds,	and	projects.	Another	problem	is	the	limited	reach	
of	such	organizations	that	work	in	only	a	few	districts	in	the	country.	








argue	 that	 the	 women’s	 movement	 in	 Zimbabwe	 allowed	 access	 for	
women	 into	 the	 middle	 class	 which	 has	 both	 advantages	 and	 disad‐
vantages	 for	 the	movement.	 The	disadvantage	 is	 that	 this	 severely	 un‐
dermined	its	political	viability	and	effectiveness	as	a	movement	while	it	
also	created	new	sources	of	identity	for	women	in	the	public	which	fur‐






women’s	organizations	 in	Zimbabwe	 face	 a	 severe	disconnect	with	 the	
grassroots.	There	is	a	 lack	of	understanding	of	gender‐related	concepts	
by	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 civic	 organizations	 working	 in	 the	 “gender	
sector”	in	Zimbabwe.	The	concept	of	gender	is	widely	used	in	Africa	but	
what	this	concept	precisely	denotes	remains	fraught	with	contestations.	




existence	 of	 patriarchy	 in	many	 societies	 in	Africa	 is	 not	 disputed	 and	
that	 it	 subjugates	 women	 and	 relegates	 them	 to	 the	 private	 sphere	 is	
well	 documented.	What	 is	missing	 is	 a	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 how	
gender	 interlinks	 and	 interplays	 with	 various	 other	 forms	 of	 identity	
such	as	class,	age,	ethnicity,	religious	affiliation,	nationality,	and	status	to	
determine	our	lives.	To	proclaim	gender	as	the	overarching	factor	in	all	
situations	 is	 to	hide	various	 fascinating	and	crucial	modes	of	 identities	
which	 are	 constantly	 being	 created	 and	 recreated	 by	 active	 agents	 in	
their	everyday	lives.	
Ramtohul	(2012)	argues	that	women’s	organizations	need	to	mobilize	a	
feminist	 consciousness	 if	 they	 are	 to	 transform	 unequal	 gender	 rela‐
tions.	There	are	thus	many	contested	feminist	positions.	For	some	femi‐
nist	 consciousness	 is	 the	 awareness	 by	 women	 that	 they	 belong	 to	 a	
subordinate	group	and	that,	as	members	of	such	a	group,	they	have	suf‐
fered	wrongs.	 It	 is	 recognition	 that	 their	 condition	 of	 subordination	 is	
not	natural,	but	societally	determined.	This	will	lead	to	the	development	
of	a	 sense	of	 sisterhood;	 the	autonomous	definition	by	women	of	 their	
goals	and	strategies	 for	changing	 their	condition;	and	 the	development	
of	 an	 alternate	 vision	 of	 the	 future.	 This	 consciousness	 needs	 to	 be	
steeped	 in	 the	 everyday	 lived	 experiences	 of	women	on	 the	 continent.	
Feminist	 consciousness	 calls	 for	 sisterhood	 and	 unity	 among	 women	
through	 transcending	 their	 intersectional	 identities.	 Nzegwu	 (in	









the	 mainstream	 women’s	 movement	 in	 Zimbabwe	 is	 mainly	 Harare‐
based	(capital	city).	Other	areas	have	sub‐offices	but	remain	outside	the	
mainstream.	 She	 outlines	 how	 for	 young	 women	 outside	 Harare	 the	
movement	 remains	 inaccessible	 and	 hopelessly	 out	 of	 touch	 with	 the	
grassroots.	Women	who	have	been	at	the	helm	of	the	movement	do	not	
invest	 in	 training	 the	 next	 generation;	 transferring	 skills,	 knowledge,	





members.We	 can	 propose	 a	 serious	 critique	 on	 the	 radical	 and	 trans‐
formative	nature	of	urban‐based	civil	society	in	Zimbabwe.	Civil	society	
in	Zimbabwe	(which	includes	women’s	organizations)	has	been	thought	
of	 as	 progressive,	 yet	 “…civil	 society	 itself	 is	 in	 various	ways	 a	 site	 of	
domination,	 inequality	 and	 conflict:	 the	 moment	 of	 social	 domination	
inscribed	within	civil	 society	 is	 ignored”	 (Helliker,	2012:	11).	Women’s	
organizations	 fall	 prey	 to	 problems	 that	 generally	 affect	 all	 other	 civil	
society	 groupings,	 for	 example	 upward	 accountability	 and	 urban	 bias.	
They	are	answerable	to	donors	and	women	at	the	grassroots	have	little	
say	in	how	or	what	happens	with	programming.	There	has	been	a	grow‐




5 Challenges Facing Women’s Organizations 
Ziyambi	(1997)	argues	that	women’s	groups	in	Zimbabwe	have	histori‐
cally	operated	within	a	tight	resource	base	as	they	have	always	existed	
outside	 government	 support.	 In	Zimbabwe,	 funding	 flow	 from	 interna‐





tional	 donors	 to	 local	 civic	 organizations	 has	 gradually	 declined	 from	
around	US$2.6	million	to	just	over	US$1	million	since	2007	(Joint	Donor	
Steering	Committee,	2010).	Most	formal	women’s	organizations	depend	
on	 international	 donor	 funding	 which	 has	 its	 own	 serious	 pitfalls:	 for	
example,	such	funds	are	usually	tied	to	short‐term	projects	which	might	
not	necessarily	help	in	the	long‐term	battle	against	inequality.	With	the	











to	 be	 more	 service	 oriented	 and	 hence	 keep	 in	 a	 safe	 space	 (Jones,	
2008).	 Another	 problem	 is	 that	 politically	 the	women’s	movement	 re‐
mains	weak.	Major	political	parties	remain	male	dominated	and	patriar‐






currently,	 so	 for	women	 it	 is	 ‘Aluta	Continua’—the	 struggle	 continues”	
(Jones,	2008).	
One	of	 the	biggest	challenges	 for	 the	women’s	movement	has	been	 the	
question	of	the	state.	The	state	in	this	instance	is	not	simply	the	govern‐
ment	but	rather	the	whole	authoritarian	structure	based	on	partriachial	










points	 out,	 the	 women’s	 movement	 in	 Zimbabwe	 has	 never	 really	 re‐
bounded	 from	Operation	Clean	Up	of	1983	when	 the	state	violated	 the	
rights	 of	 ordinary	 citizens	 by	 arresting	 thousands	 of	 women	 for	 the	
“crime”	of	being	on	the	street	alone.	As	noted	earlier,	this	led	to	the	birth	
of	 Women’s	 Action	 Group	 (WAG)	 which	 was	 followed	 by	 many	 other	
organizations	some	of	which	challenged	the	state,	others	remained	apo‐
litical	and	yet	still	others	were	co‐opted	and	captured	by	the	state.	This	
confrontational	 approach	 to	 the	 state	 by	WAG	meant	 that	 it	 remained	
isolated	from	the	growing	women’s	movement	and	they	were	disowned	
by	 some	women’s	organizations	 in	public.	 Even	 for	other	women	 their	
confrontational	 approach	 to	 state	 and	 patriarchy	 was	 untenable.	 Pre‐
sent‐day	women’s	movement	 is	 still	 riddled	with	 this	 problem	 in	 rela‐
tion	to	state	and	patriarchy.	The	differences	in	approach	and	worldview	
toward	 the	 state	and	patriarchy	have	often	 seen	divisions	between	or‐
ganizations.	 Thus	 we	 have	 organizations	 all	 working	 for	 the	 develop‐





demnation	of	 ZANU	PF	or	 its	 opponents.	 It	 is	 not	 only	political	 parties	
that	carry	this	perception	but	also,	media,	donors,	and	women’s	organi‐
zations	 themselves.	 This	 has	 brought	 about	 attacks	 on	many	organiza‐
tions	especially	the	“silencing”	of	the	women’s	movement	on	Prime	Min‐




as	 National	 Constitutional	 Assembly	 (NCA),	 Movement	 for	 Democratic	
Change,	 and	other	women’s	 organizations.	 It	 remains,	 however,	 an	 im‐
portant	issue	going	forward	for	the	women’s	movement	to	analyse,	out‐
line,	and	strategize	how	they	relate	to	the	state	and	various	other	agen‐
cies.	 Essof	 (2005:	 13)	 notes	 that,	 “Whether	 women	 should	 organise	
within	the	state	or	stay	outside	of	it	has	been	the	subject	of	much	debate	
internationally.	 Some	 commentators	 believe	 that	 effective	 reform	 can	
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only	 come	 via	 state	 instruments,	while	 others	 argue	 that	 the	 state	 co‐
opts	women’s	issues.”	
6 Is There a Women’s Movement(s) in Zimbabwe? 
This	question	is	based	on	an	ongoing	internal	conversation	within	Zim‐





ing	 the	 outcomes	 of	 a	meeting	 in	 2001	 of	women’s	 organizations	 that	
was	meant	 to	discuss	 the	question,	asks	 the	question,	 “does	Zimbabwe	
have	 a	women’s	movement?”	 and	 notes	 three	 responses.	 Firstly,	 there	
were	those	who	questioned	whether	the	activities	of	Zimbabwean	wom‐
en’s	organizations	constitute	a	movement;	secondly,	those	that	suggest‐








Shaba	 (2001)	 argues	 that	 the	women’s	movement	 can	 be	 explained	 as	
being	 a	 loose	 formation	 of	 development	 organizations	 and	 individuals	
who	apply	a	feminist	ideology	to	development	activities	aimed	at	uplift‐
ing	 the	 status	 of	women	 in	Zimbabwe.	There	 are	 those	who	 stress	 the	
divisions	 and	 challenges	 that	 paralyze	 the	 movement.	 For	 them	 the	
movement	 is	 at	 best	 weak	 and	 polarized.	 Political	 polarization	 in	 the	
country	has	caught	up	with	women’s	organizations	in	Zimbabwe.	Wom‐







above	 the	 challenges	 of	 the	 current	 context,	 and	 coalesce	 once	 more	
around	shared	interests,	with	our	sense	of	these	interests	made	stronger	






ing	 common	 ground.	 Musonza	 (2012)	 then	 asks	 a	 pertinent	 question:	
What	are	women’s	issues	anyway?	One	of	the	interesting	aspects	within	
the	Zimbabwean	context	is	the	issue	of	sexuality.	Zimbabwe	has	a	hege‐
monic	 discourse	 of	 heteronormality	 based	 on	 the	 power‐constructions	
of	male‐domination,	political	 interference,	and	the	rise	of	religious	 fun‐
damentalism.	Sexual	 rights	are	a	contentious	 issue	within	 the	women’s	
movement.	 For	women	who	 are	 lesbian	 or	 transsexual,	 their	 interests	
mainly	revolve	around	earning	their	rights	in	a	country	were	queer	and	
alternative	 sexualities	 are	 repressed	 and	 stigmatized.	 Most	 women’s	
organizations,	 especially	 those	 based	 on	 religious	 philosophies,	 do	 not	
support	 the	 fight	 for	 sexual	 rights;	politically	based	organizations	 such	
as	ZANU	PF	Women’s	League	 follow	the	party	 line,	 thus	being	outright	
hostile	to	homosexuality.	Gays	and	Lesbians	Zimbabwe	(GALZ,	2012:	5)	
argue	that:	




dependently.	 The	 exclusion	of	 LBT	people	 in	 the	women’s	 rights	






cation,	 location,	 age,	 and	 physical	 attributes.	 For	 example,	 women	 in	
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rural	Matabeleland	 live	 in	a	dry	 region	 that	has	historically	 faced	mar‐
ginalization	 and	 thus	 face	 severe	 food	 insecurities.	 There	 interests	 do	
not	necessarily	correlate	to	those	of	most	organizations	that	are	located	
in	 the	capital	city	Harare,	 far	away	 from	their	everyday	 lives.	Women’s	
interests	are	not	unitary	but	we	can	 try	 to	 transcend	 these	differences	
and	intersectionalities.	How	this	process	of	transcending	should	happen	
when	 issues	 that	 are	 divisive,	 such	 as	 sexuality,	 politics	 and	 ethnicity,	
are	 involved	 is	 highly	 contested.	 McFadden	 (2002)	 narrates	 her	 own	
experiences	with	 the	women’s	movement	 in	 Zimbabwe	where	 she	 did	
not	 get	 any	 support	when	 deported	 for	 “betrayal	 of	 ‘Zimbabwean	 cul‐
ture’	 and	 ‘family	 values’	 and	 identified	 as	 a	 lesbian.”	 Even	 though	 she	
was	heterosexual,	her	feminist	stance	and	views	against	homosexuality	
as	 inauthentic	 and	 criminal	 were	 deemed	 dangerous.	 Yet	 none	 of	 the	
women’s	 organizations	 came	 out	 to	 her	 support.	 As	 she	 notes:	 “The	
deafening	 silence	with	which	 this	was	 greeted	 by	 the	Women’s	Move‐
ment	 in	 Zimbabwe	 spoke	 volumes	 about	 the	 hegemony	 of	 patriarchal	
nationalism,	of	the	deeply	ingrained	right‐wing	definitions	of	alternative	
sexual	choices	as	culturally	alien,	and	of	 the	political	and	discursive	si‐





set	up	 in	1999	as	a	way	to	push	women’s	demands	 in	 the	constitution.	
This	was	around	the	time	where	a	coalition	of	diverse	organizations	un‐
der	the	banner	of	National	Constitutional	Assembly	(NCA)	was	formed.	
Among	 the	 commendable	work	 they	 have	 done,	 one	 is	 to	 fight	 for	 the	
increase	in	participation	of	women	in	the	constitution‐making	processes	
in	Zimbabwe.	WC	had	members	within	the	NCA	which	successfully	cam‐
paigned	 for	 a	 “No”	 vote	 on	 the	 government	 promoted	 constitution	 in	
2000.	The	authors	of	the	new	constitution	were	chosen	by	government	
under	what	was	 known	 as	 the	 Constitutional	 Commission	 (CC),	 which	
co‐opted	some	members	of	the	NCA	and	WC	and	this	created	crisis	and	






would	 the	women’s	movement	 have,	 if	 any,	 with	 the	 opposition	
political	parties	 in	 this	process?	Was	a	good	constitutional	docu‐






to	 deal	with	 this	 pertinent	 issue.	 It	 is	 about	managing	 the	 diversity	 of	






the	evolution	of	 the	student	movement	 in	Zimbabwe,	outlines	an	 inter‐





the	 frustrated	 transition,	 and	 the	 decline	 in	 the	 movement	 that	
gave	birth	to	the	MDC,	which	is	regarded	as	having	distorted	grass	
roots	activism	by	 the	 introduction	of	donor	money	 (Zeilig,	2008:	
230).	
This	phenomenon	 is	 apparent	 across	 all	 civil	 society	 sectors	 in	Zimba‐
bwe.	Donor	funding	while	necessary	and	helpful	to	building	up	civil	so‐
ciety	 organizations	 has	 led	 to	 serious	 problems	 at	 the	 grassroots.	 At	 a	




especially	 in	 the	rural	areas.	Competition	 increased	 in	attracting	donor	
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funding	 as	 fundraising	 and	 not	 grassroots	 mobilization	 became	 the	
business	 of	 the	day	 for	many	organizations,	 some	of	which	had	mush‐
roomed	in	response	to	the	crisis.	Zeilig	further	notes	that:	
John	 Bomba	 captures	 these	 distortions	 and	 the	 effect	 the	 “com‐
modification	 of	 resistance”	 has	 on	 the	 student	 movement:	 [I]t	
brings	 in	 the	 question	 of	 how	 the	 international	 community	 has	



















activism	 has	 become	 a	 career	 path	 for	 many	 educated	 middle‐class	
women	 within	 academia	 and	 NGOs	 who	 are	 using	 the	 experiences	 of	
rural	women	and	poor	urban	women	as	a	platform	to	build	careers	and	
make	 a	 living.	 Feminist	 scholarship	 has	 become	 a	 market	 commodity	
within	 research	houses	and	organizations	where	knowledge	about	and	
for	poor	rural	women	is	used	for	 fundraising	and	project	making	with‐
out	 fundamental	 challenge	 to	 the	 structures	 that	keep	 these	women	 in	
poverty.	Gender	 activism	as	 promoted	 currently	does	not	 speak	 to	 the	
needs	and	experiences	of	a	differentiated	class	of	women	on	 the	conti‐
nent.	 It	can	be	argued	that	the	present	context	of	 limitless	 information,	
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globalized	 power	 relations,	 transnational	 media	 oligarchies,	 and	 com‐
moditized	 academic	 knowledge	mystifies	 patriarchal	 and	 neo‐imperial	
injustice	 through	 the	 rhetoric	of	 “liberalisation”	and	“legitimate”	pater‐
nalist	 protection	 and	 patriotism.	 Feminist	 demands	 under	 such	 a	
framework	are	easily	and	readily	co‐opted,	dismissed,	and	marginalized.	
7 Women’s Organizations and Gendered Social 






is	 rooted	 in	 these	 four	 spheres	 yet	women’s	 organizations	 have	 rarely	
challenged	them	in	a	holistic	manner.	Only	through	a	coalition	can	con‐
certed	 efforts	 by	 organizations	 working	 in	 these	 various	 sectors	 be	
properly	orchestrated	and	directed.	What	Spannos’s	theory	shows	us	is	
that	without	complementarity	the	individual	work	of	organizations	will	
not	 achieve	 transformation	 of	 existing	 partriachial	 systems	 that	 have	
entrenched	women	in	poverty.	The	theory	of	complimentary	holism	thus	
recognizes	 the	need	 for	coalitions.	 In	Zimbabwe,	sharing	a	gender	may	
not	 be	 enough	 for	 coalition	building	 (Win,	 2004).	 Yet	despite	 intersec‐
tional	 differences	 of	women,	 there	 is	 a	 common	 thread	 of	 partriachial	




ing	 certain	positions	 at	 the	 expense	of	 others.	The	political	 sphere	has	
seen	organizations	such	as	WiPSU	working	toward	increasing	the	num‐
ber	of	women	 in	political	positions.	 Increasing	numbers	without	a	 fun‐
damental	 shift	 in	 the	 policy	 framework	 will	 not	 achieve	 much	 for	 the	
majority	of	women.	The	goal	should	be	 to	change	politics	and	promote	
women’s	 interests	 in	 their	 diversity.	 Gendered	 social	 transformation	
begins	at	the	grassroots	with	the	investment	of	communities	in	the	erad‐
ication	 of	 structural	 constraints	 that	 leave	 women	 poorer	 than	 men.	
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Within	 the	 Zimbabwean	 context,	 the	women’s	movement	 as	 presently	
operating	 offers	 little	 hope	 for	 a	 holistic	 transformation	 of	 women’s	
lives.	 What	 is	 required	 is	 an	 internal	 reengineering	 based	 on	 the	














(2015)	 highlight	women’s	 organizations’	 positive	 contribution	 to	 com‐
munities’	 development.	 They	 note	 that	 “the	 history	 of	 the	 women’s	
movement	 in	 Zimbabwe	 is	 not	 only	 about	 engagement	 with	 the	 state,	
but	also	in	community‐based	organizing.	The	positive	effects	of	commu‐
nity‐based	 organizing	 in	 terms	 of	 improving	 livelihoods	 or	 facilitating	
access	to	services	are	widely	acknowledged,	in	diverse	domains,	such	as	
entrepreneurship,	 savings	 and	 credit	 and	 HIV/AIDS”	 (Eerdewijk	 and	
Mugadza,	2015:	37).	
8 Conclusion  




and	 opportunities.	 There	 is	 need	 for	 new	 forms	 of	 engagement	 with	
people,	especially	vulnerable	groups,	based	on	mutual	camaraderie	and	
not	top‐down	approaches	utilized	by	mainstream	civil	society.	Women’s	




are	 located.	 Competition	 and	 contestations	 achieve	 very	 little	 for	 the	





tices	 of	women’s	 organizations	 as	way	 to	 promote	 action	 research.	 As	




gaging	 with	 the	 grassroots	 as	 equal	 partners	 remains	 a	 priority.	 The	
movement	 cannot	 afford	 to	 be	 urban	 centric	 and	 concentrated	 within	
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CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENTS AND RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN POST-
APARTHEID SOCIOECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
Christopher	G.	Thomas1	
South	Africa’s	political	transition	of	1994	promised	to	transcend	colonial	
and	 apartheid	 legacies	 of	 poverty	 and	 disenfranchisement.	 Two	 years	
into	 its	 rule,	 the	 African	 National	 Congress	 government	 dropped	 the	
populist	 participatory	 transformation	 policy	 framework	 of	 the	 Recon‐
struction	and	Development	Program	for	the	neoliberal	orientation	of	the	
Growth,	Employment	and	Redistribution	(GEAR)	macroeconomic	policy.	
GEAR	 worsened	 unemployment,	 social	 inequality,	 and	 poverty.	 It	 has	




inspire	policies	 and	actions	which	effectively	procure	 significant	 socio‐
economic	transformation	in	the	lives	of	the	now	enfranchised	black	ma‐
jority	with	 a	 constitutionally	 legitimated	 claim	 to	 the	 full	 scope	of	 citi‐
zenship	 rights?	 He	 then	 looks	 at	 how	 post‐apartheid	 economic	 policy	
making	 followed	 globally	 hegemonic	 neoliberalism	 and	 worsened	 un‐
employment,	 inequality,	 and	poverty,	 consequently	 increasing	depend‐
ence	 on	 welfarist	 state	 support.	 Constitutionally	 recognized	 socioeco‐
nomic	 rights	are	 to	be	realized	under	 this	neoliberalist	 framework.	So‐
cial	movements	have	developed	in	opposition	to	government’s	neoliber‐
al	policies	and	contemplated	whether	socioeconomic	rights	adjudication	
creates	 opportunities	 for	 reforms	 which	 bring	 relief	 to	 impoverished	
subordinate	classes.	










nent	 in	 the	 struggle	 against	 the	misery	 visited	 on	 the	 disenfranchised	
black	majority,2	and	has	been	influencing	social,	political,	and	economic	
transformation	projects	since	a	political	 transition	 in	1994.	A	new	con‐
stitution3	 recognizing	 the	 rights	 all	 citizens	 may	 equally	 claim	 is	 the	
overarching	 legal	 framework	 of	 rights‐based	 transformation	 projects.4	




has	 not	 satisfactorily	 delivered	 housing,	 water,	 and	 employment	
prompting	community	protests,	organized	mobilization	by	social	move‐
ments	 and	 courtroom	 contestation	 for	 the	 realization	 of	 such	 rights.7	
                                                 
2	 Odendaal	(1984)	writes	about	a	mission	educated	African	elite	and	trading	class	
that	expressed	their	anti‐colonial	struggle	in	the	language	of	“national	rights,”	“Af‐










4	 Klare	 (1998:	 150),	 sees	 South	 Africa’s	 rights‐based	 constitution	 as	 “trans‐




6	 TH	 Marshall’s	 1949	 address,	 Marshall	 and	 Bottomre	 (1992),	 “Citizenship	 and	
social	 class,”	 is	 the	 seminal	 argument	 about	 the	 evolutionary	 emergence	 of	
different	generations	of	rights	and	the	welfarist,	redistributivist	 intent	of	second	





This	 reality,	 two	 decades	 into	 post‐apartheid,	 is	 in	 tension	 with	 opti‐
mism	about	the	constitution’s	transformative	framework.	
In	 some	 circles,	 and	 in	 a	 “post‐socialist	 world”,8	 rights	 discourse	 is	
deemed	an	ideal	strategy	to	redress	a	 legacy	of	social	 inequality.	None‐
theless,	 African	 scholars	 are	 uneasy	 about	 rights	 discourse	 in	 Africa’s	
socioeconomic	 development	 and	 transformation	 projects.	 Makau	 wa	
Mutua	sees	rights	discourse	as	inappropriate	for	addressing	asymmetric	
power	between	citizens	and	generally	for	Africa’s	struggles	to	undo	so‐
cial	 inequality,	 particularly	 in	 South	 Africa,9	 which	 has	 vaunted	 its	
rights‐based	 constitution	 as	 the	 most	 advanced	 in	 the	 contemporary	






Rights	 discourse	privileges	 a	 prominent	 role	 for	 organs	 of	 the	modern	
state	in	the	realization	of	rights	that	effect	transformation	in	the	lives	of	
citizens.	 Impatience	about	 the	 realization	of	 socioeconomic	 rights	 fuels	
erratic	protests	and	poses	a	challenge	to	the	place	of	rights	discourse	in	
post‐apartheid	 transformation	 projects.	 In	 addition,	 anti‐statist	mobili‐
zation	spurns	dependence	on	state	institutions	to	effect	liberation.11	
The	 central	 question	 driving	 my	 research	 in	 this	 sphere	 of	 struggles	
against	economic	globalization	and	worsening	poverty	is:	Can	a	philoso‐
phy	of	rights	 inspire	policies	and	actions	which	effectively	procure	sig‐
nificant	 socioeconomic	 transformation	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 now	 enfran‐
chised	black	majority	with	a	constitutionally	legitimated	claim	to	the	full	
scope	of	citizenship	rights?	I	look	at	how	post‐apartheid	economic	policy	
making	 followed	 globally	 hegemonic	 neoliberalism	 and	 worsened	 un‐
                                                 
8	 	Francis	Fukuyama	(1989)	is	a	preeminent	non‐marxist	account	of	the	decline	of	
socialist	alternatives	and	a	“post‐socialist”	world	characterized	by	a	contemporary	
convergence	 to	 capitalist	 liberal	 democratic	 social	 orders,	 an	 institutional	
arrangement	girded	by	the	language	of	rights.	
9	 See	 respectively,	 Makau	 wa	 Mutua	 (2008),	 Human	 rights	 and	 powerlessness;	
1997,	Hope	and	despair	 for	 a	new	South	Africa:	 the	 limits	of	 a	 rights	discourse;	
and,	more	generally,	1996,	The	ideology	of	rights.	
10	 Hogan	(2001:	7)	and	Heyns	and	Brand	(1999).	




employment,	 inequality,	 and	poverty,	 consequently	 increasing	depend‐
ence	 on	 welfarist	 state	 support.	 Constitutionally	 recognized	 socioeco‐
nomic	 rights	are	 to	be	realized	under	 this	neoliberalist	 framework.	So‐
cial	movements	have	developed	in	opposition	to	government’s	neoliber‐
al	policies	and	contemplated	whether	socioeconomic	rights	adjudication	
creates	 opportunities	 for	 reforms	 which	 bring	 relief	 to	 impoverished	
subordinate	classes.		
2 Post-apartheid Transformation and Development 
Strategies and Poverty Trends 
The	 constitution’s	 welfare	 state	 aspirations12	 and	 acquiring	 the	 fiscal	
resources	for	state	social	spending	are	constrained	by	how	much	it	may	
actually	acquire	from	its	tax	revenue	base,	 the	economy’s	performance,	
and	 the	 actual	 social	 spending	 regime	 embarked	 upon.13	 The	 political	






                                                 
12	 The	specific	sections	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	recognizing	such	rights	are:	Section	3	on	
labour	relations,	Section	26	on	the	progressive	realization	of	the	right	of	the	right	





13	 Marxists	 political	 economists	 O’Connor	 (1973)	 and	 Offe	 (1984)	 argue	 that	 the	
state’s	 attempts	 to	 increase	 its	 social	 spending	 capacity	 through	 tax	 increases	
negatively	 impacts	 upon	 individual	 citizens	 and	 the	 profit	 motivations	 of	
corporations.	Gough	(1979),	shows	how	social	spending	came	to	consume	almost	
half	of	all	state	expenditure.	
14	 Political	 scientists	 Guillermo	 O’Donnell	 and	 Philippe	 Schmitter	 (1986)	
popularized	 the	 term	 “elite	 pacts”	 as	 a	 mode	 of	 transition	 to	 an	 enduring	 and	
consolidated	 democracy.	 Its	 defining	 element	 is	 the	 agreed‐upon	 compromises	
made	 between	 elites	 that	 lean	 toward	 conservative	 policies	 and	 result	 in	





elections,	 but	 the	 challenge	 to	 redistribute	 income	 remained.	A	promi‐
nent	 indicator	 of	 the	 ANC’s	 cautious	 approach	 to	 reconstruction	 is	 its	
approach	to	property	relations.	Although	it	 is	 the	majority	party,	 it	has	
not	embarked	upon	a	drastic	alteration	of	property	relations	shaped	by	
three	centuries	of	colonial	conquest	and	race	domination.15		
While	political	 parties	 negotiated	 the	mechanics	of	 the	political	 transi‐
tion,	economists	debated	economic	policies	to	ensure	income	redistribu‐
tion	 necessary	 to	 achieve	 a	 stable	 and	 democratic	 society.	 Prominent	
themes	 in	 the	 debate	 about	 effecting	 growth	 and	 redistribution	 in	 a	
model	 that	 accommodated	 local	 political	 and	 social	 interests	 entailed	
choices	 between	 economic	 growth	 with	 persistent	 class	 inequality	 as	
opposed	 to	 growth	 accompanied	 by	 redistribution,	 as	 well	 as	 eclectic	
emulation	of	 the	 capitalist	orientations	of	 developed	 industrial	nations	
with	 some	 state	 intervention,	 European	 welfare	 state	 economies	 and	
Third	World	and	Soviet	bloc	socialism.16	The	persistent	challenge	to	re‐
alize	 the	 constitutional	 redistributive	 promises	 must	 be	 understood	
against	the	background	of	the	ANC	government’s	choice	of	development	
strategies	and	 the	outcomes	of	 the	 latter.	The	ANC	adopted	 the	Recon‐
struction	 and	 Development	 Program	 (RDP)	 policymaking	 framework	
guidelines	for	post‐apartheid	reconstruction	and	economic	policy	short‐








would	build	1	million	houses	for	the	poor	 in	 five	years.17	 Its	Keynesian	
orientation	emphasized	the	state’s	leading	role	in	the	economy	and	em‐
ployment	creation	to	facilitate	growth,	development,	reconstruction,	and	
redistribution.18	 In	 this	 paradigm,	 growth	 and	 development	 are	 the	
products	of	a	policy	emphasizing	reconstruction	and	redistribution.	The	















Makau	wa	Mutua	 is	apprehensive	 that	 the	permeation	of	 the	RDP	with	
rights	 talk	 and	 blind	 optimism	 about	 correcting	 the	 apartheid	 legacy	
does	 not	 identify	 concrete	 measures	 and	 policies	 to	 that	 effect	 and	 is	
“romantic”	 about	 its	 egalitarian	 goals,	 but	 steers	 clear	 of	 explicitly	 de‐
claring	where	 the	 resources	 for	 such	 goals	would	 come	 from,	 and	 the	
impact	 it	 may	 have	 on	 the	 stock‐pile	 of	 white	 privilege.21	 The	 RDP	
framework	must	 be	 judged	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 actual	 provision	 of	 houses,	
jobs,	 safe	 water,	 health	 care,	 nutrition,	 relevant	 education,	 and	 safety	
and	 security	 to	 citizens.	 Between	 1994	 and	 1996	 the	 RDP	 fund	 con‐
trolled	 R15.5	 billion,	 but	 many	 political	 leaders	 were	 soon	 convinced	





“dead,”	 and,	 along	 with	 it,	 the	 “people‐driven”	 development	 strategy.	
Nonetheless,	 the	 ANC	 retorted	 that	 its	 macro‐economic	 policy	 shift	
would	 make	 the	 RDP	 sustainable.	 Minister	 of	 Finance	 Trevor	 Manuel	
stated	 that	 although	 the	 separate	 RDP	 allocation	was	withdrawn,	 gov‐
ernment’s	view	was	the	budget	as	a	whole	was	now	directed	toward	the	
RDP	 goals,	 making	 a	 separate	 allocation	 unnecessary.23	 Despite	 criti‐
cisms,	toward	the	end	of	the	first	term	of	a	post‐apartheid	government,	
analysts	 noted	 “impressive”	 achievements,	 in	 a	 short	 space	of	 time,	 on	
delivery	 of	 housing,	 clean	 water,	 electrification,	 land	 reform,	 primary	









health	 care,	 and	public	works.24	The	RDP’s	 critics25	 contended	 that	 the	
allocation	 to	 housing	was	 only	 about	 1.5%	of	 the	national	 budget;	 key	
role	players,	 such	 as	banks,	were	not	 eager	 to	 extend	 loans	 to	 subsidy	
recipients	to	make	“top	up”	improvements	and	extensions	to	their	basic	
houses;	contractors	were	not	matching	the	expected	housing	standards;	
confusion	 prevailed	 about	 how	 many	 houses	 were	 actually	 delivered;	
constitutional	 protection	 of	 property	 rights	 restricted	 peri‐urban	 land	
acquisition	 for	 low‐income	housing	projects;	 and	pushed	 such	projects	
away	from	the	cities.		
In	 1995	 the	 ANC	 contended	 that	 the	 economy’s	 growth	 rate	 of	 3%	
curbed	government’s	delivery	on	RDP	promises.26	This	contextual	factor	
abetted	 the	drift	 from	state	 interventionism	 to	a	 convergence	with	 the	
old	white	 elite’s	 own	drift	 to	 neoliberal	 policies	 before	 entering	 into	 a	
negotiated	 political	 transition.	 President	 Mandela’s	 opening	 of	 parlia‐
ment	address	in	1996	acknowledged	modest	economic	growth	and	little	
job	creation,27	called	 for	a	 “new	patriotism”	 to	accept	 the	challenges	of	
structural	changes	to	the	economy,	and	advocated	neoliberal	ideas	about	
achieving	international	competitiveness	in	a	new	macro‐economic	poli‐
cy.	 In	 1996	 the	 ANC	 dominated	 Government	 of	 National	 Unity	 (GNU)	
announced	 its	 preference	 for	 an	 open	 economy	 and	 adopted	 Growth,	




egy	 over	 the	 RDP’s	 preference	 for	 a	 greater	 state	 role	 in	 coordinating	
economic	growth.29	
Marais	 (2001)	 argues	 that	 the	 evolution	 of	 ANC	 political	 thought	 en‐
tailed	the	view	that	seizure	of	state	power	would	facilitate	the	easy	rem‐
edying	 of	 a	 legacy	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 inequalities.	 The	 Freedom	
Charter	 contained	 some	 formulations	 on	 the	 restructuring	 of	 a	 post‐
apartheid	economy,	but	while	 in	exile	 the	ANC	did	not	refine	any	post‐
apartheid	economic	policy	and	was	not	in	a	strong	position	to	argue	the	











dress.	 Effectively,	 the	ANC’s	 elite	 leadership	 followed	 the	 advice	 of	 big	






of	 SA,	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Economic	 Research,	 the	WB,	 and	 the	 SA	 Reserve	
Bank.31	
GEAR	recognized	the	population	growth	was	faster	than	the	economy’s	
growth	 rate	 (GDP	 grew	 by	 1.3%	 in	 1993,	 2.7%	 in	 1994,	 and	 3.5%	 in	
1995),	and	the	unemployment	rate	at	GEAR’s	inception	was	between	38	
and	 40%.32	 It	 emphasized	 “a	 competitive	 fast‐growing	 economy	which	
creates	sufficient	jobs	for	all	workseekers,”	in	order	to	achieve	“a	redis‐
tribution	 of	 income	 and	 opportunities	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 poor.”33	 An	 ex‐
port‐oriented	 economy	was	 expected	 to	 attract	 investment	 and	 create	
jobs	 as	 a	 means	 of	 effecting	 redistribution.	 GEAR’s	 lofty	 expectations	
entailed:	 an	 average	 growth	 rate	 increase	 of	 4.2%	 for	 four	 years,	 then	






growth	 path	 through	 restructuring	 industries	 and	 increasing	 their	
openness	 to	 international	 competitiveness	was	 expected	 to	 have	 long‐
term	 benefits	 of	 increasing	 employment	 opportunities,	 and	with	 some	
later	redistribution	gains	through	wages.35	
GEAR’s	 critics	 dubbed	 it	 “trickle	 down”	 economics	with	 flawed	projec‐
tions	 of	 employment	 increases	 and	 economic	 growth	 increases	 of	 6%	









and	 then	 12%;	 it	 was	misguided	 in	 its	 privileging	 of	 growth	 first	 and	
redistribution	 later	 after	 a	 period	 of	 some	 sustained	 economic	 growth	
redistribution.36	 In	 hindsight,	 low	 economic	 growth	 rate	 has	 been	 ap‐




reach	 the	6%	growth	rate	 targeted	 for	2010	and	beyond.	The	 IMF	pre‐
dicted	 that	 the	 growth	 rate	will	 persist	 at	 4.8%	up	 to	 2012,	while	 the	
Treasury	Department	revised	its	projections	to	a	5.1%	growth	rate.	The	
thrust	 of	 criticisms	 of	 economic	 policy	 has	 been	 that	 it	 followed	 the	
Washington	consensus	principles	of	 international	 financing	 institutions	
prescriptions	for	reform	or	liberalization	of	financial	movement	policies	
as	a	means	of	attracting	 foreign	direct	 investment,	only	 to	see	 the	out‐
flow	of	 capital.	 Investment	has	not	materialized	 in	 the	proportions	 the	
policy’s	architects	hoped	for.37	The	National	Economic	Development	and	
Labour	 Council	 (NEDLAC)	 38	 a	 corporatist	 economic	 policy	 advisory	
council	made	up	of	labor,	business,	government	and	development	organ‐
izations,	links	the	high	unemployment	rate	to	liberalization	of	the	econ‐
omy	 about	 investment	 and	 outflows,	 and	 non‐realization	 of	 expected	
domestic	and	foreign	investment	rates	because	of	the	volatility	of	global	
financial	markets:	 gross	 domestic	 investment	 as	 a	 percent	 of	GDP	was	
expected	 to	 increase	 to	26%	but	did	not	 exceed	14.9%;	between	1999	
and	 2000	 foreign	 direct	 investment	 declined	 from	R9.2	 billion	 to	 R6.1	
billion39;	 portfolio	 investment	 into	 South	 Africa	 declined	 from	 R83.9	
billion	 in	 1999	 to	 R11.8	 billion	 in	 2000;	 overall,	 a	 net	 inflow	 of	 R52.4	
billion	shifted	 to	an	outflow	of	R13.8	billion	 in	2000.	Foreign	direct	 in‐





characterized	 by	 processes	 of	 “exclusion”	 and	 “implosion”	 where	 industrialized	
countries	 prefer	 to	 invest	 among	 themselves	 and	 there	 is	 a	 decrease	 in	 foreign	






GEAR	predicted,	 under	prevailing	 economic	 structures	 and	policies,	 an	
unemployment	 growth	 trend	 reaching	 37%	 by	 2000.	 In	 1995,	 in	 the	
strict	 definition	 of	 unemployment,	 which	 treats	 workers	 who	 are	 dis‐
couraged	 from	 seeking	 work	 as	 outside	 of	 the	 labor	 force,	 it	 stood	 at	
16.5%,	 but	 the	 expanded	 definition	 put	 unemployment	 at	 29.3%	 that	
year.41	 In	 a	 total	 national	 population	 of	 44.8	million	 (the	 2001	 figures,	
but	50	million	according	to	 the	2011	census),	and	with	a	national	pov‐
erty	line	of	R569	per	month	per	adult	equivalent,	about	21	million	peo‐
ple	 still	 live	below	 that	 line;	 income	 inequality,	when	measured	by	 the	




contends,	 countervailing	 forces	 produced	 increased	 inequality	 when	
using	the	Gini	coefficient	as	an	indicator.		
Putting	brakes	on	 increasing	 the	 state’s	 role	 is	 contrary	 to	many	other	
expectations	and	to	the	state’s	“positive”	role	in	the	realization	of	socio‐
economic	 rights.	 Increasingly,	 the	 dominant	 trend	 in	 the	 broad	 recon‐
struction,	growth,	and	redistribution	debate,	marginalized	the	role	of	the	
state	in	favor	of	market‐led	solutions,	and	increased	disappointment	and	
criticism	 by	 those	 still	 seeking	 solutions	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 re‐
forming	capitalism.	Activists	in	post‐apartheid	social	movements	regard	
developments	in	the	economy	on	employment,	the	subsequent	inability	
to	 pay	 bonds,	 as	 reducing	 many	 households	 from	 fairly	 good	 circum‐
                                                 
40	 Loyiso	Langeni	(2011)	draws	these	figures	from	a	United	Nations	Conference	on	
Trade	and	Development	report.	
41	 South	 African	 Institute	 of	 Race	 Relations	 (1996/1997:	 358–359).	 The	 United	
Nations	 Development	 Programme’s	 (UNDP)	 (2003:	 19–20)	 discussion	 of	 the	
disastrous	 outcomes	 of	 South	 Africa’s	 macro‐economic	 policy	 highlights	 the	
figures	of	the	expanded	definition	of	unemployment;	it	reported	unemployment	in	
March	 2003	 reached	 31.2%	 (5.2	 million),	 but	 in	 an	 extended	 definition	 of	
unemployment	 the	 figure	 stands	 at	 42.1%	 (8.4	million)	 in	 a	work	 force	 of	 29.6	
million	(UNDP	2003:19–20).	Neva	Seidman	Makgetla	(2004),	pp.	264–265,	notes	









inent	 in	 the	 statements	 of	 critical	 opinion‐makers.	 The	 realization	 that	















3 Post-apartheid Civil Society Movements 
Trade	 unions	 and	 civics	movements	 were	major	 forms	 of	 civil	 society	
mobilization	and	opposition	to	the	apartheid	state	and	by	endorsing	the	
Freedom	Charter	 they	 ideologically	aligned	 themselves	with	 the	ANC.44	
This	 likely	 contributed	 to	 civil	 society	 organizations	 being	 poorly	 pre‐
pared	 for	 their	role	 in	a	democracy.	The	RDP	spoke	of	a	major	role	 for	
civil	society	structures	in	the	reconstruction	and	development	after	the	
political	 transition;	however,	 it	 turned	out	 that	 civics	 seemed	useful	 to	
the	new	government	only	insofar	as	they	could	end	bond,	rent	and	ser‐
vice	 boycotts,	 and	 get	 communities	 in	 line	 with	 government’s	 drift	 to	
market	policies	for	the	provision	of	services	by	accepting	the	neoliberal	
disciplining	 of	 paying	 for	 services.	 It	 appeared	 that	 social	 movements	
whose	actions	were	vital	to	bringing	about	a	political	transition	in	South	





Africa	were	 to	 be	 demobilized	 in	 a	 fashion	 similar	 to	 that	 observed	 in	
other	 contexts	 in	 the	 corpus	of	 “transition	 theory,”	once	political	 elites	
drifted	 to	 neoliberalism.45	 Some	 civic	 organizers	 anticipated	 being	
watchdogs	 that	 were	 included	 in	 the	 policy‐making	 process46	 but	 the	
ANC	government	avoided	consulting	with	 them	and	 it	 implemented	 its	
own	projects.		
Following	 the	 unfolding	 of	 GEAR’s	 neoliberal	 logic	 of	 the	 privatization	
and	the	cost	recovery	approach	to	the	provision	of	social	services,	sever‐
al	 “new”	 social	movements	 have	 arisen	 in	 an	 environment	 enabled	 by	
democratization	processes	and	are	largely	animated	by	the	consequenc‐
es	of	neoliberal	economic	policies.	Several	combinations	of	relationships	






ernment	 and	 civil	 society	 organizations,	 as	well	 as	 the	 growth	 of	 new	
social	 movements	 opposed	 to	 the	 thrust	 of	 the	 neoliberalism,	 for	 in‐
stance,	 the	 Anti‐Privatization	 Forum.48	 Some	 new	 social	 movements	
draw	 from	 class‐based	 ideologies	 calling	 themselves	 “socialist	 move‐
ments”	with	explicit	 counter‐hegemonic	projects	against	 the	state;	oth‐
ers	 have	 formal	 relationships	 or	 partnerships	 with	 the	 state;	 in	 some	
cases,	 there	 is	 vacillation	 between	 these	 strategies;	 in	 some	 instances,	




















not	 afford	 the	 necessary	 deposit.	 The	 vacant	 space	 for	 mobilizing	 on	
housing	 rights	 has	 sometimes	 been	 filled	 by	 spontaneous	 actions	 and	
ephemeral	organizations,	as	well	as	those	proving	to	last	longer	such	as	
the	Landless	People’s	Movement	(LPM)	and	Abahlali	baseMjondolo	(“the	
shackdwellers”).50	 Both	 organizations	 are	 independent	 of	 the	 ANC	 and	
have	an	“adversarial”	strategy	of	engagement	with	the	state	animated	by	




they	are	concerned	predominantly	with	 rural	 land	reform	 in	 the	 inter‐
ests	 of	 people	 seeking	 agricultural	 livelihoods;	 however,	 its	 campaigns	
have	linked	the	urban	housing	shortage	to	a	need	for	urban	land	reform	
too.	Press	releases	of	LPM	marches	and	campaign	demands	 in	Gauteng	
Province	 involving	 squatters	 in	 Protea	 South	 and	 Kliptown	 (Soweto),	
Thembelihle	(Lenasia),	and	Thembisa	(Kempton	Park)	reveal	a	concern	
with	issues	of	an	urban	nature,	namely,	the	issues	of	the	urban	homeless	


















law	 underlying	 the	 constitution	 as	 well	 as	 of	 left‐wing	 intellectuals:	
“When	Abahlali	marched	…	a	number	of	left	intellectuals	declared	them	
criminal	in	the	national	press	…	it	was	clear	that	competing	elites	in	the	
state	and	 the	 institutionalised	 left	were	united	on	 the	position	 that	 the	
poor	should	not	think	their	own	politics	and	that	doing	so	rendered	the	
movement	 ‘out	 of	 order’	 and	 even	 criminal.	 Abahlali’s	 intellectual	 pro‐
ject	is	founded	on	the	decision	that	‘when	order	means	the	silence	of	the	
poor	then	it	is	good	to	be	out	of	order’”.54	
4 Landmark Socioeconomic Rights Adjudication 
The	trias	politica	principle	of	the	statemaking	process	of	the	negotiated	




oeconomic	 rights.55	 The	 constitution,	 the	 international	 human	 rights	





ing	of	 rights	 and	 state	obligations,	 in	nurturing	a	 culture	of	 rights,	 and	
ultimately	redressing	the	legacy	of	inequality.	The	position	of	the	Consti‐








55	 Although	 these	 cases	may	 not	 be	 argued	 to	 have	 been	 initiated	 by	 civil	 society	
organizations	as	such,	 the	cases	nevertheless	 form	the	basis	of	 landmark	rulings	








Court	 from	 subjecting	 itself	 to	 the	 dominant	 discourse	 on	 social	 and	
economic	 rights	 and	 the	 capacity	 of	 states	 to	 act	 in	ways	 that	 citizens	




protect	 the	neoliberal	 framework	 that	 economic	 elites	 are	 comfortable	
with.	 These	 types	 of	 constitutional	 outcomes	 preserve	 and	 protect	 the	
interests	and	hegemony	of	three	types	of	elites	who	favor	a	trend	to	“ju‐
ristocracy”	 in	 connection	 to	 a	 preference	 for	 neoliberal	 economic	poli‐
cies.	These	elites	include	the	old	ruling	elite	that	wishes	to	retain	its	po‐
litical	 hegemony	 from	 democratization,	 the	 economic	 elites	 who	 see	
constitutions	 as	 a	 means	 of	 promoting	 a	 neoliberal	 economic	 agenda,	
and	the	judicial	elite	that	wished	to	increase	their	political	influence.57	
Contestation	 in	 courts	 is	 crucial	 in	 a	 context	 where	 the	 obligations	 of	
government	in	the	realization	of	rights	are	not	always	concrete.	A	repos‐
itory	 of	 Constitutional	 Court	 decisions	 about	 socioeconomic	 rights	 as	
well	as	disputes	between	organs	of	state	has	evolved	over	two	decades	
since	1994	and	a	few	notable	cases	frame	the	basis	for	the	interpretation	
of	 the	 realization	 of	 socioeconomic	 rights.	 The	 Soobramoney	 case	pre‐
ceded	Grootboom,	but	the	Grootboom	judgment	emerges	as	the	founda‐
tion	of	future	socio‐economic	judgments.	
4.1  Soobramoney: The Right of Access to Health Care Services58  
Mr	 Thiagraj	 Soobramoney,	 an	 unemployed	 41‐year‐old	 diabetic	 with	















longed	 were	 entitled	 to	 emergency	 medical	 treatment	 in	 terms	 of	 s	
27(3),	 which	 held:	 “No	 one	may	 be	 refused	 emergency	 medical	 treat‐







unable	 to	 pay	 for	 such	 treatment	 was	 entitled	 to	 have	 the	 treatment	
provided	at	a	State	hospital	without	charge.”59	






security,	 and	many	do	not	 have	 access	 to	 clean	water	or	 to	 ade‐
quate	health	services.	These	conditions	existed	when	the	Constitu‐






posed	 on	 the	 State	 by	 sections	 26	 and	 27	 in	 regard	 to	 access	 to	
housing,	health	care,	 food,	water	and	social	 security	are	depend‐
ent	upon	 the	 resources	available	 for	such	purposes,	and	 that	 the	
corresponding	rights	themselves	are	limited	by	reason	of	the	lack	









The	 justices	 accept	 that	 even	 if	 the	 right	 were	 not	 qualified,	 the	 state	
would	still	not	be	able	 to	meet	 the	obligation,	and	 there	 is	a	 rationality	
about	which	state	organs	use	 their	 resources.	The	provincial	health	de‐
partment’s	resources	position	about	the	rationality	behind	the	use	of	its	
available	resources	swayed	 the	High	Court	 judge	and	 the	Constitutional	
Court	supported	that	ruling.	The	justices	were	mindful	of	the	state’s	fiscal	
position;	 they	were	wary	 of	 the	 pressures	 on	 the	 provincial	 health	 de‐
partment’s	resources;	it	had	overspent	its	current	budget	with	the	expec‐
tation	of	future	overspending.61	
President	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Court,	 Justice	 Chaskalson	 re‐
marked:	“One	cannot	but	have	sympathy	for	the	appellant	and	his	
family,	who	face	the	cruel	dilemma	of	having	to	impoverish	them‐
selves	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 the	 treatment	 [Soobramoney]	 seeks	 in	
order	 to	prolong	his	 life.	The	hard	and	unpalatable	 fact	 is	 that	 if	
[Mr	Soobramoney]	were	a	wealthy	man	he	would	be	able	to	pro‐









rational	use	of	 its	 available	 resources	but	 also	 the	Court’s	 views	on	 the	
state’s	national	budget	allocations.	 It	refrains	 from	challenging	the	state	






on	 the	 rational	 allocation	 of	 resources	 because	 it	 accepts	 the	 argument	
that	state	resources	are	limited.	If	judges	force	a	state	to	realize	one	right,	
it	comes	at	the	expense	of	other	services	and	of	other	people	seeking	to	
enjoy	 the	 same	 right.	 Furthermore,	 judges	 do	not	have	 the	 expertise	 to	
decide	on	the	state’s	priorities.	Following	the	trias	politica	principle,	the	
Constitutional	 Court	 justices	 declined	 to	 probe	 the	 state’s	 rationality	
about	the	use	of	its	resources.	
4.2  Grootboom: The Right to Have Access to Adequate Housing63  
Mrs	Irene	Grootboom	was	among	a	group	of	 indigent	squatter	camp	in‐
habitants	numbering	390	adults	and	510	children	who	applied	 for	 low‐
cost	municipality	housing	but	 remained	on	waiting	 lists	 for	years.	They	
moved	 out	 of	 an	 overpopulated	 squatter	 settlement	 to	 occupy	 an	 area	
they	believed	was	vacant	land	renaming	it	“New	Rest.”	They	were	evicted	
and	 appealed	 to	 the	 High	 Court,	 which	 referenced	 the	 Constitutional	
Court’s	 ruling	 in	 Soobramoney	 about	 the	 provincial	 health	 authorities’	
rational	use	of	available	budget	resources;	it	ruled	that	the	local	authori‐
ties	did	have	a	rational	housing	program	within	the	means	of	its	available	
resources	and	 the	courts	 should	not	 judge	on	 the	suitability	of	 such	ra‐
tional	programs.		
Some	 temporary	 relief	 came	 for	 the	 squatters	 because	 the	 High	 Court	
made	a	ruling	in	terms	of	s	28(c),	that	children	have	an	unqualified	right	
to	shelter.	The	 judge	 ruled	 that	 the	children	being	protected	 thus	could	





lative	 and	 other	measures	 to	 ensure	 the	 progressive	 realization	 of	 this	














measures	 to	provide	housing.	The	 State	had	 to	 create	 the	 condi‐








lived	 in	 deplorable	 conditions	 and	with	 a	 sense	 of	 being	 abandoned	by	








[T]he	 obligation	 does	 not	 require	 the	 State	 to	 do	 more	 than	 its	
available	 resources	 permit.	 This	means	 that	 both	 the	 content	 of	
the	obligation	in	relation	to	the	rate	at	which	it	is	achieved	as	well	
as	 the	 reasonableness	 of	 the	measures	 employed	 to	 achieve	 the	
result	are	governed	by	the	availability	of	resources.68	
Justice	Yacoob	also	pointed	out	that,	although	South	Africa	had	signed	the	
International	 Convention	 on	 Economic,	 Social	 and	 Cultural	 Rights	












edged	 “the	 right	 of	 access	 to	 housing.”	 This	 qualification	 of	 the	 right	 is	
dependent	upon	 the	state	demonstrating	 that	 it	was	 taking	 “reasonable	
legislative	 and	 other	 measures”	 which	 would	 enable	 it	 “to	 achieve	 the	
progressive	 realisation”	 of	 the	 right	 to	 housing,	 and	 that	 this	 was	 de‐
pendent	on	its	“available	resources.”	
It	was	apparent	that	while	the	state	progressively	built	up	its	resources,	
claims	by	 the	homeless	 to	 the	 right	 to	housing	and	 the	actions	 they	 re‐
sorted	 to	 encroached	 on	 other	 people’s	 right	 to	 private	 property	 and	
land.	In	2004,	the	case	of	Port	Elizabeth	Municipality	v	Various	Occupiers	
and,	 in	 2005,	 the	 case	 of	 President	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 South	 Africa	 and	




these	 judgments	 affect	 the	 approach	 to	 socioeconomic	 rights	 since	 the	
issue	of	 the	pace	of	 the	state’s	use	of	 its	 resources	 to	provide	adequate	
housing	was	raised	again	and	 the	manner	 in	which	 the	constitution	ap‐
proached	 the	 interrelationship	between	 land	hunger,	homelessness	and	
respect	for	property	rights.	In	the	latter	two	cases,	the	Court	upheld	the	
protection	 of	 private	 property	 rights,	 and	 that	 homeless	 people	 or	
evictees	could	not	demand	of	the	state	immediate	fulfilment	of	the	right	
to	 adequate	 housing.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Court	 would	 not	 demand	 such	
action	 by	 the	 state.	 The	 constitution	was	 an	 instrument	 developed	 in	 a	
particular	 social,	political,	 and	economic	context	 that	 required	 transfor‐














This	 case	 was	 about	 the	 right	 of	 access	 to	 health	 care	 services	 (s	 27),	
which	TAC	had	earlier	brought	to	the	Transvaal	High	Court.	Specifically,	
TAC	 demanded	 that	 government	 make	 available	 in	 state	 hospitals	 the	
drug,	Nevirapine,	which	is	used	by	pregnant	women	in	the	prevention	of	
mother‐to‐child‐transmission	 of	 the	 Human	 Immunodeficiency	 Virus.	
The	High	 Court	 ruled	 that	 state	 health	 authorities	must	make	 the	 drug	





ment	of	 the	right	was	reasonable.	Wesson70	sees	 the	TAC	case	as	 trans‐
cending	 the	 Grootboom	 case	 because	 it	 extended	 individual	 rights	 to	 a	
particular	 group.	 Furthermore,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 state’s	 fiscal	 limits,	
there	were	 limited	 cost	 implications	 to	 extending	 this	 entitlement,	 and	
the	Court	was	guided	by	 the	Grootboom	approach	 in	 the	sense	 that	 the	
state	takes	reasonable	measures	in	availing	this	service.	
In	hindsight,	TAC	organizers	reflect	on	their	involvement	in	the	HIV/AIDS	
medicines	 issue	 and	 the	 court	 ruling	 victory	 places	 that	 struggle	 in	 a	














Africa’s	 left‐wing	 thinkers	about	using	 rights	discourse	as	well	as	 right‐
wing	views	opposing	the	broadening	of	the	notion	of	rights	to	the	realm	
of	social	and	economic	rights.	
4.4  Khosa: The Right to Have Access to Social Security72 










4.5  Mazibuko: The Right to Water73  
Mrs	 Lindiwe	 Mazibuko	 and	 five	 other	 residents	 of	 Phiri,	 Soweto,	 chal‐
lenged	the	City	of	Johannesburg’s	installation	of	prepaid	water	meters	as	
a	violation	of	 their	s	27	 (1)	b	right	 to	sufficient	water.	The	proceedings	







ernment.	 Its	 views	 on	 the	 positive	 aspects	 of	 episodic	 litigation	 about	
social	and	economic	rights	assert	that	it	is	a	way	of	getting	government	to	
account	to	citizens	as	to	whether	its	policies	are	indeed	“reasonable”	or	
should	 be	 reconsidered.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 praised	





the	prominence	of	NGOs	assisting	 in	such	 litigation	 in	the	service	of	 the	
poor.	
4.6  What Choices Remain for Further Socioeconomic Rights 
Litigation? 
The	constitution’s	weak	statement	of	the	state’s	social	rights	obligations	
feeds	 conclusions	 that	 the	 judiciary’s	 adjudication	 of	 these	 rights	 still	
functions	to	protect	the	hegemony	specifically	of	the	economic	elite,	de‐
spite	the	latter’s	outwardly	transformed	nonracial	appearance.	It	may	be	
possible	 to	 pronounce	 on	 the	 outcomes	 of	 adjudication	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
consequences	 of	 rulings	 on	 the	 class	 interests	 of	 affected	 parties.	 The	
class,	 income,	 and	 indigent	 circumstances	 of	 the	 appellant	 in	 the	
Soobramoney	 case,	 the	 community	 in	 the	 Grootboom	 case,	 and	 the	 in‐
tended	beneficiaries	in	the	TAC	case	raise	questions	about	the	qualitative	
changes	a	constitutional	order	has	meant	for	poorer	segments	of	society	
and	 their	 dependence	 on	 positive	 state	 actions.	 Unfortunately	 for	 Mr	


























of	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 and	 its	 decisions.	 Bond’s	 appraisal	 of	 the	
Court	is	a	social	structural	approach	tied	to	a	critique	of	the	ANC‐led	gov‐
ernment’s	 neoliberal	 policies	 and	 accepts	 no	 excuses	 resorting	 to	 the	
trias	politica	idea	of	separating	the	powers	of	the	state	where	judges	ac‐
cept	the	executive	performs	its	task	in	terms	of	a	rational	use	of	available	
resources.	He	 feels,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	South	Africa	has	a	 constitution	
promising	 socioeconomic	 rights,	 the	 judges	 are	 afraid	 to	 challenge	 the	
state’s	neoliberal	policies.76	
5 Taking Socioeconomic Rights Seriously  
Foucault’s	notion	of	discourse	captured	the	capacity	of	humans	to	resist	
power	 and	avoids	 the	notion	of	 ideology	 and	 its	 representation	of	 sub‐
jects	in	a	homogenized	fashion.	To	see	rights	simultaneously	as	discourse	
implies	rights	are	an	object	of	knowledge,	statements	are	made	about	the	
truth	 of	 that	 object,	 and	 processes	 about	 their	 nature	 exclude	 subordi‐
nate	 groups	 from	 challenging	 that	 truth.	 Subordinate	 classes’	 struggles	
are	 advanced	 by	 including	 strategies	 for	 an	 alternative	 discourse.	 In	
pragmatic	 approaches	 to	 rights	 discourse,	 this	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 Gramscian	
counter‐hegemonic	project.77	Class	domination	is	achieved	through	coer‐
cion	 as	 well	 as	 consent,	 and	 the	 struggle	 for	 liberation	must	 challenge	
dominant	beliefs,	values,	law,	myths,	and	so	on,	bringing	forth	the	coun‐




efied	 speaking	 subjects”	 who	 dominate	 the	 discourse	 on	 the	 nature	 of	
rights	and	who	complement	the	hegemony	of	dominant	classes	by	defin‐
                                                 
76	 See	Bond	(2004).	
77	 Purvis	and	Hunt	(1993:	483–484).	Bartholomew	and	Hunt	(1990:	52)	partly	draw	
on	 Foucaultian	 notions	 of	 “discursive	 struggles,”	 but	 opt	 more	 explicitly	 for	
similar	 Gramscian	 notions	 of	 struggles	 for	 hegemony,	 Bartholomew	 and	 Hunt	





whether	 the	 ideas	 and	practices	 about	 rights	 of	 the	major	 interpreters,	
and	social	agents	and	institutions	dealing	with	their	realization	are	flexi‐
ble	when	encountered	with	each	challenge.		












Upon	querying	 their	 involvement	 in	 the	provision	of	1,	372	 community	
legal	 aid	 services	 including	 litigation,	 it	 turned	 out	 that	 the	 seventeen	
“Evictions”	matters	for	2011	were	largely	disputes	between	family	mem‐
bers	 who	 wish	 to	 evict	 other	 family	 members	 following	 disputes	 over	
informal	 agreements	 about	 occupying	 homes	 that	 have	 been	 inherited.	




are	not	an	 issue	 in	 the	Cape	Town	metropolis.	However,	an	area	where	
they	 do	 have	 a	 considerable	 caseload	 of	 assisting	 indigent	 people	 is	 in	
that	of	divorce	which	has	further	ramifications	for	the	realization	of	the	
right	 to	housing.	The	RDP	house	 that	divorcing	 indigent	people	acquire	
can	only	pass	on	to	one	former	spouse	and	the	other	spouse	will	not	re‐
ceive	a	subsidy	for	another	RDP	house.80	The	director	of	the	University	of	
Cape	 Town	 (UCT)	 legal	 aid	 clinic	 shared	 the	 view	 that	 the	 metropolis	
                                                 
78	 Cox	and	Seale	(2008).	
79	 Interview	 with	 Hadley	 Saayman,	 University	 of	 South	 Africa	 Law	 Clinic,	 June	 7,	
2012.	





er,	 the	UCT	clinic	has	become	 involved	 in	an	ongoing	action	supporting	
the	 legal	 struggle	 of	 the	 residents	 of	 Hangberg,	 using	 the	Prevention	of	
Illegal	 Eviction	 from	 an	Unlawful	Occupation	 of	 Land	 Act	 of	 1998	 (also	
called	 the	 “PIE	Act”),	against	 the	city’s	and	provincial	officials’	 resort	 to	
the	courts	 to	have	 them	evicted	 from	about	2010.81	The	Hangberg	 resi‐
dents	 are	 reluctant	 to	 move	 from	 their	 informal	 settlement	 dwellings	
while	 there	 is	 slow	 development	 about	 low	 income	 housing;	 they	 also	
resort	to	an	indigenous	peoples’	land	claim	to	an	area	which	has	a	majes‐








grounding	 litigation	 as	 a	 strategy	 to	 “change	 the	 socio‐economic	 condi‐
tions	that	undermine	human	dignity	and	development,	and	prevent	poor	
people	from	reaching	their	full	potential.”83	Despite	taking	its	name	from	






tion	 of	 the	 right	 to	 basic	 education,	 a	 section	 29	 right	 of	 the	 Constitu‐
tion.84	Non‐realization	of	 the	 right,	 largely	due	 to	 the	 state’s	maladmin‐
istration,	 continues	 to	 marginalize	 poor	 black	 learners,	 constrains	 up‐
ward	 social	 mobility,	 and	 reinforces	 inequalities	 in	 society.	 The	 ruling	
created	 an	 opportunity	 for	 a	 civil	 society	 organization	 to	 have	 a	 close	
relationship	with	a	state	organ	about	its	progress	with	delivery	of	a	ser‐
                                                 
81	 Interview	 with	 Yellavarne	 Moodley,	 University	 of	 Cape	 Town	 Legal	 Aid	 Clinic,	
February	23,	2016.	






vice,	nonetheless,	 the	relationship	soured	once	 it	was	apparent	 that	 the	
state	 organ	 remained	delinquent	 about	 its	 obligations	 and	 SECTION	27	
took	the	matter	to	court	once	again.		




inner	 city	 residents	 challenging	 the	 courts’	 interpretations	 of	 the	 “PIE”	
Act.85	SERI	also	provides	legal	assistance	to	the	families	of	miners	killed	
by	police	at	Marikana	mine	in	2012.	




neoliberal	 framework	 in	 which	 it	 operates	 exacerbates	 this.	 The	 opti‐
mism	 of	 the	 new	 ruling	 elite	 has	 been	 that	 its	 transformation	 project	
would	offer	lessons	worth	emulating	for	other	countries	undergoing	po‐
litical	 transformation.	 Establishing	 the	 lessons	 to	 be	 learned	 from	 the	
South	Africa	may	be	too	difficult	to	make	in	this	chapter;	however,	I	con‐
sidered	it	important	to	look	at	the	incorporation	of	rights	discourse	in	the	
constitution‐making	 of	 some	 of	 the	 recent	 state‐making	 and	 political	
transitions	in	selected	parts	of	Africa.		
In	 the	 Constitution	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Somaliland	 approved	 by	 referen‐
dum	in	May	2001,	a	series	of	articles	under	Part	Three	explicitly	organiz‐
es	the	spectrum	of	first‐	and	second‐generation	rights	relating	to:	Rights	
of	 the	 Individual,	 Fundamental	 Freedoms	 and	 the	Duties	of	 the	Citizen;	
Political,	 Economic,	 Social	 and	 electoral	 Rights;	 Freedom	 of	 Movement	
and	 Association;	 The	 Right	 to	 Life,	 Security	 of	 the	 Person,	 Respect	 for	
Reputations,	 and	 Crimes	 against	 Human	 Rights;	 The	 Right	 to	 Liberty,	
Guarantees	and	the	Conditions	of	Rights	and	Freedoms;	The	Right	to	Own	
Private	 Property;	 The	 Rights	 of	Women.	 The	 statement	 of	 the	 Political,	
Economic,	 Social	 and	 electoral	 Rights	 in	 Article	 22	 is,	 however,	 neither	





















	 34.	 (1)	 Every	 citizen	has	 the	 right	 to	 have	 access	 to	 decent	
housing.		
	 (2)	 The	 State	 shall	 formulate	 policies	 and	 take	 reasonable	
legislative	measures	within	 its	available	resources	 to	achieve	 the	
progressive	realization	of	these	rights.		
	 (3)	No	one	shall	be	evicted	from	his	or	her	lawfully	acquired	
home	 or	 have	 his	 or	 her	 home	 demolished	 save	 in	 accordance	
with	the	law.		
When	 looking	 at	 constitution‐making	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 “Arab	
Spring”	in	North,	locating	an	English	version	of	Morocco’s	draft	constitu‐
tional	proposals	of	June	2011	have	proved	difficult	and	more	attention	is	
given	 to	 those	of	Egypt	and	Libya.	A	 search	 for	 terms	such	as	 “right/s,”	
“housing,”	 “health,”	 “education,”	 and	 “water”	 in	 the	 2011	 Provisional	
Constitution	of	Egypt	reveals	minimal	commitment	to	the	notion,	that	is,	
the	emphasis	is	on	first‐generation	rights	of	association	and	equal	appli‐




cation	of	 law.	Article	14	can	be	 regarded	as	 referring	 to	housing	 rights,	
but	not	in	the	manner	anticipated:	









	 Article	 (7)	 Human	 rights	 and	 basic	 freedoms	 shall	 be	 re‐
spected	by	the	State.	The	state	shall	commit	itself	to	join	the	inter‐




	 Article	 (8)	The	State	 shall	 guarantee	 for	every	citizen	equal	
opportunities	and	shall	provide	an	appropriate	standard	of	living.	
The	State	shall	also	guarantee	the	right	of	work,	education,	medi‐






[D]iscussion	 of	 the	 right	 to	 health	 deserves	 to	 be	 featured	 in	 socio‐
political	 discourse,	 through	 conventional	 media,	 through	 social	 media,	
and	through	appropriate	government	forums”.87	
Also	prompted	by	the	Arab	uprisings,	Tunisia’s	constitutional	reform	has	
brought	 forth	 a	 new	 constitution	 which	 includes	 first‐	 and	 second‐




generation	 rights;	 however,	 concern	 remains	 that	 “[T]he	 majority	 of	
these	 rights	 is	 expressed	 in	 just	 a	 few	words	 each,	 and	 says	 very	 little	
about	 how	 these	 rights	 are	 to	 be	 exercised.”88	 Egypt’s	 revolution	 has	
brought	 forth	 a	 constitutional	 reform	 expanding	 the	 state’s	 obligations	
toward	 socioeconomic	 rights	 in	Article	 11,	 yet	 enthusiastic	 civil	 society	
engagement	with	 the	 constitution	 is	 skeptical	 about	 its	 vague	 formula‐
tions	and	the	privileging	of	private	sector	interests.89	




seeking	 socioeconomic	 justice	 in	 these	new	states	will	 go	 through	 their	
own	 trials	 of	mobilizing	 and	 litigating	 for	 the	 realization	 of	 rights,	 and	
likely	 push	 for	 fresh	 interpretations	 thereof	 by	 their	 respective	 courts	
and	state	organs	committed	to	their	realization.	An	upsurge	of	critiques	
of	Eurocentricism	and	rights	philosophy	needs	to	be	cognizant	that	while	
rights	philosophy	may	have	 facilitated	 the	emergence	of	 capitalism	and	
its	attendant	social	and	economic	inequalities,	rights	philosophy	evolved	
in	a	manner	to	safeguard	the	interests	of	capitalism’s	subordinate	classes,	




7 Conclusion  
Pessimism	prevails	about	whether	rights	discourse	can	effect	significant	
socioeconomic	 transformation	 in	 Africa.	 Contrarily,	 Africa’s	 new	 states	
and	 their	 respective	 constitutions	 reveal	 an	 imminent	 jettisoning	 of	
                                                 
88	 Al‐Ali	and	Romdhane,	Donia	(2014:	5).	
89	 Taha	(2013).	
90	 Wa	Mutua’s	oeuvre	in	this	 field	is	critical	of	the	Eurocentric	genesis	of	rights,	 its	
links	with	the	ideologies	of	liberalism	and	political	democracy,	emphasis	on	first‐
generation	 rights	 and	 realization	 of	 socioeconomic	 rights	 through	 free	 market	
institutions,	but	appreciates	that	rights	philosophy	can	be	adapted	and	beneficial	
to	Africa’s	social	and	economic	reconstruction.	See	wa	Mutua	(2009).	




rights	discourse	 is	unlikely.	The	critical	 legal	 studies	approach	of	North	
American	pedigree	 that	 underlaid	my	 research	 question	was	 a	 concern	
about	whether	rights	discourse	limits	the	aspirations	of	the	black	work‐
ing	 classes	 or	 is	 it	 significantly	 positively	 impacting	 the	 gradual	 trans‐
formation	from	the	apartheid	legacy	of	race	and	class	inequality	and	im‐
proving	the	socioeconomic	conditions	of	poorer	classes.	Succinctly,	does	
the	 experience	 about	 rights	 contestation	 as	 promised	 in	 South	 Africa’s	
“avant	garde”	constitution	hold	lessons	for	Africa’s	new	political	dispen‐
sations?	Clearly,	 it	 is	 a	 reformist	 strategy	 about	episodic	 and	piecemeal	
amelioration	of	the	poor’s	access	to	and	realization	of	housing,	food,	wa‐
ter,	 education,	 and	 health	 care	 services.	 Global	 hegemony	 of	 neoliberal	
policies	and	austerity	about	social	spending,	and	the	privatized	provision	
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of	 ideas	was	 so	powerful	 those	days,	 in	 the	midst	 of	 the	 “Arab	Spring,”	
that	we	couldn’t	 let	 them	go	to	waste.	From	that	background,	 this	book	
attempts	to	provide	a	diverse,	thorough,	and	grounded	discussion	capa‐
ble	 of	 contributing	 to	 the	 struggle	 against	 poverty	 across	 the	 Global	
South.	
Poverty	 is	 an	 intrinsically	 controversial	 concept	 and	process.	Even	 if	 in	









with	 and	 powered	 by	 agency.	 Concrete	 actors	 and	 institutions	 work	
through	 the	 social	 structure	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 (their)	wealth	 and	 at‐
tendant	positions	of	power	which	are	often	realized	together	with	(oth‐
er’s)	misery	and	marginalization.	But	this	does	not	mean	that	population	
which	 live	 in	 conditions	of	poverty	are	passive	bystanders.	On	 the	 con‐
trary,	 as	 the	chapters	 in	 this	book	show,	 “the	poor”	are	not	passive	ob‐
servers	waiting	to	be	helped	or	rendered	helpless	in	their	poverty.	They	
work	 hard	 and	 through	 concerted	 channels	 in	 order	 to	 organize	 them‐
selves	in	several	ways	to	confront	the	processes,	relationships,	and	social	
actors	that	have	impoverished	them.	They	not	only	dwell	in	poverty	but	








erty	 is	 without	 a	 doubt	 capitalist	 poverty,	 produced	 and	 expanded	 be‐
cause—not	 in	 spite—of	 the	 ever‐mounting	 exploitation	 of	 labor	 for	 its	
transformation	 into	 surplus‐value.	 Féliz’s	 contribution	 among	 others	
shows	how	the	dynamics	of	capitalist	social	reproduction	in	a	dependent	
setting	can	foreclose	an	all‐out	struggle	against	poverty.	
As	such,	poverty	 in	our	days	 is	also	 the	result	of	 the	works	of	capitalist	
and	capitalist‐oriented	states.	In	effect,	the	way	in	which	the	creation	and	
persistence	 of	 poverty	 has	 become	 tantamount	 with	 the	 dynamics	 of	
economic	development	should	force	us	as	both	researchers	and	citizens	
of	 the	newly	glocalized	world	 to	open	our	eyes	 to	an	apparently	simple	




persed	 soft	 and	 hard	 power,	 across	 the	 world.	 Thomas’	 reflections	 on	
South	Africa	provide	an	example	of	this	through	their	exploration	of	ne‐
oliberal	strategies	designed	to	foment	“development”	in	accord	with	ob‐
jectives,	directives,	 and	models	developed	 in	and	 imposed	by	American	
and	 European	 financial	 institutions.	 Public	 policies	 and	 development	
strategies	cannot	be	expiated	from	their	role	in	the	promotion	of	the	sub‐
stantive	processes	and	 interests	 that	perpetuate	 impoverishment	of	 the	
masses	 and	 hinder	 their	 agency,	 as	 Pérez‐Bustillo	 makes	 abundantly	
clear	in	his	contribution.	
As	the	different	chapters	make	explicit,	poverty	is	not	a	simple,	objective	
fact.	 The	 (re)production	 of	 poverty	 is	 also	 involved	 in	 the	 continuous	
construction	of	 the	concept	of	poverty	 in	distinct	and	often	overlapping	
sociocultural	spheres.	 In	a	sense,	 there	are	a	multitude	of	 forms	of	pov‐
erty,	 and	 as	 a	 relational	 concept,	 its	 definition	 depends	 on	 the	 side	we	
adopt,	 or	 in	which	we	are	 forced	 to	move,	 in	 each	and	every	particular	
relationship	 which	 our	 individual	 and	 collective	 lives	 encompass.	 The	
chapters	 in	 this	 book	 abound	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 possible	ways	 and	means	
through	which	we	as	both	observers	and	participants	may	 identify,	un‐
derstand,	and	potentially	rectify	the	lived	experiences	and	economic	exi‐
gencies	 of	 poverty	 throughout	 the	 Global	 South	 and	 its	 diasporas	
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throughout	other	parts	of	 the	world.	 In	particular,	 these	 intellectual	 in‐
terventions,	 based	 as	 they	 are	 upon	 the	 particular	 circumstances	 and	
thoughts	 of	 communities	 in	 these	 physical	 and	 cultural	 geographies,	
show	that	the	“top‐down,”	institutional,	academic,	definition	of	the	expe‐
rience	 of	 poverty,	 its	 causes	 and	 consequences	 do	 not	 necessarily	 (and	





production	of	poverty	 through	capitalist	networks	of	exchange	 is	at	 the	
same	time	the	propagation	and	strengthening	of	the	ideology	of	its	natu‐
ralization,	and	acceptance	on	a	massive	scale.	Together	with	these	appar‐
ently	 quantitative	 definitions	 of	 wealth	 and	 poverty	 it	 must	 be	 under‐
stood	that	the	rhetoric	and	study	of	poverty	is	embedded	within	and	con‐
tributes	to	the	constitution	of	a	particular	way	of	 looking	at	wealth.	De‐




volved	 in	 this	 debate.	 Not	 paradoxically,	 but	 probably	 enlightening	 to	
many,	 this	 books	 shows	 that	 while	 an	 idealized	 form	 of	 capitalism	 at‐
tempts	to	provide	a	universal	pattern	of	well‐being,	 the	realities	of	eco‐
nomic	 scarcity	and	alienation	have	 led,	 if	 not	outright	 forced,	people	 in	
different	 parts	 of	 the	 Global	 South	 to	 construct	 their	 own,	 often	 vastly	
divergent	idea	of	a	good	life.	Rosenberg’s	chapter,	for	example,	makes	use	
of	popular	culture	in	the	form	of	songs	from	Kenya	and	Jamaica	in	order	
to	 formulate	and	dispute	 the	validity	or	 invalidity	of	alternate	means	of	
generating	wealth	in	economically	disadvantaged	contexts.	
This	being	said,	poverty	is	not	just	a	subjective	feeling	or	perception.	The	
experience	 of	 capitalist	 impoverishment	 runs	 through	 people’s	 bodies	
and	minds,	 creating	 conditions	 that	 violently	 limit	 their	 possibilities	 of	
happiness	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 imagine	 and	 to	 therefore	 work	 toward	
building	a	future	of	actual	freedom	for	themselves	as	well	as	their	fami‐
lies	and	communities	on	a	variety	of	levels.		




tal	 attempts	 to	build	 a	world	or	bend	 it	 to	 its	 own	 image,	 those	people	
who	are	caught	up	in	these	complex	processes	strive	to	build	something	








tribute	 to	 this	 in	ways	 that	 so	many	 “anti‐poverty	 strategies”	 from	 top‐
notch	institutions,	be	them	national	or	transnational,	have	not.	
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